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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Bernie R. Burrus* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF LIMITATION 
A. The Historical Setting 
The government of the United States, as well as those of its 
constituent subdivisions, is predicated upon the principle of limi-
tation.1 Neither birth nor divine right, neither deified economic 
law nor revolutionary usurpation, serves to legitimate the status 
and authority of our governing mechanism. Such is derived, rath-
er, from a document of concession-the Federal Constitution.2 
Therein, the people, as the source of sovereignty, created their 
government as an instrument or agent to do, as Abraham Lincoln 
phrased it, "what they could not do so well for themselves."3 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown University; formerly Legis-
lative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan, 
1960-62. LL.B., N.Y.U., 1960; M.P.A., Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public & International Affairs, Princeton University, 1957; B.S., Uni-
versity of Houston, 1955. 
1. The limitation is both of philosophical orientation, i.e., of an overrid-
ing "higher law" or natural law background [ see generally Corwin, 
"The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," 42 
Harv. L. Rev. 149-85, 365-409 (1928-29)], and a reflection of the 
positive law as devised. The clear language of the Constitution con-
cerning, for example, "enumerated powers" and "reserved rights" 
seems support enough on the latter point, although reference may be 
made to The Federalist Nos. XLIV - LI (Dawson ed. 1863). See also 
Pound, "Law and Federal Government," in Federalism as a Demo-
cratic Process 27 (1942). 
2. Such would appear manifest from the very Preamble to our Federal 
Constitution: 11 We the people of the United States ... establish this 
Constitution .... " See also the language of Mccullogh v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816); and Chisholm, Ex'r. v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793). 
3. 2 Lincoln, Complete Works of Lincoln 183 (Nicholay & Hay ed. 1905). 
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The scope of the agency, however, was to be rigidly con-
fined. The forefathers had witnessed the excesses of absolutism, 
both of the privileged few4 and of the deprived many,5 and sought 
to preclude the eventuality in the new nation of Acton's dictum 
that "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."6 
Thus, power was trifurcated in accord with the ancient Aristote-
lian "functions of government. " 7 In separating legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial functions by means of a tripartite governing 
body, each insulated against encroachment by any other, yet each 
possessing certain checks in regard to one another, the framers 
sought to effect a balanced government, devoid of absolutism 
either of the executive or of the parliamentary type.8 Further, 
the powers of each branch were specifically enumerated, and all 
4. See generally Hicks & Mowry, A Short History of American Democ-
racy 3-87 (2d ed. 1956). Such considerations impinged frequently 
upon the framers' discussions. See, in this regard, the remarks of 
Hamilton, e.g., "If government in the hands of the few, they will tyr-
ranize over the many," in 1 Farrand, The Record oithe Federal 
Convention 308-10 (rev. ed. 1937). 
5. See letter of General Knox to Washington, printed in Hofstadter, The 
American Political Tradition 3-4 (rev. ed. 1955). Hamilton com-
mented on the locus of governmental power: "If ( in] the hands of 
the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the 
hands of both; and they should be separated." 1 Farrand, supra note 
4, at 308. The fear of the excesses of popular democracy, i.e., the 
"tyranny of the majority," was, as is well known, a motivating enigma 
of the framers in constructing the new government. E.g., The Fed-
eralist No. LVII, supra note 1. This theme runs throughout DeTocque-
ville, Democracy in America (Bowen ed. 1956). 
6. Acton, Letter to Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887 (Letter now at 
Cambridge University). 
7. Politics, Book IV, ch. 14 (Jowett trans. 1888). For a discussion, in-
cluding citations, of the debate over Aristotle's parentage of this 
doctrine, see Winters, State Constitutional Limitations on Solutions 
of Metropolitan Area Problems 110-12 (1961). It was, of course, 
Montesquieu who forged the analytic functionalism of Aristotle into a 
viable, comprehensive theory of political philosophy, ingeniously com-
bining both sound government and individual freedom. See Vol. I of 
his Spirit of Laws Bk. XI, ch. VI, 151-61 (Nugent trans. 1873). The 
framers were explicit in acknowledging their debt. See The Federal-
ist No. XLVII, supra note 1. See generally Spurlin, Montesquieu in 
America, 1760-1801 (1940). 
8. See particularly The Federalist No. XLVI, supra note 1. See also 
Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution 139-40 (1922); and 
Sharp, "The Classical American Doctrine of 'The Separation of Pow-
ers,'" 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1935). As Jefferson wrote in his 
autobiography: "It is not by the consolidation, or concentration of 
powers, but by their distribution that good government is effected." 
Quoted in Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 29. 
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powers not so designated were "reserved to the States respective-
ly, or to the people."9 Finally, so as to leave no doubt as to the 
limited nature of the agency prescribed, the Bill of Rights was 
designed as a necessary complement to popular sovereignty, or 
majority rule.IO By this means, the framers sought to guarantee 
against certain types of governmental activity, or at the least to 
provide a certain set of procedures required of government in 
effectuating its decisions of policy. 
This concept of limitation, the skeleton upon which the flesh 
of our body politic was erected, proved quite compatible with the 
actualities of the early days of our federal republic. Two great 
oceans insulated the infant nation against the contingency of for-
eign attack and precluded the necessity of a central government 
of a strength sufficient to sustain a more-or-less permanent mo-
bilization for its national defense.11 The great frontier provided 
a safety-valve for urban discontent, affording opportunity to es-
cape the stratification of the older societies of the Eastern Sea-
board.12 No need was thus evinced for supplicating government 
to assuage the hunger pains and apotheosize the aspirations of 
the "have-nots." Indeed, our very national image, the frontiers-
man-proud and self-reliant, militated against the demand that 
government become a provider of social services.13 
But times change, and with them the conditions out of which 
are derived the political and social theories designed for their 
rationalization and service. Such theories, however, institutional-
ized over time, assume an existence independent of the now-dis-
appeared conditions upon which they were structured. Exhibiting 
a tenacity to life as formidable as any attributed by the psychol-
ogists to man himself, the old bottles of institutionalized theory 
9. U.S. Const. amend X. See The Federalist Nos. XLIV, XLV, supra 
note 1. See generally Briggs, "States Rights," 10 Iowa L. Bull. 297 
(1925). 
10. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 
3-4 (1955). See generally Commager, Majority Rule and Minority 
Rights (1943). 
11. In fact, the provision of "standing armies" was specifically dis-
claimed by the framers as being within the power of the Federal 
Government. See The Federalist No. XXIV, supra note 1. Cf. 
Mcilwain, "The Historical Background of Federal Government," in 
Federalism as a Democratic Process, supra note 1, at 37-39. 
12. See generally Turner, The Frontier in American History (1921); and 
Hicks & Mowry, supra note 4, at 534-37. 
13. In addition to the Turner book cited supra note 12, see his Rise of 
the New West, 1819-29 (1906), and The United States, 1830-50 (1935). 
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endeavor desperately to contain the new wine of new social con-
ditions.14 
Toynbee's allegory is indeed apropos of the importunate 
juncture confronting this nation today. In this age of thermo-nu-
clear capability, the prophylactic significance of the great oceans 
has receded in military consequence to that of a dry stream.15 
No longer may we heed the parting admonition of President Wash-
ington to "avoid entangling alliances.1116 No longer may we extol 
the wisdom of President Jefferson, who saw in our very associa-
tion with the European powers and in emulation of their urban 
mode of life the seeds of the revolutions and wars which had 
plagued that continent.I 7 Indeed, the minuteman who forged his 
plowshare into a musket for employment at Lexington and Con-
cord has given way to a new Minuteman, reminiscent of its earl-
ier counterpart in name only. This missile, product of the com-
plex planning and fantastic budgets requisite to national defense 
in this century, symbolizes our accelerating pace towards a Gar-
rison state. 
The great frontier has long since vanished.18 Where buffalo 
once roamed and the good black dirt craved by hardy souls once 
14. Cf. Nichols, "Federalism versus Democracy," in Federalism as a 
Democratic Process, supra note 1, at 50-51. 
15. Snyder & Furniss, American Foreign Policy 54-59 (1955). See gen-
erally Lippmann, Isolation and Alliance (1952). 
16. See his Farewell Address, reprinted in 13 Writings of George Wash-
ington 277 (Ford ed. 1889). 
17. See Jefferson's letter to President Monroe, October'24, 1823, in The 
Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 708-10 (Koch & 
Peden ed. 1944). Illustrative of the frequent aspersions which Jef-
ferson cast upon city-life is the following: "I think our governments 
will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they remain 
chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant 
lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another 
in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Eu-
rope." Quoted in Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 27 n.3. 
18. In addition to the well-known "Turner Thesis" [ see sources cited in 
notes 12 & 13 supra) respecting the significance of the decline of the 
frontier in American history, reference should be made to President-
elect Roosevelt's famous Commonwealth speech in San Francisco in 
1932. He said, inter alia: " [ E] quality of opportunity as we have 
known it no longer exists. Our industrial plant is built; the problem 
just now is whether under existing conditions it is not overbuilt. Our 
last frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically 
no more free land. More than half of our people do not live on the 
farms or on lands and cannot derive a living by cultivating their own 
property. There is no safety valve in the form of a Western prairie 
to which those thrown out of work by the Eastern economic machines 
can go for a new start. . . . We are now providing a drab living for 
our .•. people." Quoted in Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 329-30. 
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abounded, there now sprawl vast urban-industrial complexes. 
Man's self-reliance, buttressed by vast expanses of unclaimed 
land and his own strong back, has given way to reliance upon 
impersonal forces over which he has no control.19 The inevitable 
frustrations ensuing from compelled and accelerating propinquity 
with his fellow man has entailed increasing demands upon govern-
ment to right the wrongs, to mitigate the inequities, imagined or 
real, which he formerly resolved by merely moving on. The aug-
mentation of governmental activity thus occasioned, symptomizes 
our current plunge towards a Service State. 
The new wine swells in its fermentation, threatening to 
burst the bottles which contain it. This, indeed, is a critical 
question of our times. Can our time-honored precepts of a free 
people and limited government persist in the path of the twin as-
sault of international involvement and mass demands precipitated 
by the new conditions of this century? 
B. In Local Perspective 
The magnitude of the question posed may very well obscure, 
by sheer weight of its national dimensions, cognate developments 
at the local level. Yet as a forest fire necessarily destroys in-
dividual trees as well as the woodlands which they compose, so 
do the new conditions, though national in scope, entail conse-
quences to communities of less than national breadth. Thus, the 
current applicability of the theoretical grease serving to lubri-
cate and render operative the various vehicles of local govern-
ment is, in this regard, as deserving of serious inquiry and ap-
praisal as is its more customary consideration at the national 
level. 
In this connection, an additional facet of the concept of lim-
itation as employed by the framers should be noted-i.e., the fed-
eral structure, itself. By the nation-state-city division, govern-
mental power was trisected vertically as well as horizontally and 
an additional bulwark erected in the effort to protect against the 
eventuality of absolutism.2° Currently, however, and incidental to 
19. See generally Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, 1878-1898 (1933). 
20. See generally Pound, supra note 1. It is significant that although the 
supremacy of the states under the Articles of Confederation gave way to 
the supremacy of federal law under article VI, paragraph 2 of the new 
Constitution, the states were far from being eviscerated under the new 
system. See The Federalist Nos. XLIV-XLV, supra note 1, The extent 
of their reserved power was made explicit by the ninth, tenth, and 
eleventh amendments to the Constitution. See Douglas, A Living Bill 
of Rights 17-18 (1961); and Reed, "Introduction to Symposium on 
Federal-State Relations," 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 991-93 (1959), for a 
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the prevailing trends in the direction of the so-called Gari'ison 
and Service State, we hear plaints of encroachment by the federal 
government upon the states' traditional spheres of authority,21 
The augmentation of national power and the atrophy of states 
rights, which is said to be a natural consequence thereof, has 
occasioned a still additional slogan of opprobrium. Thus, the op-
ponents of the alleged vertical realignment of powers lament that 
our government is rapidly becoming a Centralized State. 
It does not follow, however, from the increased activity of 
government at the national level that the respective spheres of 
authority and activity by the lesser governing units are thereby 
contracted. The point is, and this is overlooked by many, author-
ity itself has greatly expanded. Hence, from the proposition that 
the federal government's slice is much larger now in absolute 
terms, it does not follow that the state and local governments' 
relative shares are that much less. In fact, in absolute terms, 
they, just as much as the federal government, have assumed func-
tions and prerogatives in proportions inconceivable to our fore-
fathers.22 
The reasons for the augmentation of local governmental ac-
tivity, as well as that of the states, resemble those at the nation-
al level. Self-defense, effected nationally in the form of military 
capability and the various other contrivances addressed to the 
protection of our borders against external aggression, operates 
locally through the police power and is directed to the protection 
of health, welfare, and morals internal to the community 
Footnote pontinued 
statement of the necessity and value of state verility and activity in 
these crucial times. On the present day responsibilities of the states 
to our governmental structure, see McNamera, "The Challenge of a 
Federal-State Partnership," Crihfield & Smothers, "The States in 
the Federal System," and Dwinell, "State Responsibility in a Federal 
System," appearing respectively at 996-1010, 1018-36, and
0 
1037-44 of 
34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. (1959). 
21. The animadversions in this regard are legion. E.g., the congression-
al debate on unemployment compensation, appearing in 105 Cong. Rec. 
4644-72 (1959). See also remarks of ex-President Eisenhower before 
the Michigan Constitutional Convention, reported in N .Y. Times, Dec. 
14, 1961, p. C33, col. 3. Contra, Anderson, The Nation and the States, 
Rivals or Partners (1955). 
22. Rottschaefer, The Constitution and Socio-Economic Change 96-144 
(1948); Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United 
States 44 (1946); "The States and the American Federal System," 31 
State Govt. 67 (1958); and Dwinell, supra note 20, at 1039-40. 
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served.23 The provision. of services, illustrated at the national 
level by. Social Security, has, of course, numerous local counter-
parts. Illustrative are the provision of schools, hospitals, and 
sewage disposal. 
The point is that many of the same conditions occasioning 
demands upon the federal government are operative locally as 
well, in some cases more so. The swelling metropolitan areas-
characteristic of our contemporary urban mode of life24-with 
their consequent crowds and cramped living quarters, spawn con-
flicts and problems on a scale unimaginable in the nineteenth 
century. Disease was not much of a problem to farm families 
isolated by many miles from an afflicted neighbor, but what if 
infectious calamity strikes a multi-unit apartment house in mod-
ern day New York City? The aged constituted little problem in 
the early days of our republic. Assuming Grandfather was able 
to survive the high mortality rates of those times, there was al-
ways room on the farm for him to live and always chores for 
him to do to make him feel useful. But what happens to this 
serene picture with the protraction of life expectancy, the specter 
of compulsory retirement, and his children crammed into two or 
three room flats ?25 
The result is that threats to internal peace and well-being 
as well as local needs and social requirements have generated 
demands upon local governments just as the threat of external 
aggression and mass unemployment have occasioned similar so-
licitousness nationally. Indeed, local governments have become 
miniature monoliths of authority and activity in their own rights.26 
23. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341 (1906); 
City of Albany v. Anthony, 262 App. Div. 401, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 963 
(1941). 
24. See generally The Exploding Metropolis (1958), published l:)y the edi-
tors of Fortune. See also Adrian, Governing Urban America 1-29 
(1955); and The States and the Metropolitan Problem 3-22 (1956), 
published by the Council of State Governments. 
25. And, of course, this group is, in the main, financially unable prop-
erly to care for itself, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare estimating that "three-fifths of all persons aged 65 and over 
had less than $1,000 in money income in 1958." Social Security Bul-
letin, June 1959, p. 8. 
26. See Report of the Committee on State-Local Relations, published by 
the Council of State Governments 1-8 (1946). For a discussion of 
the plethora of services currently afforded and restrictions currently 
imposed, see MacCorkle, American Municipal Government and Ad-
ministration 466-573 (1948). But see Hearings on Federal-State-
Local Relations, Federal Grants-in-Aid, H.R. No. 2533, Committee 
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Transferring attention now from the realm of needs and 
demands to that of theory, it is significant that our political 
models at the national level have been fashioned to the service 
of our state and local governments as well. At least is this true 
theoretically, as is revealed by even cursory perusal of state 
constitutions and legislation, in addition to city charters and ordi-
nances and especially the court decisions endeavoring to construe 
them. Such sources are replete with references to popular sov-
ereignty ,27 enumerated powers,28 the separation of powers,29 
checks and balances,30 and of certain prohibitions or actions 
government is constrained to undertake or can do so only in the 
framework of specified procedural safeguards guaranteed to the 
populace31-in a word, the very epitome of the concept of limited 
government. 
Footnote continued 
on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 47 (1958), for a 
statement of the increasing inability of local governments adequately 
to cope with such local problems. See Connery & Leach, The Fed-
eral Government and Metropolitan Areas (1960); and Hutchison, Met-
ropolitan Area Problems: The Role of the Federal Government 
(1961), for a discussion of the efforts of the Federal Government to 
mitigate the consequences of state-local impotency in this regard. 
27. Cf. the language of the court in City of Covington v. Reagan, 284 
S.W. 2d 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955). 
28. E.g., Jayhawk Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Topeka, 176 Kan. 517, 
271 P .2d 769 (1954), which held the city of Topeka to be without stat-
utory authority to obligate itself to extend water mains into a sub-
division until certain statutory requirements had been met. 
29. The Federal Constitution does not require the several states to ob-
serve in their internal organization the limitations imposed by the 
separation of powers doctrine. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Ver-
mont, 207 U.S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178 (1908). Most states however, con-
trary to the federal government, explicitly provide in their constitu-
tions for such separation. E.g., Tex. Const. art. II, § 1: "The pow-
ers of the government of the State of Texas shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a sep-
arate body of magistracy, to wit: Those who are Legislative to one; 
those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial 
to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of 
these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to 
either of the others .... 11 
30. Anderson & Weidner, State and Local Government 306-07 (1951). 
31. E.g., Wis. Stats. ch. 227, § 227.09 (1951), which requires, in regard 
to contested administrative proceedings, a 11 full, fair, public hearing 
after reasonable notice." And, of course, the state constitutions are 
uniform in containing a Bill of Rights, generally in the very first 
article, reserving, thereby, to the people of an area of activity which 
the state might not transgress. E.g., N.Y. Const. art. I. 
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Tangentially, it should be noted that in our political order 
we emphasize grassroots democracy .32 Popular government is 
incapable of survival in the absence of an enlightened, responsi-
ble populace. And the latter is, of course, germinated and nur-
tured at the local level, where everyday wants and needs are 
most acute, where demands for political activity or inactivity are 
most direct and their effects are most felt. If the system mis-
carries here, may we really expect it to achieve viability and 
vitality in the more remote national context ?33 
Hence, if the problem of a dichotomy between political theo-
ry and new conditions persists in the proportions suggested, it 
would seem particularly appropriate of study at the local level, at 
the grassroots. Before, however, foraging with some considera-
ble effort among the grassroots of our government, consideration 
should be given to the concept of limitation at the national level. 
C. An Insight into Current Meaning 
1. Preventing Absolutism 
The needs and demands of modern society inexorably impel 
big government; and, as suggested above, this is as true at the 
local and state levels as at the national. The question is whether 
the continued growth of governmental activity necessarily means 
the abandonment of the concept of limitation. Phrased in this 
manner, the answer would seem to depend upon what limited gov-
ernment actually means. If the meaning be that "that government 
governs best which governs least, "34 then expanded activity would, 
of course, require elimination of the limitation concept. If, how-
ever, the meaning be procedural, limiting the method rather than 
the quantity of governmental activity, then expansion of the gov-
ernment's role in society should not read limitation out of our 
governmental framework. 
The answer as to which meaning should prevail, I would 
submit, is to be gleaned from that root idea of the progenitors 
of our government, the prevention of absolutism either of the few 
32. For a discussion of the various theories of local self-government 
that have held currency in this country, see Adrian, supra note 24, 
at 48-66. 
33, MacCorkle, supra note 26, at 19. 
34. This view is, of course, not without devotees today. E.g., Goldwater, 
The Conscience of a Conservative (1960). 
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or of the many.35 Indeed, the framers were well aware of the 
tyranny of both types of absolutism, as the excesses of the pre-
1789 French aristocracy as well as of the unbridled democracy 
of the revolutionary period were close at hand. And, of course, 
on the philosophical plane, the prevention of absolutism was the 
only means of accomplishing the desideratum of maximum self-
assertion and freedom of the individual.36 
2. The Mission of Administrative Law 
As theoretically traumatic as it may seem to some, it is 
nevertheless true that government may need to be active to pre-
vent absolutism. How else, to give just two examples, was the 
aristocracy of wealth-the unscrupulous robber bal'onry37 of the 
turn of the century-to be dealth with; and, how else was the 
mob-rule of depression panic38 to be resolved absent outright po-
litical anarchy and social anomie? On the other side of the same 
coin, increased governmental activity appears requisite to secure 
the very maximum self-assertion and freedom of the individual 
35. See generally Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 3-17. Primary source 
material is available in the first volume of John Adams' Defence of 
the Constitutions of the Government of the United States of America, 
appearing in Volume IV of his Works (Adams ed. 1851). Therein, 
Adams averred that aristocracy and democracy should be made to 
neutralize each other. To that end, each element was to be given 
its own house of the legislature, and over both houses should reign 
a strong chief executive armed with the veto power. The split as-
sembly would thus contain within itself an organic check and would, 
under the governance of the executive and the influence of an inde-
pendent judiciary, be capable of self-control. The inevitable tendency 
of the few and the many-the rich and the poor-to plunder each other 
would thus, in Adams' thesis, be kept in hand. This, of course, was 
the design of our Constitution. See generally Beard, An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913). 
36. Douglas, supra note 20, at 17. 
37. The term is taken from Josephson, The Robber Barons (1934). The 
antitrust laws and securities regulation represent but two of the nu-
merous areas in which government currently operates to check the 
"economic royalists" or "malefactors of wealth" characteristic of 
the times of which Josephson wrote. See generally Weissman, The 
New Wall Street (1939). 
38. On the seriousness of the situation and the steps taken by way of 
amelioration, see generally Hacker, American Problems of Today 
(1938); Mitchell, Depression Decade (1947); Rauch, History of the 
New Deal, 1933-38 (1944); and Seldes, The Years of the Locust 
(1933). 
INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF LIMITATION 11 
traditionally associated with weak government.39 The right of 
workers to organize for the promotion of their common interests 
guaranteed py the Wagner Act40 and the enforcement of civil 
rights following from Brown v. Board of Education41 and the im-
plementing decisions and statutes which succeeded it, constitute 
but two of the many activities undertaken by government to se-
cure the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution but impossible 
of consummation absent such governmental essays.42 Thus, posi-
tive government proves necessary in both meeting the actualities 
of current needs and demands and in realizing the principal ob-
jectives of the framers in their attempts to deter absolutism and 
achieve the maximum self-assertion and freedom of the individual. 
But big or active government does not mean unrestrained 
government.43 Indeed, it is precisely the vigorous and monolithic 
governing mechanism that is in most need of restraint.44 Other-
wise, the creation of man intended to serve his needs becomes a 
Frankenstein monster, threatening his very existence as a free, 
assertive being. To forestall the eventuality of such a contingency 
is the task of administrative law.45 By this means, and the due 
39. Illustrative of the numerous current apologias of "positive govern-
ment" is McCarthy, Frontiers in American Democracy (1960). 
40. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U .S.C.A. § 151 et~. 
41. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
42. It was, of course, the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt which first 
undertook, in this country, the concept of "positive" government on a 
grand scale. See Schlesinger, The New Deal in Action, 1933-39 
(1940). For a contemporary statement, see McCarthy, supra note 39, 
43. See generally Duguit, Law in the Modern State 32-67 (1919). 
44. 1n· this age of necessary bigness, fear of the abuse of its consequent 
incidence of power has been the subject of considerable thought and 
writings. Illustrative are Galbraith, American Capitalism-The Con-
cept of Countervailing Power (1952); and Croly, The Promise of 
American Life (1909). 
45. Such is not meant to suggest that administrative law is the individu-
al's sole insulation in this regard, nor that its provision is the only 
task of this body of the law. Indeed, so long as free elections con-
tinue to characterize our political process, the individual will pos-
sess a strong weapon in his own defense. And the facilitation of 
governmental objectives, non-suited to judicial resolution, constitute 
a principal contribution of the administrative mechanism. Neverthe-
less, the averment in the text is thought justified, especially in the 
light of the compelling comment of Justice Douglas: "Unless we 
make the requirements for administrative action strict and demand-
ing, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a 
monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion. Ab-
solute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of 
liberty." New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884, 72 S. Ct. 
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process clauses of our federal and state constitutions, we have 
sought to limit governmental excesses and thereby to insulate the 
individual from the arbitrary intrusions of an impersonal govern-
ment. This, after all, is the objective from the perspective of 
individual safeguards. Big or active government is not the evil; 
rather the danger persists in arbitrary or capricious government 
regardless of size. Smaller government poses less of a problem 
in this regard than big government, but with the· necessity of the 
latter it becomes all the more imperative to achieve the limita-
tion in a different manner. 
Footnote continued 
152, 153 (1951) (dissenting opinion). See also United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644, 70 S. Ct. 357, 364-65 (1950); Schwartz, 
"Administrative Justice and its Place in the Legal Order," 30 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390, 1390-94 (1955); and Frankfurter, Foreword, 41 
Colum. L. Rev. 585, 586 (1941). 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FEDERAL AND STATE 
A. Federal Law 
1. Threshold Problems 
In describing, albeit very generally, the principal protec-
tions a<:corded to the individual under the aegis of administrative 
law, at least two rather basic problems are encountered at the 
outset. To begin with, it is certainly arguable that the limitation 
doctrine itself is at the least jeopardized, if not outright decimated, 
by the ever-augmenting proliferation of the administrative organ-
ism. The concentration of functions in a single agency-whic;:h 
makes its own rules, conducts its own investigations, and prose-
cutes as well as judges and sentences violators of such self-de-
termined proscriptions46-is anything but consonant with tradi-
tional notions of the separation of powers.47 Indeed, such appar-
ent antinomy constituted a principal ground for the early judicial 
assaults upon this "headless fourth branch"48 of our government,49 
and remains as a source of continuing agitation for reform.50 
46. The leading defense of the concentration of powers in the adminis-
trative process appears in Landis, The Administrative Process 
(1938). Illustrative of the criticisms such proposed combination have 
occasioned is Schwartz, "The Administrative Agency in Historical 
Perspective," 36 Ind. L.J. 263 (1961). See also in this regard FTC 
v. Klesner, 280 U .s. 19, 25, 50 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1929); In re Larsen, 17 
N.J. Super. 564, 574, 86 A. 2d 430, 435 (1952) (concurring opinion); 
and Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 55 (1941). 
47. Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and its Pres-
ent-Day Significance, especially 50-95 (1953). 
48. Description employed by the President's Committee on Administra-
tive Management 32 (1937), and ridiculed in Landis, supra note 46, 
at 49. 
49. E.g., A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
55 S. Ct. 837 (1935). See generally Schwartz, Introduction to Ameri-
can Administrative Law ch. 2 (1958). Cf. Springer v. Government of 
the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48S. Ct. 480 (1928); and Klein 
v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N.W. 457 (1923). 
50. E.g., Recommendation No. 51 of the Report of the Congress on Le-
gal Services and Procedure (1955), of the Hoover Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. See also 
Jaffee, "Basic Issues: An Analysis," 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1272, 1278-89 
(1955). 
13 
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Contradiction, however, is a matter of context in political 
theory no less than in the physical sciences. Just as the com-
bination of chemical ingredients may either blend nicely or erupt 
violently depending upon the solvent employed, so do political de-
vices prove compatible or disruptive depending upon the philo-
sophical perspective in which they interact. 
The concentration of functions so characteristic of the ad-
ministrative mechanism is undoubtedly at loggerheads with the 
separation doctrine if the latter itself be understood to constitute 
the elan vital of our governing structure. If, however, the doc-
trine be viewed rather as a means of achieving a greater goal 
(as opposed to identification with the pristine objective itself), 
then, from the broader perspective of seeking to limit absolutism 
and secure maximum individual self-assertion, the contradiction 
disintegrates. While in most instances the doctrine serves faith-
fully the broader objective enunciated, in others, conditions so 
operate as to require disperate means. In order that the latter 
means or devices, however, lacking the enforced disipline of tri-
furcated authority, do not feed the engines of absolute and im-
personal power, still other checks, more amenable to the cir-
cumstances, must be fashioned. Thus, the administrative agency, 
devised to cope with new conditions, yet requiring for its proper 
exercise the excision of traditional safeguards,51 impels, all the 
more, limitation of a different sort. To fill the chasm, by con-
taining administrative power within the banks of fair procedure,52 
is the aspiration of administrative law. 
A second problem, at least ostensibly so, is evidenced by 
the fact that the limitation in this regard is, for the most part, 
imposed by the government upon itself. Self-limitation through 
. statutory self-proscription is quite a different matter from the 
limitation contained in constitutional confinement to the exercise 
solely of enumerated powers.53 Indeed, what greater opportunity 
for arbitrary action could be imagined than when the principal 
check upon its exercise is its own self-restraint? 
In this regard, however, it must be remembered that under 
our system governmental power is not concentrated but, on the 
51. Cf. Pound, Administrative Law 26 (1942). See generally Landis. 
supra note 46. 
52. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 45. 
53. Cf. Language of the court in Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., 
160 F. 2d 259, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The annals of failure are re-
plete with such endeavors at self-restraint, or self-regulation. By 
way of illustration, the NIRA experience of the early Roosevelt Ad-
ministration readily comes to mind. See, in this regard, Johnson, 
The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth (1935). 
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contrary, is widely diffused. Whereas self-restraint hardly proves 
sufficient as a brake to the heavy foot of the absolute monarch, 
restraint in the form of one branch or department of government 
serving to check an entirely different branch or department is 
something else again. Legislative determination of agency juris-
diction and function,5 4 together with judicial review of activities 
conducted pursuant thereto,55 render the hypothesized self-re-
straint, at least under our system, not at all incompatible with 
the limitation idea. Hence the separation doctrine is not alto-
gether eviscerated by the administrative process. External checks 
by the other branches continue to operate on the agencies, though 
concentration of functions is the rule internally. 
In addition to the broader framework of legislative and judicial 
oversight, specific doctrines of administrative law have evolved. 
Of comparatively recent vintage,56 the procedural safeguards thus 
embodied constitute the very essence of the individual's insula-
tion against arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. Such is 
not, of course, to suggest an ideal situation. Administrative law, 
even at the federal level, is still in the developmental stages, as 
criticisms and recommendations for modification and reform con-
tinue to abound in both officiaI57 and nonofficiaI58 sources. 
54. The agency canhot act without the confines of congressionally de-
clared intent, and the authority delegated is itself subject to the re-
quirement of reasonably precise standards. Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935). 
55. Black, The People and the Court 39-54 (1960). 
56. Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 3 (1951). In fact, 
comprehensiveness of the administrative guarantees had to await the 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 stat. 237, 
5 U .S.C. §1001. The best textual treatment of this act is still 
Schwartz, "The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation," 29 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1173 (1954). For a capsule presentation of the Act by 
Section No., together with the various State Acts and the Model Act 
based upon it, see Appendices 1-IIl infra. · 
57. E.g., the reports of the Committee on Legislative Oversight, The 
Hoover Commission and that of Mr. Landis. Special Subcommittee 
on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Independent Regulatory Commissions, H.R. Rep. 
No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959); Commission on Organization 
of the Executive Branch of the Government, Report on Legal Serv-
ices and Procedure (1955); and Report on Regulatory Agencies to 
the President-Elect (1960) [published as a committee print by the 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) .] , com-
prehensively reviewed in McFarland, 11 Landis' Report: The Voice of 
One Crying in the Wilderness," 47 Va. L. Rev. 373 (1961). 
58. E.g., ABA Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure, Re-
port, 81 A.B.A. Rep. 491 (1956); Hector, "Problems of the CAB and 
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Nevertheless, considerable headway has been achieved, which jus-
tifies elaborating, at least in broad outline, the •progress that has 
been made. 
2. Definition; A Basic Distinction 
As a starting point to such inquiry, Professor Cooper's def-
inition would appear particularly salutary in both demarcating 
relevant subject-matter and in affording a modus operandi for 
present discussion. In his words: 
The subject is generally thought to embrace the activities of 
those administrative agencies which, either by adjudiciating 
judicial questions or by prescribing general rules and stand-
ards of conduct, act as little courts or little legislatures in 
regulating individual activities. It includes those aspects of 
constitutional law which pertain to limitations on the powers 
of such agencies, and embraces as well questions of prac-
tice and procedure before such agencies, and also questions 
relating to judicial review of the determinations and orders 
of such agencies,59 
Constitutional limitations, rules of practice and procedure, and 
judicial review-administrative law's focal categories as enunci-
ated above-, each possesses its own peculiar faculties for de-
limiting the exercise of absolute power. 
Before, however, proceeding to consider in turn the safe-
guards afforded by each category, a basic distinction of adminis-
trative law should be noted. As suggested in the foregoing defi-
nition, two principal functions are performed by agencies: adjudi-
cation and rule-making.60 The distinction is a crucial one from 
the vantage of private rights; for the whole structure of individ-
ual interaction with the administrative process, for example, the 
availability of a formal hearing,61 is dependent upon the classifi-
cation. 
Owing to its importance, many attempts have been made by 
way of differentiation. Illustratively, Mr. Dickinson observed: 
Footnote continued 
the Independent Regulatory Commissions," 69 Yale L.J. 931 (1960); 
and Schwartz, supra note 46. 
59. Cooper, supra note 56, at 4. 
60. Note the distinctions indicated in §§ 4 (Rule-making) and 5 (Adjudi-
cation) in the AP A. 
61. Infra notes 91-94, and accompanying text. 
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What distinguishes legislation ( rule-making] from ad-
judication is that the former affects the rights of individuals 
in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding 
before the legal position of any particular individual will be 
definitely touched by it; while adjudication operates con-
cretely upon individuals in their individual capacity.62 
17 
Accordingly, where agency action is particularized, e.g., in 
the grant or revocation of licenses,63 its essentially adjudicative 
character should command more·-or-less judicialized procedure.64 
As the Supreme Court said with regard to agency discretion in a 
federal licensing case: 
[ TJ his must be construed to mean the exercise of a dis-
cretion to be exercised after fair investigation, with such a 
notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the applicant 
as would constitute due process.65 
On the other hand, generalized action, e.g.:; the promulgation of a 
tax ruling or regulation,66 while having particular effects upon 
those who must pay, is less demanding of procedural safeguards 
to individual interests.67 In its concern with policy and its pure-
ly practical aspect of collecting necessary public revenues "with-
out the interruptions and delays that might be caused by elaborate 
procedure of individual notice and lengthy hearings on questions 
of valuation,"68 formal adjudicative techniques are forsaken. 
62. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 21 
(1959). According to Justice Holmes, the distinction was as follows: 
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as 
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already 
to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other 
hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making 
a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those 
subject to its power." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 
210, 226, 29 S. Ct. 67, 69 (1908). 
63. Se'e generally Forkosch, Administrative Law 143-76 (1956). 
64. E.g., Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 s. Ct. 752 
(1957). See also § 9(b) of the APA; and Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 383 
(1961). State law is generally contra. Infra notes 153-54, and ac-
companying text. 
65. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123, 
46 S. Ct. 215, 217 (1926). 
66. See generally Cooper, supra note 56, at 59-62. 
67. Under the APA, notice and limited participation rights are available, 
however, in rule-making cases. Infra notes 122-24. 
68. Cooper, supra note 56, at 59. --
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Perspective thus provided, attention is now directed to the 
principal limitations upon administrative government, or-stated 
alternatively-the basic safeguards afforded by the doctrines of 
administrative law to individual rights. 
3. Specific Safeguards 
a. Constitutional Limitations 
Traditionally, the principal substantive guarantees bestowed 
by the Constitution have clustered generally around two topics, 
namely the concept of the separation of powers and the due proc-
ess requirement of notice and hearing. With the qualification of 
external checks noted above,69 the import of the former is fun-
damentally historical, its value being confined for the most part 
to the academician.70 Due to its continued relevance at other 
levels of governmental activity, however, some discussion is 
thought appropriate at this point. 
The basic manifestation of the separation doctrine in this 
context is the maxim against delegated power. Thus, what the 
people had invested in the Congress by the Constitution-so the 
theory goes-could not be re-delegated to a separate, unelected 
body.71 And, of course, the offense to the doctrine was com-
pounded where adjudicative and executive functions were merged 
with legislative or rule-making authority in the same body.72 As 
the venerable Blackstone had observed: 
In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, 
or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws is 
vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body 
of men; and wherever these ... powers are united together 
there can be no public liberty. 73 
In matter of historical fact, however, the black-letter pro-
scription of delegated power (delegata potestas non potest dele-
gari)74 as well as the requirement of rigid separation of which it 
69. Supra notes 54 & 55, and accompanying text. 
70. Cooper, supra note 56, at 27-28. 
71. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 53 
S. Ct. 42 (1932). 
72. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 
73. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 146 (7th ed. 1775). 
74. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498 (1873). See generally Emke, "Dele-
gata Potestas Non Potest Delegari; A Maxim of American Constitu-
tional Law," 47 Cornell L.Q. 50 (1961). 
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is an offshoot have simply failed to survive the ravages of time. 
Indeed, delegation of legislative and judicial power, though fre-
quently softened by the appellative "quasi, "75 is, at this date, uni-
formly acknowledged as proper and, in fact, as a necessary in-
gredient of modern government.76 It is true that even today del-
egation may not amount to an abdication of the legislative func-
tion. Thus: 
Under American theory, grants of authority to the ex-
ecutive branch must be limited by prescribed standards. 
The discretion conferred must not be so wide that it is im-
possible to discern its limits. There must be an ascertain-
able legislative intent to which the exercise of the delegated 
power must conform. 77 · 
Nevertheless, the "gradual process of inclusion and exclusion" by 
which black letter rules assume content has, in this instance, 
been almost entirely weighted on the side of exclusion, i.e., judi-
cial vindication of the authority delegated on the ground that the 
standards prescribed were specific enough so as not to violate 
the apposite proscription. 78 Even the standard of "public inter-
est" in the Communications Act has been upheld as not so vague 
and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. In language typical in 
these cases, the Supreme Court said: 
It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere gen-
eral reference to public welfare without any standard to 
guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the require-
ments it imposes, and the context of the provision in ques-
tion, show the contrary.79 
75. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law 495-96 (3d ed. 1951). See 
generally Wade, "'Quasi-Judicial' and Its Background," 10 Camb. 
L.J. 216 (1949). 
76. As one author concluded: "The survey of congressional delegations 
since the Schechter case indicates that if the opinion was intended 
to raise any substantial barriers to delegation of legislative power 
by Congress it has failed to achieve its goal. . . . Practical neces-
sity seems the only limitation left as far as delegability is con-
cerned." Nutting, "Congressional Delegations since the Schecter 
Case," 14 Miss. L.J. 350, 366 (1942). 
77. Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775, 
779 (1953). 
78. E.g., Yak.us v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944). For 
an analysis of the bases of validation, see Cooper, supra note 56, at 
41-44. 
79. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226, 63 
S. Ct. 997, 1014 (1943). It seems doubtful, however, whether a 
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To complete the emasculation of the non-delegability rule, 
the virtual certainty of judicial condonation suffers no attenuation 
from the concentration of powers in a single agency.80 The 
Hoover Commission Task Force reported: 
[ W] hen agencies are established to explore a new area of 
regulation, it is expedient to combine in them all the pow-
ers which are needed to achieve maximum effectiveness, 
even at the cost of consolidating judicial and legislative 
functions.81 
Footnote continued 
standard such as that contained in the Communications Act really 
furnishes an effective legislative guide. As it has been stated by 
Professor Davis, "telling the agency to do what is in the public in-
terest is the practical equivalent of instructing it: 'Here is the 
problem. Deal with it.'" Davis, Administrative Law 46 (1951). 
80. See language of Justice Jackson in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 
470, 487-88, 72 s. Ct. 800, 810 (1952) (dissenting). 
81. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Task Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure 241 
(1955). It is true that although, constitutionally, powers may be 
combined in a single agency, some degree of separation is required 
within the agency in cases of adjudication where Section 5 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act is applicable. In such instances, Sec-
tion 5(c) requires an internal separation between those officials who 
hear and decide and those who investigate or prosecute, theoretically 
removing from the latter a favored position insofar as their oppor-
tunity to influence decisions in which they are interested is con-
cerned. Indeed, in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41, 70 
S. Ct. 445, 450 (1950), Justice Jackson declared the fundamental pur-
pose of the APA to be "to curtail and change the practice of em-
bodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge." 
Such, however, seems to fall far short of its object. As the New 
Jersey court said: "The crux of the matter lies in the concentration 
of functions. . . . [ C) an there be a practical separation of prose-
cuting and deciding where both are subject to one ultimate authority." 
In re Larsen, supra note 46 at 576, 86 A. 2d at 435-36. This ques-
tion is left unanswered by Section 5(c) of the APA constituting one 
of its principal lacunae. "Though the Act is a long step forward," 
stated one of this country's most distinguished jurists, "the internal 
separation of presecuting and adjudicatory functions in an agency in-
evitably falls short of giving the individual the protection to which he 
has been traditionally entitled in all justiciable controversies. One 
wonders, indeed, if the individual can ever be given adequate pro-
tection, human nature being what it is, when the prosecuting and ad-
judicatory functions are still subject to the control of the same agen-
cy heads." Vanderbilt, supra note 47, at 93. The inadequacy of the 
current situation appears patent in the situation of Marcello v. Bonds, 
349 U.S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 757 (1955). See Schwartz, 1955 Annual Survey 
of American Law 104-05. On the problem of personal friendships 
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Thus, neither delegation 82 nor the combination of functions would 
appear to afford the individual any significant constitutional pro-
tection as against impingement by the federal government.83 
The due process requirements of notice and hearing, how-
ever, stand on a somewhat different footing.84 After a period of 
temporary retreat from the general eighteenth-century mandate 
of notice and hearing in all administrative proceedings,85 the 
Footnote continued 
and group loyalty within the agency, see Henderson, The Federal 
Trade Commission 84 (1924). Complete separation of the investiga-
tive and adjudicative functions by the establishment of an adminis-
trative court was, indeed, one of the principal recommendations of 
The Hoover Commission. See Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch of the Government, Report to the Congress on 
Legal Services and Procedure 84 (1955). See, also, Nutting, "The 
Administrative Court," 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1384 (1955); and Schwartz, 
supra note 46. Were such suggestions heeded, the separation doc-
trine might once again constitute the bulwark against arbitrariness 
that it was once its privilege to occupy. 
82. On the problem of subdelegation within agencies and the occasions 
upon which courts will undertake invalidation, see Grundstein, "Sub-
delegation of Administrative Authority," 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144 
(1945). 
83. But see supra notes 54 & 55, and accompanying text. 
84. It should be mentioned that many statutes, independent of constitu-
tional requirements, provide for notice and hearing. Cf. Vanderbilt, 
supra note 47, at 90; and Netterville, "The Administrative Proce-
dure Act: A Study in Interpretation," 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 16 
(1951). In such cases, and absent a waiver of the rights authorized 
[see Democrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F. 2d 298 (D.C. Cir, 1952)], 
notice and hearing must be accorded even where 11 due process" 
would not otherwise so direct. See Dickinson, supra note 62, at 295. 
The importance of the "due process" provision, of course, resides 
in the fact that many statutes do not require such notice and hear-
ing. E.g., the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 997 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 
§401 (1946), as amended, 63 Stat. 579 (1949), 49 U.S.C. §401 (1952). 
That "due process," nevertheless, may still require a hearing in the 
Board's rule-making procedure, see CAB v. American Air Trans-
port, Inc., 201 F. 2d 189 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 4, 73 
S. Ct. 2 (1952). 
85. On the eighteenth century experience, see Mott, Due Process of Law 
216-40 (1926). In the nineteenth century, the well-nigh compulsive 
veneration of the doctrine of separation of powers led to the labeling 
of the administrative activity as quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative 
and of according and hearing in the former instance but not in the 
latter. See generally Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be 
Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 Yale L.J. 1093 (1942). 
Though the reasons for the atrophy of the requirement, at least as 
regards quasi-legislative activity, are many ( Cooper, supra note 56, 
at 55-67), perhaps the most cogent statement is that of Holmes: 
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proclivity is once again in the direction of acknowledging the old 
guarantees. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) even 
legislative or rule-making activities are subject to the require-
ments of antecedent publicity and the right of participation by in-
terested persons.86 Where adjudication is involved, the Act re-
quires that the agency concerned accord full judicial-type re-
quirements of formal notice and hearing.87 And, in the latter in-
stance, this means a real hearing (as contrasted with the mere 
formalism of a proceeding before an agency tool in judicial robe) 
to insure which "a special class of semi-independent subordinate 
hearing officers11 88 is provided.89 
Though the Act thus extends the notice and hearing guaran-
tee even beyond the ambit of due process, the savings clause 
(permitting exemption from the requirement where a particular 
Footnote continued 
"Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is 
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adop-
tion." Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of 
Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445, 36 S. Ct. 141, 142 (1915). 
86_- See § 4. There are, of course, exceptions-the principal ones being 
where it is "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest" to so provide, and where the rules promulgated are only 
interpretative or matters of procedure internal to the agency con-
cerned. See generally Schwartz, supra note 56. This provision is 
especially significant in view, of the fact that, "in legislation, or 
rule-making, there is no constitutional right to any hearing whatso-
ever." Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676, 694 (9th Cir. 
1949). 
87. See §§ 5, 7, 8, and 11. It is true, however, that the notice require-
ment has been somewhat watered down by the courts. CAB v. State 
Airlines, 338 U.S. 572, 70 S. Ct. 379 (1950). 
88, Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 
132, 73 S. Ct. 570, 573 (1953). 
89. See § 11. By this means, at least such was the intention of the APA 
[ Fuchs, "The Hearing Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative 
Procedure Act," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1950).], the "unlovely situa-
tion" ( McCarran, "Three Years of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act-A Study in Legislation," 38 Geo. L.J. 574 (1950)] of the 
hearing officer-the Judge, if you will-as a subordinate of a policing 
agency, depending upon the agency for his promotions, etc., and with 
the inevitable personal friendships among investigating and prosecut-
ing officers [ Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 
supra note 88, at 131, 73 S. Ct. at 572) might be obviated. Univer-
sal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495, 71 S. Ct. 456, 468 
(1951). Unfortunately, some difficulty still persists in the attainment 
of both independence and competence of the trial examiners. Thomas, 
"The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners: Pressure Groups and 
the Administrative Process," 59 Yale L.J. 431 (1950). 
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enabling act so provides)90 renders a rather substantial gap in 
the safeguard. In such an event, the task becomes to ascertain 
whether the administrative undertaking in question is one to which 
the fifth amendment guarantee of due process will attach. The 
resolution of this question is, of course, dependent upon the sub-
stantive content which the courts have poured into this most 
changeable of constitutional concepts at the particular moment. 
As must seem evident, answer to the question unfortunately 
can be made only generally and without much predicative value to 
future cases. There has been some tendency to distinguish be-
tween judicial and legislative activities, requiring notice and 
hearing in the former type of case and not in the latter ;91 This 
approach, however, is too often eschewed by the courts to serve 
as a basis of confident predictability .92 Indeed, if generalization 
can be made at all in this regard, it is that individual decisions 
represent in esse the results of a particular judicial balancing of 
the policy considerations involved. As one author observed: 
The essential problem in every case is that of weighing the 
relative merits of a public interest in prompt action against 
the respondent's private interest that the hand of the law be 
stayed until he has fully argued the equities of his particu-
lar position. Sometimes the balance is plain-for example, 
the public necessity of expeditious collection of the public 
revenues obviously outweighs the individual taxpayer's de-
sire to avoid payment of a contested tax until the validity 
thereof has been finally determined by a court of last re-
sort. Conversely, the right of a doctor to continue the prac-
tice of his profession, pending determination of charges that 
he improperly advertised, clearly outweigh the public inter-
est in curtailing such instances of asserted unethical con-
duct.93 
Where no such clear-cut determination can be made, such other 
factors as the degree of discretion accorded to the agency, the 
substantiality of property interest in question, the relative ad-
vantages as between administrative and judicial procedure in get-
ting at the truth in the type of situation involved, and the 
90. See § 7(a). See, in explanation, Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1222-24. 
91. E.g., Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of 
Colorado, supra note 85, at 445, 36 S. Ct. at 142; and Philadelphia 
Co. v. SEC, 175 F. 2d 808, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1948), 
92. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 799-808. 
93. Cooper, supra note 56, at 88. 
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opportunity for judicial review are weighed in to tip the scales 
either in favor of or in opposition to the requirement.94 
The content of the due process clause in regard to the re-
quirements of notice and hearing in the federal administrative 
process may thus be seen to comprise a facet of the broader in-
clination of the current Supreme Court to seek accommodation 
between private rights and social purposes in the so-called bal-
ancing of the interests involved.95 Perhaps no more specific 
statement of the requirement is possible. Although the guarantee 
now appears to have an ad hoc character, the judiciary occasion-
ally has expressed the guarantee in positive terms such as the 
following: 
It is elementary also in our system of law that adjudicatory 
action cannot be validly taken by any tribunal, whether judi-
cial or administrative, except upon a hearing wherein each 
party shall have opportunity to know of the claims of his 
opponent, to hear the evidence introduced against him, to 
cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence in his own 
behalf, and to make argument. This is a requirement of the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.96 
True, the guarantee may, upon judicial testing in a particu-
lar case, be vindicated. But in a different situation, the "bal-
ance" may compel a contrary result. Fortunately, on balance-to 
use the magic word-the tendency is to revitalize the old guar-
antee. 97 And, of course, independent of the due process guaran-
tee, the APA requires notice and the opportunity to be heard 
94. Id. at 89-90. In some cases, the "privilege-right" distinction has 
been employed to deny a hearing. Thus, immigration is said to be a 
privilege, not a right, and not within the due process guarantee. 
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 
309 (1950). The same has been held true of government employment. 
Bailey v. Richardson 341 U.S. 918, 71 S. Ct. 669 (1951). 
95. E.g., language of the court in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 
S, Ct. 804 (1959). 
96. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, supra note 91. See also in this regard 
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Corp., 351 U .s. 192, 202, 76 
S. Ct. 763, 770 (1956). Where allowed, the right is to an oral hear-
ing. Standard Airlines v. CAB, 177 F. 2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 
and Schwartz, supra note 77, at 812-15. 
97. See generally Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804, 72 s. Ct. 47 (1951); 
Riss & Ct. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907, 71 S. Ct. 620 (1951); and 
CAB v. American Air Transport, Inc., supra note 84. 
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before an independent judicial officer in a very substantial por-
tion of administrative cases.98 
b. Rules of Practice and Procedural Limitations 
This category is divisible into two subcategories, corres-
ponding to the two general classifications of activity undertaken 
by the agencies. Inasmuch as adjudicative practice and procedure 
differ substantially from that involved in rule-making (i.e., legis-
lative) activity, separate treatment is thought appropriate. In gen-
eral the APA controls the procedural safeguards afforded; and 
the text in this section is, in consequence, directed to its provi-
sions. Where by definition, "saving clause," etc., the Act is in-
applicable, reference will have to be directed to the specific 
statute and agency practice involved. 
Where adjudication is at issue, the tendency, at least since 
the advent of the APA, is to require a full judicial type proceed-
ing. 99 Such includes, as has been indicated previously, notice and 
hearing and the separation within the agency of the investigating 
and prosecuting functions from that of the adjudicative or deci-
sion-making.100 
Pretrial conduct in administrative adjudication has pursued 
a course similar to that of the so-called "liberalizing tendency" 
of the Federal Rules.101 Thus, although section 5 (a) of the Fed-
eral Act seems to require rather stringent notice requirements, 
the Supreme Court has been loath to strike down administrative 
complaints on grounds of insufficiency ,102 Indeed, Justice Bran-
deis's dissenting view in the famous Gratz case,103 rejecting the 
formal notice requirements of a case at law, reflects the judicial 
98. The very existence of the APA, as a declaration of legislative policy, 
has had its effects in broadening the "due process" guarantee even 
where the Act by its terms is inapplicable. See, e.g., language in 
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra note 81. 
99. Ibid. 
100. Of course, complete separation is not required by the APA. As the 
New Jersey court commented: "That statute embodies the theory 
of internal separation, leaving the function with the agency but pro-
viding safeguards to assure their insulation from one another and 
to further the independence of personnel engaged in judging." In re 
Larsen, supra note 46, at 576, 86 A. 2d at 436. 
101. Cf. Kuhn v. CAB, 183 F. 2d 839, 841-42 (D.C. Civ. 1950). 
102. E.g., American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F. 2d 
782 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 345 U.S. 100 (1953). 
103. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 430, 40 S. Ct. 572, 575-76 (1920). 
26 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
sentiment at this time.104 On the other hand, informal prehear-
ing conferences redound to the benefit of private parties in ad-
ministrative proceedings even more than in judicial, saving time 
and expense where by nature such matters are of the essence.105 
Agency discovery powers indicate, at least historically, 
somewhat of an imbalance as against private litigants. In addi-
tion to their vast resources, both manpower and financial, agen-
cies are typically endowed by statute with rather broad powers 
of investigation.106 Subpoena enforcement, however, especially as 
regards imprisonment for contempt, has traditionally been denied 
to the agencies,107 thereby affording to the recalcitrant party his 
day in court on the question of the prospective invasion of his 
privacy _108 And in amelioration, to some extent, of the imbal-
ance of resources, section 6 (c) of the Federal Act requires fed-
eral agencies to issue subpoenas to any party upon a statement 
showing the general relevance and reaonable scope of the evi-
dence, and further requires that denial of such an application 
must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor. 
Regarding the administrative trial itself, the basic require-
ments of trial procedure in the courts are, of course, not im-
posed upon administrative tribunals.109 In the interest of brevity 
and speed, and with the justification of expertise in the activity 
at issue, the agencies are left free to work out their own hearing 
procedures-subject, of course, to the mandate that the fundamental 
104. E.g., CAB v. State Airlines, supra note 87. 
105. See generally Cooper, supra note 56, at 114-24. 
106. Davis, supra note 79, at 93. Significant recent cases illustrating 
this point are Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S. Ct. 1502 
(1960); and CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322, 77 S. Ct. 804 (1957). 
Investigatory powers are not inherent, however, and accrue only 
where statute so provides. Cf. § 6(b) of the APA. "In obtaining in-
formation, the agencies normally have available at least four meth-
ods of discovery: (1) investigation of books and records; (2) re-
quiring the appearance of witnesses and the production of docu-
ments by subpoena; (3) requiring the furnishing of reports; and 
(4) physical inspections." Cooper, supra note 56, at 127. 
107. E.g., United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 76 S. Ct. 281 (1956); 
ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125 (1894); and Lange-
berg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892). See also Sher-
wood, "The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas," 44 Colum. 
L. Rev. 531 (1944). 
108. E.g., Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947); and 
SEC v. Tung Corp. of America, 32 F. Supp. 371 (D. Ill. 1940). 
109. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 60 S. Ct. 437 
(1940). 
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requirements of fair play and decency be observed.110 Thus, the 
hearing officers must be impartial, and the time, place, and man-
ner of the hearing must not be unduly prejudicial to the parties.ill 
Section 6 (a) of the Federal Act accords the right to be heard by 
counsel; Section 7 (c) provides the right "to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of 
the facts;" by judicial decision112 the right is afforded to be ap-
prised of the specific files or records upon which the decision is 
to be made;113 and under Section 8 (b), agency decisions must be 
accompanied by findings.114 
Though not "narrowly constrained by technical rules as to 
the admissibility of proof,11115 administrative tribunals hesitate to 
ignore them in the adjudication of judicial questions. As explained 
by one author: 
While often freed by statutory provision from the ne-
cessity of following- the common-law rules of evidence-or, 
as it is not infrequently expressed, the technical rules of 
evidence-most agencies in practice, and often by specific 
agency rule, apply the fundamental principles of relevancy, 
materiality, and probative force in a manner not unlike that 
of equity courts. Partly, this results from their constant 
consciousness of the necessity of supporting all findings by 
"substantial evidence," in order to avoid the possibilities of 
judicial reversals of their determinations, and partly, the 
tendency is a reflection of their appreciation of the innate 
wisdom of the general rules as worked out in the courts.116 
The observation possesses official buttress in the requirement of 
the Federal Act that decision must be based upon the whole 
record and be "in accordance with the reliable, probative, and 
110. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 23, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938). 
111. See § 5(a) of the APA. Cf. NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F. 2d 562, 563 
(5th Cir. 1943). -
112. United States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S. Ct. 565 
(1924). 
113. In this connection it is noteworthy that the requirements of the 
Jencks rule have been imported into administrative law. NLRB v. 
Adhesive Products, Inc., 258 F. 2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1958). 
114. Such, of course, is indispensable to the adequacy of judicial re-
view. International Union of Electrical Workers v. United States, 
280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Civ. 1960). 
115. ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 569 (1904). See in 
explanation Justice Black's opinion in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 
U.S. 683, 705, 68 S. Ct. 793, 805 (1948). 
116. Cooper, supra note 56, at 180. 
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substantial evidence.11 117 And, although mitigated to some extent 
by the expansion of the doctrine of official notice, the basic prin-
ciple of the "exclusiveness of the record" still inures to the ben-
efit of the private litigant.118 
Finally, so as to approximate as closely as practically pos-
sible the requirement of the first Morgan case119 that the one 
who decides must hear, the Federal Act provides for recommend-
ed decisions by the hearing officers in those cases where, by 
statute, decision-making is not vested in the agency head.120 
These decisions, in turn, become final in the absence of appeal. 
Directing attention now to rule-making, it has already been 
indicated that there is, in such event, no constitutional require-
ment of notice and hearing.121 Nevertheless, Section 4 of the 
Federal Act has imposed, for the first time in our law, certain 
mandatory requirements in rule-making. General notice must be 
published in the Federal Register and interested persons must be 
afforded the opportunity to participate.122 Though somewhat di-
luted by the exceptions of interpretative rules, procedural rules 
and pre-emptive statutes, the "guarantee to the public [ of] an op-
portunity to participate in the rule-making process"123 certainly 
represents an improvement over pre-APA practice. And, where 
formal rule-making is concerned, i.e., where rules are "required 
by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing, " 124 the adjudicatory techniques described above 
supplant the less formal requirements ordained for ordinary rule-
making. In such event, the rules as issued must be based upon 
the record made in an adversary judicial-type hearing, with all 
the added guarantees thus occasioned. 
117. See § 7(c) of the APA. See, in this regard, Mississippi Valley 
Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 54 S. Ct. 692 (1934). 
Professor Schwartz has argued that § 7(c) imports the "legal resi-
duum rule into federal administrative law." Schwartz, supra note 
56, at 1262. Contra, Davis, supra note 79, at 459. 
118. Schwartz, 1956 Annual Survey of American Law 79. 
119. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481, 56 S. Ct. 906, 911-12 
(1936). 
120. See § 8 of the AP A. 
121. Supra note 73. 
122. On the requirement of antecedent publicity, see Airline Pilots Ass'n 
v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960). That the "right to par-
ticipate" safeguard, however, may prove illusory, see Lansden v. 
Hart, 168 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1948). 
123. Attorney General's Manual on the APA 26, quoted in Schwartz, 
supra note 56, at 1195. 
124. See § 4(6) of the AP A. 
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c. Judicial Review 
The category of judicial review is divisible into two as-
pects: (1) its availability and (2) its scope. General limitations 
upon the availability of judicial review persist in the familiar 
legal doctrines of primary jurisdiction, the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, and estoppel for failure to utilize administra-
tive remedies.125 In addition, Section 10 of the Federal Act 
limits availability "so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial re-
view or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discre-
tion." 126 Though the statutory provision includes cases of im-
plied preclusion,127 "Mere failure to provide for judicial inter-
vention is not conclusive; neither is the presence of language 
which appears to bar it."128 Indeed, even statutory attestations 
of the finality of administrative decisions are not controlling 
where substantial private rights are thereby impaired. As the 
Supreme Court observed: "We cannot readily infer that Congress 
departed so far from the traditional concepts of a fair trial when 
it made the actions of the local boards 'final'. • • • "129 
Neither is the private litigant without redress in cases of 
board agency discretion, Section 10 (e) (B) (1) providing that re-
viewing courts are to set aside agency action found to be an 
"abuse of discretion." Thus, although an ascertainable judicial 
disinclination to substitute its own judgment for the discretion of 
administrators is clearly in evidence,130 the availability of 
125. See generally, in this regard, Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress 
From Erroneous Administrative Action," 25 Minn. L. Rev. 560 
(1941). See also United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 
77 S. Ct. 161 (1956); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 
U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938); Croydon Syndicate v. Consolidated 
Edison Co., 72. N.Y.S. 2d 846, 848-49 (1947); and McFarland & Van-
derbilt, Administrative Law 662 (2d ed. 1952). 
126. Airline Dispatchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F. 2d 685, 688 (D.C. Cir. 
1951). 
127. E.g., Switchman's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 
64 S. Ct. 95 (1943); Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 167 F. 2d 
529 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F. 2d 714 (2d Cir. 
1948); and Mechanics Educational Society v. Schauffler, 103 F. Supp. 
130 (E.D. Pa. 1952). 
128. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U .s. 229, 233, 73 s. Ct. 603, 605 (1953). 
The leading case on this proposition is Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 
288, 64 S. Ct. 559 (1944). 
129. Estep v. United States, 327 U .s. 114, 122, 66 S. Ct. 423, 427 (1946). 
Cf. Davis, supra note 79, at 835. 
130. E.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 
50 S. Ct. 389 (1930). 
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judicial review remains a significant factor in the vindication of 
private rights.131 
The scope of review is generally said to depend upon the 
distinction between questions of law and questions of fact.132 
Questions of law are fully reviewed upon the independent judg-
ment of the reviewing court.133 The Federal Act, according to 
Justice Frankfurter, 
... direct(s] that courts must now assume more responsi-
bility for the reasonableness and fairness of. . .decisions 
than some courts have shown in the past. Reviewing courts 
must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate 
the conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on 
them responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within 
reasonable grouncts.134 
Review of questions of fact, on the other hand, is governed by 
the substantial evidence rule. 
The court looks only to see if the administrative answer to 
the factual question is supported by substantial evidence; it 
is not concerned with the weight of the evidence.135 
The difficulty, of course, is that the "law-fact" classifica-
tion is inexact, wanting of a clear-cut dividing line in any par-
ticular case.136 In the words of one observer: 
131. As Justice Douglas observed: "Tolerance of judicial review has 
been more and more the rule as against the claim of administra-
tive finality." Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 619, 79 S. 
Ct. 1351, 1361 (1959) (dissenting opinion). See also Leedom v. 
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S. Ct. 180 (1958); and United States v. 
Storer Broadcasting Co., supra note 96. 
132. Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 510, 71 
S. Ct. 470, 473 (1951) (dissenting opinion). On such niceties of this 
general distinction as the doctrines of jurisdictional fact and of 
constitutional fact, see Schwartz, supra note 77, at 857-61. 
133. See § l0(e) of the APA. 
134. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 S. Ct. 
456, 466 (1951). 
135. Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1255. See also Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 
'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,"' 64 Harv. L. Rev. 
1233, 1235-36 (1951). 
136. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, the distinction "is often not 
an illuminating test and is never self-executing." Baumgartner v. 
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671, 64 S. Ct. 1240, 1244 (1944). See 
generally Isaacs, "The Law and the Facts," 22 Colum. L. Rev. 1 
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The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the 
point where the court chooses to draw the line between pub-
lic interest and private right.137 
31 
Nevertheless, it is the court, in a contested adversary proceeding, 
that makes the decision,138 The private party has his day in 
court, with right of appeal, no mean nor empty guarantee, indeed. 
B. State Practice 
1. In General 
If the inapplicability of the APA to certain administrative 
activities-by definition, preclusion or exemptionl39-occasions 
some degree of disharmony of practice at the federal level,140 
the fifty states, without the benefit of such a unifying act,141 ex-
hibit divergency run rampant. Even within a given state, prac-
tices vary, one agency being compelled by statute to afford 
Footnote continued 
(1922). On the application of particular statutory terms or con-
cepts to specific states of fact, the rule of Gray v. Powell [ 314 
U.S. 402, 62 S. Ct. 326 (1941)] that the question is to be treated 
more like one of fact than one of law, is now firmly ingrained in 
federal law. See Schwartz, American Administrative Law 121 
(1950). A recent case illustrating the point is NLRB v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 76 S. Ct. 383 (1956). 
137. Dickinson, supra note 62, at 55. For a statement of general guide-
lines, as opposed to the questionable "law-fact" dichotomy, in de-
termining the availability and scope of judicial review, see Cooper, 
supra note 56, at 341-50. Included are such considerations as 
whether the conduct is of public business or the regulation of pri-
vate business, whether the legislative or judicial function is in-
volved, the extent of the statutory grant of discretion, the character 
of the administrative procedure (i.e., whether summary), and the 
experience and repute of the agency involved. 
138. On the broadening scope of review, see, e.g., Snyder v. Buck, 75 F. 
Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), vacated on other grounds, 179 F.2d 44 
(D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 15 (1950); Fischer v. Haeberle, 80 
F. Supp. 652 (E.D. N.Y. 1948); Unger v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 
281 (E.D. Ill. 1948). 
139. Supra note 90. 
140. E.g., hearings were declared requisite in deportation cases [ Wong 
Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra note 81] but not in alien exclusion 
cases [United states ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 
S. Ct. 309 (1950)]. 
141. The Uniform Commissioners have, however, prepared a uniform 
act, summary treatment of which appears in Appendices I-III of 
this Monograph. 
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hearings, another doing so on a discretionary basis, and still 
another not doing so at all. Such, of course, renders general de-
scriptive commentary a most difficult task. As one commentator 
observed: "[T]here is possibly no more trackless morass in the 
whole range of American legal bibliography than the administra-
tive materials of the states." 142 With the caution, then, of care-
ful consultation of relevant statutes of the jurisdiction in issue to 
ascertain the particular procedures prescribed, some attempt will 
now be made to indicate the general patterns that, nevertheless, 
do appear discernible. 
2. Ascertainable Patterns 
a. Constitutional Limitations 
Although no requirement is imposed upon the states to ob-
serve the desider"atum of separation of powers, such is generally 
prescribed explicitly by the state constitution.143 Thus, the prob-
lems of merged functions and of delegation and standards arise 
in this context as well. 
The idea of concentrated functions in state agencies followed 
generally the evolution at the federal level, no real controversy 
now existing as to constitutionality in either case.144 The law of 
delegation, however, has developed differently, and continues to 
have a good deal of vitality in the states to this date. True, del-
egation is now regarded as proper in itself by state courts,145 as 
opposed to early judicial justifications as merely "filling up the 
details" of legislation.146 But the point of difference with federal 
practice is that whereas in the former the requirement of stand-
ards has been all but emasculated,147 in the states it has proven 
a good deal more tenacious. As the New Jersey court stated: 
142. Abel, "The Double Standard in Administrative Procedure Legisla-
tion: Model Act and Federal Act," 33 Iowa L. Rev. 228, 244 (1948). 
Among the more useful of the state materials that are available are 
the following: Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the state of 
New York (1942); Judicial Council of California, Tenth Biennial Re-
port to the Governor and Legislature (1944); Heady, Administrative 
Procedure Legislation in the States (1952); Ohio Administrative Law 
Commission, Report to the Governor (1945); and Texas Civil Judicial 
Council, Administrative Procedure Laws in the United States, A 
Comparative Study (195 7). 
143. Supra note 29. 
144. See generally Davis, Administrative Law 27-30 (1959). 
145. See language in Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A. 2d 385 (1952). 
146. Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. v. Clinton, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852). 
147. Supra notes 78 - 89, and accompanying text. 
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If no standards are set up to guide the administrative agen-
cy in the exercise of functions conferred on it by the legis-
lature, the legislation is void as passing beyond the legiti-
mate bounds of delegation.148 
There are, of course, state cases in which rather broad grants 
of authority have been upheld.149 Nevertheless, in general, the 
requirement remains of great significance at this level.150 
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By the fourteenth amendment, "due process" becomes a re-
quirement of state governments no less than the federal. 151 In-
deed, the requirement would seem of double strength in its ap-
pearance in state constitutions as well. Yet, though twice con-
firmed, its content or substance, as manifested in specific requi-
sites of notice and hearing in a particular case, is, if possible, 
even less certain as a guarantee of individual rights than nation-
ally. Perhaps the best example of the inadequacy of the consti-
tutional guarantee-both federal and state-in this context occurs 
with regard to business licensing.152 For due process to attach, 
personal or property rights must be involved. So, by character-
izing licenses as privileges, the states have read the notice and 
hearing requirements right out of the constitutions.153 Typically, 
the Iowa court observed: "[A] license to handle, sell, or other-
wise dispense beer, wines, and other malt or spiritous liquors is 
a privilege granted by the state and in no sense a property right.•'154 
148. State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation, 2 N.J. 335, 353, 
66 A. 2d 616, 625 (1949). This does not suggest, of course, that 
grants of authority will be invalidated merely because the standard 
prescribed is general in terms ( e.g., Ratliff v. Lampton, 187 P. 2d 
421 (Cal. App. 1947), aff'd, 32 Cal.2d 226,195 P.2d 792 (1948)). 
But delegations unconfined by any standards will generally be 
knocked down. E.g., Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of 
State of New York, 298 N.Y. 184, 81 N.E. 2d 80 (1948); and State 
v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Federation of New Jersey, 2 N.J. 335, 66 
A. 2d 616 (1949). 
149. E.g., Ward v. Scott, supra note 145. Usually even here, however, 
procedural safeguards are required for validation. Downey v. 
Grimshaw, 410 Ill. 21, 101 N.E. 2d 275 (1951). 
150. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 782. In this connection, it should be 
noted that State Legislatures retain a high degree of legislative 
oversight. See generally Howe, Legislative Review of Administra-
tive Rules (1956). 
151. Cf. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 105 A.2d 545 (1954). 
152. See illustratively Monaghan, "The Constitution and Occupational 
Licensing in Massachusetts," 41 Bost. U.L. Rev. 157 (1961). 
153. Davis, supra note 144, at 139-42. 
154. Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W. 2d 785 (1953). 
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Of course, not all the states take this view,155 Nevertheless, ab-
sent a state administrative procedure act,156 notice and hearing 
in state licensing cases may be denied without constitutional of-
fence.157 
b. State Procedure Acts 
Where by constitution, general legislation or special statute, 
hearings are prescribed, the question arises as to the procedures 
to be employed in the conduct thereof. And, as might be expect-
ed, it is here that state practice-both internally and in compari-
son with other states-is most disparate. In fact, so dissimilar 
are state practices, from discovery procedures to the require-
ment that findings conform to a record,158 that about all that can 
be meaningfully stated by way of general reference is that spe-
cific state statutes and decisions must be consulted to ascertain 
procedural limitations in any given fact-situation.159 In this con-
text, procedural rights are, of course, subject to the whim of 
legislators and the caprice of administrators. 
Some obviation of this unfortunate situation exists in the 
action of the sixteen states which have enacted administrative 
procedure acts more or less on the federal model,160 Even here, 
155. As the California Court stated: "Law contemplates justice whether 
it is granted as a privilege or recognized as a vested right .... 
[ T] he right to engage in the sale of beverages. • .may not be arbi-
trarily denied by the Board of Supervisors without a hearing or an 
opportunity on the part of the petitioner to present the merits of 
her application to the licensing tribunal." Fascination, Inc. v. 
Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260, 270, 246 P. 2d 656, 662 (1952), 
156. E.g., the Massachusetts Act provides: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, no agency shall revoke or refuse to renew 
any license unless it has first afforded the licensee an opportunity 
for hearing ..•• " Mass. G.L.A. ch. 30A, § 13 (1961). 
157. Davis, supra note 144, at 141. The well-nigh universal academic 
condemnation of this practice is stated in Gellhorn, Administrative 
Law 278 (2d ed. 1947). The attempt of the Uniform Law Commissioners 
to intrude upon this practice is indicated in §§ 1(4) and 14 of the 
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961. 
158. Cf. language in Matter of Sorrentino v. State Liquor Authority, 10 
N.Y. 2d 143, 176 N.E. 2d 563 (1961) (right to copy of hearing of-
ficer's report). 
159. See generally Texas Civil Judicial Council, supra note 142. 
160. Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 41-1001 to 41-1008 (1956)); California 
[Cal. Gov't Code § § 11370 to 11529 (1953)]; Colorado [Colo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 3-16-1 to 3-16-6 (1953) J ; Illinois [ Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10 § 3, 
and §§ 264 to 279 (1956)]; Indiana [Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 63-3001 to 
63-3024 (1961)); Maryland [Md. Ann. Code art. 41, §§ 244 to 256 
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procedure differs widely. The California Act, for example, is 
even more comprehensive than that of the federal government, 
providing for a central panel of hearing officers to serve all of 
the state's agencies.161 Contrawise, the limitations imposed by 
the Illinois Act are for the most part confined to the provision 
for judicial review.162 The specific practices prescribed by these 
states are indicated in the Appendices to this monograph, so no 
more detailed treatment is thought necessary at this point. 
Granting the divergencies that exist, however, it should be 
kept in mind that uniformity is not an end in itself; this, indeed, 
is one of the justifications for the existence of states in the first 
place. The goal, rather, consists in the safeguard of individual 
rights. General legislation at the state level-where in existence-
seems to serve this end, flexibility being afforded as between 
states, with fairly uniform and virile safeguards in effect intern-
ally _163 
c. Judicial Review 
Even with regard to the availability and scope of judicial 
review, the rule of dissimilarity holds reign in state practice. 
Rudimentary principles as to the exhaustion of remedies, nonin-
terference with discretion reasonably exercised, and the "law-
fact" dichotomy,164 have been borrowed from federal law. How-
ever, sufficient divergency exists to caution careful scrutiny of 
Footnote continued 
(1957)]; Massachusetts [Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 30A, §§ 1-17 (1961)]; 
Michigan [ Mich. Comp. Laws-Mich. Adm. Code §§ 24.101 to 24.110 
(1954)]; Minnesota [Minn. Stat. Ann. §§15.0411 to 15.049 (Supp. 
1962)]; Missouri [Mo. Ann. Stat. §§536.010 to 536.140 (1953)]; 
North Dakota [ N.D. Cent. Code §§ 28-32-01 to 28-32-22 (1960)]; 
Ohio [ Oh.io Rev. Code §§119.01 to 119.13 (1953)]; Oregon [ Ore. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 183.310 to 183.510 (1961)]; Pennsylvania [Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 71, §§1710.1 to 1710.46 (1962)]; Virginia [Va. Code Ann. 
§§ 9-6.1 to 9-6.14 (1956)]; and Wisconsin [ Wis. stat. Ann. §§ 227 .01 
to 227 .26 (1957)] . For a graphic treatment of similarities and dif-
ferences, see Appendices I-III infra. 
161. On the success of the California experiment see Heady, "State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Laws: An Appraisal," 12 Pub. Ad. Rev. 
10, 15 (1952); and Nathanson, "Recent Developments in State Ad-
ministrative Law," 33 Iowa L. Rev. 252, 290 (1948). 
162. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10, §§ 264-79 (1956). 
163. See generally Preparatory Note to Uniform Commissioners' Re-
vised Model State Administrative Procedure Act 8 (1961). 
164. Supra notes 125-37, and accompanying text. 
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particular state concepts prior to any undertaking in this regard 
as well. 
Caution is also in order in the selection of the appropriate 
form of action. While some states have abolished, by constitu-
tion or by statute, the old prerogative writs and have instituted 
in their stead a solitary means for controlling administrative ac-
tion, the great majority adhere to the old common law writ prac-
tice of using extraordinary remedies such as mandamus, prohibi-
tion, quo warranto, certiorari, etc.165 Selection of the wrong 
writ in a particular case may, in this instance, occasion the time 
and expense of starting all over again or even of being barred 
remedy altogether,166 e.g., due to laches.167 
Further illustrating the divergency, the doctrine of prior 
resort (that is, judicial disinclination to accept jurisdiction upon 
issues which could have been presented in the first instance to 
an administrative body), though followed in many states, has been 
repudiated by others. Some courts decline to apply the doctrine 
where to do so would involve irreparable injury •168 Still others 
apply the principle to newer agencies, but adhere to established 
practices in the case of older agencies where more extensive ju-
dicial intervention has traditionally been permitted.169 
Even the substantial evidence rule and Ben Avon doctrine 
have found disparate reception by the states. Thus, some states 
today probe beyond the reaches of review allowed in the federal 
courts and approximate in scope something more akin to the 
"weight of the evidence."170 And, some reject the "constitutional 
fact" doctrine propounded in the Ben Avon case,171 which re-
quired, upon raising of a constitutional issue, provision for a fair 
opportunity "for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for 
determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law 
and facts." 1 72 (Emphasis added.) 
165. E.g., Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis. 444 (1872). 
166. See generally Davis, supra note 144, at 443-49. 
167. See generally Davison & Grundstein, 1957 Supplement to Cases and 
Readings on Administrative Law 1-29. 
168. Bell Tel. Co. of Penn. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A. 2d 912 (1941). 
See generally Main Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric 
Co., 59 R.I. 29, 193 Atl. 879 (1937). 
169. See generally Cooper, supra note 56, at 316-17. 
170. E.g., language in Ward v. Keenan, 3 N .J. 298, 70 A. 2d 77 (1949). 
171. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 s. 
Ct. 527 (1920). 
172. Id. at 289, 40 S. Ct. at 528. See in this regard the language in 
Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Public utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E. 
2d 811 (1949). 
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By way of a final word on individual safeguards, it should 
be kept in mind that there is not necessarily a right to judicial 
review at all. Indeed, in a great many situations, statutory atte-
stations of the "finality" of administrative determinations have 
been held by the courts to preclude, judicial review altogether.173 
C. Models, Problems, and a Question Resolved 
For a number of reasons the capsule treatment of the ad-
ministrative practices of federal and state presented herein is 
thought justifiable in a study entitled "Administrative Law and 
Local Government." To begin with, the lack of systematization 
and consistency in local practice renders intelligible comentary 
next to impossible without some means of classification (or, at 
least, guidelines) by which to arrange the mass of pertinent sub-
ject matter.174 Hopefully, this difficulty is obviated in the delin-
eation, albeit in broad outline, of the rather well-defined body of 
federal-and, to a lesser extent, state-practfce. Thereby conven-
ient pegs are provided on which to hang the local law. 
Secondly, of course, the federal law is the model towards 
which state and local practice strive. True as it certainly is 
that the federal law reflects shortcomings and inadequacies, the 
ideal is, nevertheless, in evidence in the drift of current im-
provements and recommendations. Even the shortcomings are 
relevant to local practice, in pinpointing areas likely to be of 
concern at this level as well. 
A third benefit derived from the foregoing treatment is that 
a means is presented by which to assess or evaluate local prac-
tice. In addition to the value inherent in comparative analysis in 
and of itself, a technique is thus evinced to determine the extent 
of individual safeguards against governmental excesses as mani-
fested at each of the three levels of our administrative process. 
Most important, however, is the answer afforded by such 
presentation to the broader policy questions posed earlier in this 
monograph. Clearly, the development of federal administrative 
law demonstrates that big government does not necessarily mean 
unlimited government. Though expediency has required abride-
ment of the old safeguard of the separation of powers, executive 
government-swelling, in response to modern conditions, to im-
mensities of size and power inconceivable to our forebears-
173. Cf. "privilege-right" dichotomy in occupational-licensing, supra 
notes 152-57, and accompanying text. 
174. Cf. Abel, supra note 142. 
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continues to be limited through the procedural guarantees evolved 
in the doctrines of administrative law. Limitation remains the 
touchstone of our political order. Its new form consists not in 
the fetters of compelled inactivity but in a positive government 
canalized within substantial procedural banks to keep it from 
overfiowing.175 
175. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 45. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
A. Introduction 
1. The Problem Posed 
The manner in which the limitation doctrine is being fash-
ioned to the service of the individual has been demonstrated, al-
though sketchily, re the federal-and, to a lesser extent, state-
government. Equally important to limitation in our system, how-
ever, is local or municipal government. It cannot be gainsaid 
that the surfeit in size and activity at this level as well raises 
a specter of tyranny just as significant to individual rights as 
any that could be imagined at higher levels. In the words of the 
Kansas court, "It has twice been said that the tyranny of the 
American system of government very largely consists in the ac-
tion of municipal authorities."176 And, of course, from the view-
point of direct effect, the action of local authorities in allowing 
or disallowing a permit to use a public hall or a license to en-
gage in a lawful business, in imposing a local sales tax or a 
special assessment upon specific property-holders, in granting a 
variance or upholding an exception to a zoning ordinance, or in 
effecting an annexation, is much more likely to impinge upon the 
free choice and activity of individual citizens than are the more 
distant activities of the federal agencies, or even those in the 
state capitol.I 77 
2. Method of Approach 
Individuals constantly come into contact with governmental 
action. Any catalog of categories of special contact, which by 
reason of frequency and/or intensity would appear to warrant at-
tention, should certainly include local police ordinances and ac-
tivity ,178 as well as municipal liability, or its absence, in matters 
176. Smith v. Hosford, 106 Kan. 363, 366, 187 Pac. 685, 686 (1920), 
177. In this connection, the discussion at notes 32-33 supra, and accom-
panying text, should be consulted. 
178. See generally Antieau, "The Constitutional Rights of Persons 
Charged With Violating Municipal Ordinances," 48 Geo. L.J. 1 
(1959). Reference should also be made to Pock, Consolidating Po-
lice Functions in Metropolitan Areas (1962). 
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of tortl 79 and contract.180 For example, the actions of police of-
ficers in the prevention and detection of crime, of necessity, 
come into conflict with time-honored and long reputed notions of 
the privacy of self and home. Much has been written, especially 
since the advent of Naziism and the solidification of Soviet Com-
munism, of the despotic character of the police state and its de-
rogation of the inherent worth of the individual. Illustrative is 
George Orwell's 1984 with its frightening picture of giant televi-
sion sets and hovering helicopters prying into every crook of the 
citizenry's daily life. To forestall such eventuality, certain re-
strictions, e.g., the fourth amendment, prohibiting unreasonable 
searches and seizures, have been erected to limit police activity 
in its interaction with individual rights and interests. Examples 
could be multiplied in this regard. 
The instant focus, however, is upon administrative practice, 
in particular those organs and activities of government operating 
in a context of merged as opposed to separated powers. It is 
here (whether federal agency or local board) that the traditional 
safeguards have been extirpated, and attention should thus be fo-
cused to determine the present extent and future prospects of 
limited government in achieving the balance of interests sought. 
Areas of more appropriate import to this study are such 
as the following: the award, renewal and revocation of licenses, 
permits and certificates; the grant of franchises; the imposition 
of taxes and special assessments; the enactment and administra-
tion of zoning ordinances; annexation measures and their implica-
tions; eminent domain proceedings; and certain limitations upon 
civil rights. In these areas, local boards (or the governing body, 
itself, e.g., the city council) operate in the manner of the federal 
agencies. Invested with legislative, judicial and administrative 
powers, they exercise legislatively delegated authority (from the 
state legislature, and generally again by local ordinance), in gen-
eral or specific application, with or without judicial review as 
the statute or ordinance may provide. 
Limitations of space preclude any meaningful consideration 
of all the areas above-mentioned. Some attention of a general 
nature has been afforded to certain of them in other issues· of 
the Metropolitan Area Survey. In particular, the materials in 
Pooley, Planning and Zoning in the United States, and Sengstock, 
Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem, will be 
179. For recent developments in this area, see Burrus & Neuman, "Mu-
nicipal Tort Liability," in Belli, Trial and Tort Trends 651 (1959). 
180. See generally 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law 635-714 (1958). 
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drawn upon in the generalizing chapter to follow. To put the in-
stant work in concrete focus, however, the categories of permits, 
licenses, and certificates and of special assessments have been 
selected for detailed treatment. 
The selection of these two areas is thought especially justi-
fied, in the light of the materials contained in the first two chap-
ters of this work. In addition to their peculiar sensitivity to the 
individual-state conflict, the areas selected may be seen to em-
brace both of the principal functions of modern government al-
luded to above, i.e., protection (licenses) and service (special as-
sessments).181 Similarly, opportunity is afforded to examine local 
administrative practice from the perspective of both its adjudica-
tive (determination to grant or withhold a license) and legislative 
(determination of "necessity" of a special assessment) aspects.182 
Thereby, matters of immediate and particular concern to the in-
dividual, i.e., his choice of a profession or business and special 
pecuniary exactions, may be seen in the light of the two principal 
activities of administrative bodies, providing, it is hoped, a basis 
of generalization to the broader subject of individual safeguards 
or governmental limitations in the local context as a whole. 
The scope of present inquiry thus defined, it goes without 
saying that the entire fields of licenses and permits and of spe-
cial assessments as embraced in typical treatises on municipal 
corporations are without the purview of this work. Attention is 
focused rather upon the individual, his rights and remedies, as 
they are manifested in interaction with the administration of local 
licensing and assessment law. 
B. Permits, Licenses, and Certificates 
1. Nature and Purpose 
Incidental to the reappraisal and innovation in political theo-
ry occasioned by the quake of new conditions-alluded to abovel83 
-has been the rejection, at least in practice, of laissez faire at-
titudes towards the conduct of business. The social interest pro-
tection against potential fire hazards or activities corruptive of 
morality as strip shows, for example, has been balanced against 
the individual interest in making a living or pursuing an occupa-
tion of one's choice. The prevalence of the social or general 
181. Supra notes 15-19, and accompanying text. 
182. Supra notes 60-68, and accompanying text. 
183. Supra note 14, and accompanying text. 
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interest in this regard constitutes the basis for economic regula-
tion in our system (governmental limitations upon entry into and 
continuation of business activity.) Justified under the police pow-
er, the basic means of such regulation in the local context is the 
provision for licenses, permits, and certificates.184 The power of 
government in this respect, however, is not untramelled. The re-
quirements for its legitimate operation and the safeguards inuring 
to the individual in his conflicts therewith, constitute the raison 
d'etre of this section.185 The treatment is more or less chrono-
logical, commencing with application procedures and concluding 
with redress available upon revocation. 
2. Application, Conditions, and Issuance 
a. Application 
The first step in obtaining a municipal license or permit to 
enter upon a particular business or occupational activity, is ordi-
narily the filing or presentation of an application to a designated 
official, board, or department. Relevant statutes, charters, and 
ordinances must be consulted carefully and every effort made to 
comply with requirements as to the form of the application, the 
manner and place of filing, and the conditions imposed. Although 
not subject to the formal strictures requisite to a complaint at 
law (substantial compliance ordinarily sufficing and irregularities 
being waived upon issuance),186 certain elements, e.g., those af-
fecting jurisdiction or prescribing legitimate conditions, are of 
the essence and denial is sustainable for noncompliance.187 
184. The terms are, herein, used more or less synonomously. Techni-
cally, "the term 'license' is more commonly employed to designate 
official municipal authorization of a continuing business or activity 
while the term 'permit' is more commonly, but not strictly, used 
to refer to municipal authorization of an act or activity that will be 
completed, the permit thereby being executed or terminated. . . . 
Certificates of registration, approval, occupancy and the like are 
issued in various instances and have in general the effect of a per-
mit." 9 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 8 (3d ed. 1950). 
185. Of course, permits have relevance to non-business activity as well, 
e.g., the usage of a public hall for meetings or of the streets for 
parades. See generally in this regard, 9 McQuillan, supra note 184, 
at 368-77. Due to limitations of space, however, the emphasis, 
herein, will be upon business and occupational licensing. 
186. City & County of Denver v. Spiegleman, 76 Colo. 307, 231 Pac. 204 
(1924). 
187. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Davis, 194 Okla. 84, 147 P. 2d 135 (1942) 
(requirement of filing of proof of title as prerequisite to granting 
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Additionally, time and expense contingent upon correction, ampli-
fication, or litigation, even if successful, counsels judicious re-
gard for the forms and procedures ordained.188 
b. Fulfillment of Conditions 
Often provision is made by statute or by ordinance that 
certain conditions be fulfilled by the applicant as prerequisites to 
issuance. If reasonable in effect and reasonably incident to a 
public purpose within the ambit of police power activity,189 the 
condition is valid and adherence on the part of the applicant is 
necessitated. As the Kentucky court stated: 
The imposition of a condition to the granting of a li-
cense for police regulation, as distingUished from a license 
for revenue, is by no means novel or confined to one class. 
We have the familiar exactions of proof of professional 
qualifications, of evidence of fitness for certain trades, of 
the right of inspection and condemnation of dairy products 
and other foodstuffs, and the numerous sanitary and fire 
prevention regulations, as well as those controlling ·similar 
conditions. Each of these is a limitation on the liberty of 
Footnote continued 
license to drill for oil); Miller v. City of Memphis, 181 Tenn. 15, 
178 S. W. 2d 382 (1944) (Jukeboxes limited to reputable establish-
ments). 
188. Depending upon the particular ordinance involved, the requirement 
may be of elaborate, formal, and documented application, or the 
procedure may be informal and even oral. See generally City of St. 
Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. w. 1045 (1895). Some ordi-
nances may require notice of the application, even to the extent of 
publication. Schroeder Holding Co. v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 177 Md. 186, 9 A. 2d 220 (1939). A protest procedure 
may also be provided by statute or ordinance. Morrison v. Select-
men of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 181 N.E. 786 (1932). In such 
cases the giving of notice has been held to be a condition to the 
vesting of jurisdiction in the local authorities to grant the license 
applied for. Acme Development Co. v. Bureau of Licenses, 87 R.I. 
11, 137 A. 2d 422 (1957). 
189. The requirement is that the condition prescribed be reasonably re-
lated to the activity to be permitted; so that certain conditions, 
valid as to some types of activity, would not be valid as to others. 
For example, physical examination would be reasonably related to 
a permit to engage in the milk business, but would be unreasonable 
as a requirement for an auctioneer's license. Cf. People ex rel. 
Schulz v. Hamilton, 97 Misc. 437, 161 N.Y.S. 425 (1916), rev'd other 
grounds, 188 App. Div. 783, 177 N.Y.S. 222 (1919). 
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earning a livelihood and holding and using one's property as 
he desires. Nevertheless such regulations have withstood 
attack as being the result of arbitrary and unreasonable ac-
tion and others have not even been questioned. In all in-
stances where there is such an authorized condition attached, 
an applicant is not entitled to the license by merely paying 
or tendering the fee or tax demanded.190 
One of the principal categories of conditions is that of good 
moral character. Thus, such activities as soliciting fundsl.91 and 
auctioneering,192 as well as the operation of taxicabs,193 junk-
yards,194 poolrooms,195 and jukeboxes,196 have been subjected to 
the requirement of character references197 or endorsements on 
the application.198 Justification under the police power is not 
difficult in such cases. Poolrooms, for example, with their pe-
culiar sensitivities in regard to the corruption of youth, lay them-
selves open to such measures in the interest of public morality. 
Of similar effect is the condition of absence of conviction 
of certain crimes.199 Junk dealers200 and taxi drivers,201 among 
others, have been subjected to this requirement. Such conditions 
are generally justified on the ground of safeguarding the public 
from fraud.202 
A third category of conditions which an applicant may en-
counter in seeking a license or permit persists in requirements 
190. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 235 Ky. 265, 271, 30 
S.W.2d 968, 971 (1930). 
191. In re Porterfield, 63 Cal. App. 2d 518, 147 P. 2d 15 (1944). 
192. Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, 143 Cal. App. 2 d 313, 
300 P. 2d 177 (1956). 
193. Pratt v. City of Hollywood, 78 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1955). 
194. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, supra note 190. 
195. State ex rel. Reedhead v. City of Olympia, 122 Wash. 239, 210 Pac. 
371 (1922). 
196. Miller v. City of Memphis, supra note 187. 
197. DeRoos v. Chapman, 106 N.J.L. 6, 147 Atl. 570 (1929). 
198. In re Birkerstaff, 70 Cal. 35, 11 Pac. 393 (1886) (indorsement of 
five persons). 
199. In Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, supra note 192, a 
California court, in holding "good moral character" and "absence 
of conviction of a felony'' to be "permissible licensing require-
ments," went so far as to state that there is not even a "require-
ment that the conviction be restricted to that class of felonies 
which is specially related to the profession licensed." Id. at 325, 
300 P. 2d at 185. -
200. Dening v. Cooke, 162 Misc. 723, 295 N.Y.S. 724 (1937). 
201. Cf. Red Star Motor Drivers' Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 244 Mich. 
480, 221 N.W. 628 (1928). 
202. Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, supra note 192. 
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for demonstration of financial responsibility, i.e., the filing of an 
indemnity bond or financial security. Typical cases include li-
censes to peddlers,203 amusement parks,204 pawnbrokers,205 fuel 
dealers,206 a messenger business,207 plumbers,208 and auction-
eers.209 So long as such constitutes a reasonable requirement 
for the protection of the public210 (e.g., where persons wishing to 
engage in hazardous activities are required to contribute to a 
fund to compensate those suffering injuries from such dangerous 
operations) and is reasonable in amount211 (i.e., not so high as 
to be prohibitive) the condition is valid and the bond must be 
posted. 
An applicant for a building permit is ordinarily subjected 
to a number of especial conditions. Such usually include the sub-
mission of plans and specifications,212 and the demonstration of 
compliance with the building codes.213 Also, the seal of an archi-
tect may be required,214 as may be the approval of a fire com-
missioner.215 Such requirements are clearly sustainable under 
the police power (e.g., the interest of the public safety in detect-
ing the use of inferior materials or construction in a manner 
203. State v. Harrington, 68 Vt. 622, 35 Atl. 515 (1896). 
204. Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N.E. 110 (1932) (miniature 
golf course). 
205. City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29 (1985). 
206. Sverkerson v. City of Minneapolis, 204 Minn. 388, 283 N.W. 555 
(1939). 
207. Portland v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 75 Ore. 37, 146 Pac. 148 
(1915). 
208. Rock v. Philadelphia, 127 Pa. Super. 143 (1937), aff'd, 328 Pa. 382, 
196 Atl. 59 (1938). 
209. Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, supra note 192. 
210. See, in application, State ex rel. Howell v. Schiele, 153 Ohio St. 
235, 91 N.E. 2d 5 (1950) (determination of financial responsibility of 
bondsman upheld). 
211. Bryan v. City of Malvern, 122 Ark. 379, 183 S.W. 957 (1916) (bond 
of $1000 to operate billiard hall void). 
212. In Karl Wolsey Co., Inc. v. Building Inspector of Bedford, 324 Mass. 
419, 422-23, 86 N.E. 2d 644, 646 (1949), the Court stated: "Doubt-
less, this is a reasonable and necessary provision in any adequate 
plan regulating the erection of buildings. 'The requirement for sub-
mission to a public officer of proposed buildings showing location, 
size, material and details of construction has a rational connection 
with public welfare.'" 
213. People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris, 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N.E. 2d 839 
(1948). 
214. City of East Lansing v. Meridian Township Building Inspector, 332 
Mich. 96, 50 N. W. 2d 730 (1952). 
215. People ex rel. Fiberloid Corp. v. Walsh, 119 Misc. 510, 196 N.Y.S. 
536 (1922). 
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which might create a fire hazard216) and failure in their perform-
ance justifies denial of the permit.217 
For certain licenses (e.g., to deal in, distribute or handle 
milk for human consumption) blood and health tests may .be re-
quired.218 Clearly relevant to the public health (e.g., in detecting 
contagious diseases such as typhoid) such requirements are em-
braced readily by the police power and the applicant denies them 
at his peril. 
A common condition to the issuance of licenses and per-
mits to engage in certain occupations and activities is the neces-
sity of a demonstration of education, skill, or competence regard-
ing the activity to be permitted. In this connection, examinations 
have been required of applicants for taxi licenses,219 as well as 
for those of general contractors,220 moving picture operators,221 
stationary engineers,222 journeyman plumbers,223 electricians,224 
installers of gas appliances,225 harbers,226 etc. In addition to 
the requirement of justification under the police power, the ex-
amination must be reasonably incident to the activity to be per-
mitted,227 as well as reasonable in administration and applica-
tion.228 But if such requirements are met, the applicant is obliged 
to comply. 
Miscellaneous conditions which have been upheld include an 
undertaking to provide a fronting road229 and sewage facilities in 
216. Cf. Lazich v. City of Butte, 116 Mont. 386, 154 P. 2d 260 (1944). 
217. People ex rel. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 332 Ill. App. 500, 
76 N.E. 2d 201 (1947). For a detailed treatment of building permits, 
see 9 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 478-529. 
218. Cf. People v. Hamilton, supra note 189. 
219. Red Star Motor Drivers' Ass'n v. City of Detroit, supra note 201. 
220. State ex rel. Reynolds v. City of St. Petersburg, 133 Fla. 766, 183 
So. 304 (1938). 
221. Gandy v. Borras, 114 Fla. 503, 154 So. 248 (1934). 
222. City of St. Louis v. Meyrose Lamp Manufacturing Co., 139 Mo. 
560, 41 s. w. 244 (1897). . 
223. City of Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930). 
224. Cf. Richardson v. Coker, 188 Ga. 170, 3 S.E. 2d 636 (1939). 
225. Cf. Portsmouth Stove & Range Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Bal-
timore, 156 Md. 244, 144 Atl. 359 (1928). 
226. Grisbord v. Philadelphia, 148 Pa. Super. 91, 24 A. 2d 646 (1942). 
227. For example, it would be unreasonable to subject an applicant for a 
license to engage in electrical construction to be examined to as-
certain the expectancy that he will complete a contract. Richardson 
v. Coker, supra note 224. 
228. Standards governing particular determinations must be reasonably 
specific and action taken thereunder must not partake of arbitrari-
ness, whim, or caprice. See infra notes 380-84, and accompanying 
text. 
229. In re Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952). 
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building permit cases,230 and of junk yard proprietors to keep 
records of their purchases231 and to submit such to the police,232 
as well as to refrain from hiring minors233 or from purchasing 
materials from them.234 The latter is, of course, justified in 
terms of the susceptibility of junk yard operations to the dispos-
al of stolen goods. 
c. Investigation and Inspection 
In addition to examination as to technical skill and health 
indicated in the preceding section,235 certain types of licenses 
and permits may require that the applicant agree to submit his 
property to investigation or inspection. For example, provision 
has been made for search of premises as a condition to a junk 
yard license,236 and of vehicles to determine whether they are 
"proper or safe" relative to their operation for hire.237 Approv-
al of a fire commissioner may be required in order to obtain a 
permit or license to store highly combustible materiaI.238 Fur-
ther, provision may be made for periodic inspection, with fees 
charged to cover the costs of inspection.239 
Such requirements, if reasonable, must be complied with, 
and it is no defense to assert constitutional rights as to searches 
without warrants. As the Kentucky court stated: 
It cannot be gainsaid that those whose business and 
operations are covered by the challenged ordinance may vol-
untarily waive the production of a search warrant. . . . In 
consideration of the license to carry on a business of po-
tential danger to the public welfare, the applicant is re-
quired to yield to measures designed to protect the public 
interest. It is the surrender of a right for a privilege.240 
Noncompliance with appended conditions (ascertained by such in-
spections) is, of course, grounds for revocation,241 which makes 
230. River Forest State Bank v. Village of Hillside, 6 Ill. 2d 451, 129 
N.E.2d 171 (1955). 
231. City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543, 201 S.W. 870 (1918). 
232. Ibid. See also City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, supra note 205. 
233. Shurman v. City of Atlanta, 148 Ga. 1, 95 S.E. 698 (1918). 
234. Ibid. 
235. See notes 218-28 supra, and accompanying text. 
236. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, supra note 190. 
237. Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 119 N .E. 687 (1918). 
238. People ex rel. Fiberloid Corp. v. Walsh, supra note 215. 
239. Grisbord v. Philadelphia, supra note 226 (barber shops). 
240. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, supra note 190, at 
271-72, 30 S.W. 2d at 971. 
241. Friedland v. Ingersoll, 249 App. Div. 623, 291 N.Y.S. 32 (1936) (curb 
permit). 
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of the inspection device a potent weapon in the arsenal of munic-
ipal regulation. Limitations, or counter-weapons of the individual, 
are discussed in a latter section. 
d. Payment of Fees 
Accompanying the application and such other documents and 
attestations as may be required, the applicant must ordinarily 
include a designated fee. The fee schedules, both as between 
different activities in the same municipality as well as the same 
activity in different municipalities, are infinitely variable. Illus-
tratively, the following have been sustained judicially: a license 
fee of $50 for itinerant vendors242 or for peddlers, hawkers and 
solicitors;243 fees of $30 per year244 or $3 per day for hawkers 
and peddlers;245 charges of $150 per year for peddling;246 fees 
of $25 per day for the first ten days and $10 per day thereafter 
on itinerants holding special sales of damaged goods;247 license 
fees of $5 per week for hawking and peddling;248 charges of $500 
monthly on itinerant vendors;249 fees of $10 per week or $50 per 
year for hawking coffees, teas, spices, etc.;250 and fees ranging 
from $2 to $200 per year on transient traders.251 
If valid, and the presumption favors validity,252 ·payment 
constitutes a prerequisite to issuance. To be valid, the exaction 
must be authorized either expressly or by implication,253 must 
242. Nieman-Marcus Co. v. City of Houston, 109 S.W. 2d 543 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1937). 
243. People ex rel. Ellis v. Cowdrick, 150 Misc. 285, 268 N.Y.S. 825 
(1934). 
244. City of Alma v. Clow, 146 Mich. 443, 109 N.W. 853 (1906). 
245. In re White, 43 Minn. 250, 45 N.W. 232 (1890). 
246. People v. Riksen, 284 Mich. 284, 279 N.W. 513 (1938). 
247. State ex rel. Lawson v. Woodruff, 134 Fla. 437, 184 So. 81 (1938). 
248. People v. Baker, 115 Mich. 199, 73 N.W. 115 (1897). 
249. Levin v. City of Asbury Park, 9 N.J. Misc. 515, 154 Atl. 742 
(1931). 
250. City of Muskegon v. Zeeryp, 134 Mich. 181, 96 N.W. 502 (1903). 
251. People v. Grant, 157 Mich. 24, 121 N.W. 300 (1909). 
252. Detroit Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Detroit, 267 Mich. 405, 255 N.W. 
217 (1934). The burden is upon the protestant to demonstrate the 
unreasonableness of the charge. Ross v. City of Kansas City, 328 
S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1959). 
253. Though often explicitly provided by statute or charter, Arms v. City 
of Chicago, 314 Ill. 316, 145 N.E. 407 (1924), even absent an ex-
press grant, the exaction of reasonable charges may be implied 
from the licensing power. Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. 
Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943). Nevertheless, some 
authorization must exist or the fee will be struck down. Lamere 
v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552, 6~ N.E.2d 863 (1945). 
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be "reasonably commensurate with the actual cost to the munici-
pality for special services rendered," 254 must not be so high as 
to be "oppressive and confiscatory,"255 and must not unduly bur-
den interstate commerce,256 nor offend the constitutional require-
ment of equal protection of the laws.25 7 If the fee be impregna-
ble on these counts, the applicant will be required to pay. 
e. Procedures for Granting or Rejecting 
Having completed the application, fulfilled the requisite con-
ditions, and paid the necessary fees, the applicant must not await 
the decision of the designated board or official. It should be 
noted that where by statute, charter, or ordinance a certain body 
is invested with decision-making power, such may not be dele-
gated to others, even to aids of the designate.258 Such a delega-
tion, where possible of demonstration by a contesting applicant, 
constitutes grounds for judicial intervention.259 On the other 
hand, inspection or examination by subordinates (with or without 
recommendations) is totally permissible, so long as the ultimate 
decision is made by the body authorized.260 Neither may the re-
quirement of approval or endorsement (e.g., by a certain number 
254. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 
311, 316, 167 Atl. 891, 892 (1933). The crucial point here is that 
the fee must be related to the cost of issuing the license and of 
exercising police supervision. It "cannot be used as a source of 
revenue." City of Prichard v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 365, 369, 17 
So.2d 451, 454 (1944). For example, a fee of three hundred dollars 
per year for each bicycle used in vending ice cream, was held to 
far in excess of the cost of regulation and was invalidated. Gur-
land v. Town of Kearny, 128 N.J.L. 22, 24 A.2d 210 (1942). On the 
other hand, reasonable relation, not mathematical exactitude, is all 
that is required. Rutherford v. City of Nashville, 158 Tenn. 499, 
79 S.W.2d 581 (1935) (driver's license). In determining reasonable-
ness, the courts have indicated that they will scrutinize all the cir-
cumstances and necessities of the case, including type of business, 
size of the city, costs of supervision, etc. [People v. Riksen, 
supra note 246] , and will pay particular attention to fees imposed 
upon comparable businesses and activities. Gilbert & Sentinel Sales 
Corp. v. Town of Irvington, 20 N.J. 432, 120 A.2d 114 (1956). 
255. Id. at 437, 120 A.2d at 117. Fees assessed as against comparable 
businesses as well as "the share left to the business after the tax" 
[ Ibid.] constitute the factors to be assessed in ascertaining whether 
the fee is confiscatory. 
256. Infra notes 389-92, and accompanying text. 
257. Infra notes 393-98, and accompanying text. 
258. Cf. Assaid v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 47, 18 S.E.2d 287 (1942). 
259. Cf. Amusement Enterprises, Inc. v. Fielding, 189 Misc. 625, 64 
N.Y.S. 2d 857 (1946). 
260. In re Hitchock, 34 Cal. App. 111, 166 Pac. 849 (1917). 
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of landowners abutting the premises of an applicant for a liquor 
or junk yard license) be assailable as improper delegation, such 
being said to constitute a mere procedural requisite in the appli-
cation process.261 
The decision-making procedure may or may not involve a 
hearing, there being no constitutional right to such in licensing 
cases. 262 The constitutional requirement, of course, is that a 
person cannot be deprived of property without due process of 
law,263 and it has been held that the right to pursue a useful oc-
cupation or business is a property right within the protection af-
forded.264 Nevertheless, the courts have been wont to enforce the 
requirement where not provided specifically, claiming that a li-
cense is not a right, but a privilege.265 In typical language the 
West Virginia court said: 
The operation of a motor vehicle on the public high-
ways is not a natural right, nor is license to do so a con-
tract, or property right, in a constitutional sense. It is 
merely a conditional privilege .•.. 266 
Though not required, however, statutes and ordinances fre-
quently provide that hearings be held in such cases.267 The 
261. E.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 Sup. 
Ct. 190 (1917); and Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich, 499, 286 
N.W. 805 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 620, 60 Sup. Ct. 470 
(1940). On the other hand, some courts have held the delegation 
improper. E.g., Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E. 
2d 699 (1940). 
262. 3 Antieau, supra note 180, at 392. 
263. The constitutional guarantee devolves upon municipalities as agents 
of the states through the fourteenth amendment. 
264. Cf. Cutsinger v. City of Atlanta, 142 Ga. 555, 83 S.E. 263 (1914). 
Of course, if the activity is one which the state can prohibit alto-
gether-e.g., prize fighting or wrestling-then no right exists. E.g., 
Ward v. Drennon, 201 Ga. 605, 40 S.E.2d 549 (1946). 
265. See generally 9 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 24-26. 
266. Nulter v. State Road Comm'n of West Va., 119 W. Va. 312, 317, 193 
S.E. 549, 552 (1937). The rationale, though persisting tenaciously in 
the courts, has been the subject of considerable disfavor on the part 
of the commentators. E.g., Gellhorn, Administrative Law 278 (2d 
ed. 1947); Davis, supra note 85, at 1093, 1118-25 (1942); and 
Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775, 
807-08 (1953). 
267. E.g., Wilson v. Township Committee of the Township of Union, 123 
N.J.L. 474, 9 A.2d 771 (1939); and Buffalo Cremation Co., Ltd. v. 
Murch, 222 App. Div. 447, 226 N.Y.S. 477, aff'd, 249 N.Y. 531, 
164 N.E. 572 (1928). 
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provision may be permissive or mandatory, and denial where not 
specifically required affords the applicant no grounds for re-
dress.268 Public hearings may be necessitated where the activity 
to be permitted has wide-spread and noxious effects upon the 
community.269 Such protest procedures also, of course, depend 
entirely upon the governing statute or ordinance.270 
Hearings, where provided, are administrative proceedings 
and not subject to the formal strictures of a case-at-law.271 
Thus, rules of evidence, representation by counsel, etc., may be 
abnegated where not provided by statute. The hearing must, how-
ever, be fair, and adequate opportunity afforded to make a case, 
both by way of positive argument and rebuttal of the charges of 
others.272 
Generally, the requirement is that the entire body charged 
with decision-making be present and pass upon the application;273 
however, some statutes provide that a smaller number, or com-
mittee, suffices.274 The mandate of fairness, of course, compels 
that the designate board be impartial, but untimely objection (i.e., 
subsequent to the taking of the vote) has been held to waive the 
applicant's relief in the matter.275 
Upon compliance with all the prerequisites, the applicant 
is entitled to reasonable promptness in consideration and decision. 
Such may be compelled judicially .276 Finally, the applicant him-
self would be wise to ascertain whether the form of the license 
and the officer who issued it are proper, there being no estoppel 
against the government for its own errors.277 
268. Such follows from the privilege-right distinction alluded to above. 
If there is no right to a hearing, but a board in its discretion may 
allow one or not, to disallow-without more-will not be construed 
as an abuse of discretion. 
269. Barnard v. Metropolitan Ice Co., 278 Mass. 441, 180 N.E. 308 
(1932). 
270. Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, supra note 188. 
271. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City and County of San 
Francisco, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 144 P.2d 4 (1943). 
272. Perpente v. Moss, 293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E. 2d 726 (1944), 
273. King v. Guerra, 1 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). 
274. Carr v. City of El Dorado, 217 Ark. 423, 230 S.W.2d 485 (1950). 
275. Ibid. 
276. Wilson v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 403, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 6, aff'd, 277 N.Y. 
720, 14 N.E.2d 820 (1938). 
277. Cf. Buffalo Red-I-Mix Concrete Corp. v. Foell, 1 App. Div.2d 702, 
147 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (1955). 
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3. Enforcement Proceedings 
If the applicant proceeds in an activity or business prior to 
issuance, or after rejection of his application, he will be subject 
to municipal enforcement proceedings. The type of action to 
which the violator will be subjected, of course, depends upon the 
relevant statute or ordinance; and as might be expected, such 
vary widely. Thus, a suit in equity might be forthcoming by way 
of an injunction, either permanent278 or temporary,279 to restrain 
continued violation. Or an action at law may be brought by the 
city to collect license fees as a debt.280 Even the levy upon and 
sale of property has been upheld where specifically authorized by 
statute or charter .281 
License violations may also occasion penalties, enforced 
civilly by an action in debt282 or criminally by fine and impris-
onment for refusal to pay •283 The latter have been held not to 
be debts within constitutional provisions prohibiting imprisonment 
for debt;284 rather, the courts have stated, such is only a nec-
essacy method of enforcing payment of the fine.285 
Defenses against such proceedings are limited. Of course, 
the method employed by the municipality must be authorized by 
statute or ordinance,286 the courts indulging in a rather strict 
reading (especially where penal) in such cases.287 Further, pen-
alties cannot be unreasonable, excessive, cruel, or unusual;288 and 
where enforcement is by a criminal prosecution, the customary 
278. Bush v. City of Jasper, 247 Ala. 359, 24 So.2d 543 (1945). 
279. Beene v. Bryant, 201 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). 
280. Cf. Shepherd v. Little Rock, 183 Ark. 244, 35 S.W.2d 361 (1931). 
IT no adequate procedure is provided by statute or ordinance for 
collecting the fee, debt is generally the only action that can be 
taken. City of Lexington v. Wilson, 118 Ky. 221, 80 S.W. 811 
(1904). The theory is that the authority to require authorization 
implies the power to impose some sanction. City of Emporia v. 
Becker, 76 Kan. 181, 90 Pac. 798 (1907). 
281. Carson v. Mayor & Council of Forsyth, 94 Ga. 617, 20 S.E. 116 
(1894). But where unauthorized, levy and sale is improper. John-
son v. Armour & Co., 31 Fla. 413, 12 So. 842 (1893). 
282. Cf. City of Philadelphia v. Atlantic & P. Tel. Co., 109 Fed. 55 
(E.D. Pa. 1901). 
283. Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N.W. 1053 (1902). 
284. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646 (1934). 
285. City of Chicago v. Morell, 247 Ill. 383, 93 N.E. 295 (1910). 
286. 3 Antieau, supra note 180, at 408. This, of course, is subject to 
the qualification stated at supra note 280, 
287. City of Holton v. Tatlock, 77 Kan. 376, 94 Pac. 204 (1908). 
288. Village of Utica v. Rumelin, 134 Neb. 232, 278 N.W. 372 (1938). 
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rules of criminal procedure, such as the quantum of proof and 
traditional constitutional safeguards, apply .289 
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On the other hand, whereas the statute of limitations con-
stitutes a bar to municipal enforcement proceedings,290 laches 
does not.291 Neither does actual knowledge by the city of viola-
tions over a substantial period of time work estoppel against mu-
nicipal action,292 And, of course, where enforcement is by civil 
proceedings, constitutional safeguards attendant to criminal prose-
cutions are not applicable.293 
Specific defenses to a license enforcement proceeding gen-
erally follow lines suggested in a following section; that is, the 
substantive grounds for attacking a denial. However, the unsuc-
cessful applicant would be wise in pursuing one of the specific 
remedies available (for example, mandamus) rather than to begin 
business operations and await action by the local authorities. As 
the Connecticut court observed: 
He could not thus assume to take the law into his own 
hands, and pursue the business without a license, because 
a license had been wrongfully refused. His remedy, if he 
had any, would be to apply by mandamus to compel the 
board to grant him one,29'4 
4. Remedies Available Upon Denial 
a. Administrative Relief 
Frequently, recourse to, and review by, an appellate ad-
ministrative body is available to the unsuccessful applicant.295 
Such redress usually is available in respect to liquor licenses296 
289. Atlantic City v. Turner, 67 N.J.L. 520, 51 Atl. 691 (1902). 
290. Cf. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co., 
73 N.J.L. 175, 63 Atl. 906 (1906), aff'd, 74 N.J.L. 774, 67 Atl. 113 
(1907). 
291. Cf. In re Application for Certificate of Occupancy, 32 North. Co. 
Rep. 31 (Pa. 1949), 
292. City of Cleveland Heights v. Colowe, 97 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio App. 
1950). 
293. Village of Utica v. Rumelin, supra note 288, On the implications 
to personal rights of the civil-criminal classification generally, see 
Antieau, supra note 178. 
294. State v. Orr, 68 Conn. 101, 111, 35 Atl. 770, 772 (1896). 
295. E.g., Cook v. Howard, 155 Md. 7, 141 Atl. 340 (1928). 
296. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So.2d 387 (1947). 
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and building permits.297 As provided by statute, charter, or or-
dinance, however, the use of such appeal boards298 may extend 
to other activities, and local laws should be consulted to ascer-
tain the relief available and the means to be employed in its re-
alization. 
The appellate body may procede de novo, rehearing and re-
assessing all the evidence and making its own decision there-
upon.299 Though the existence of discretion in granting or deny-
ing licenses renders the proceeding quasi-judicial in effect,300 the 
body is, nevertheless, an "administrative tribunal," and in reach-
ing decisions must act in that role.301 To withstand judicial as-
sault, the decision must, of course, be reasonable. This is true 
regardless of the degree of discretion conferred.302 
The proceeding, being administrative in character, is not 
subject to the formal requirements of a case at law.303 Never-
theless, the provisions of the statute or ordinance respecting, for 
example, permissible time for appeal, are applied literally, and 
no relief is accorded to a party filing after the statutory time-
period has expired.3 04 
Where such administrative relief is prescribed, the normal 
rule of exhaustion of remedies applies to preclude prior resort 
to the courts.305 On the other hand, the local board ordinarily 
cannot consider the invalidity or unconstitutionality of the ordi-
nance under which it is acting.306 Where the attack is on the 
latter ground, it is not necessary to appeal first to administra-
tive bodies, direct resort to the courts being immediately avail-
able.307 
297. Gibbs Building & Construction Co. v. Town of Belleville, 100 N.J. 
Eq. 240, 135 Atl. 333 (1926). 
298. Sometimes council committees, rather than separate boards, con-
stitute the reviewing body. Permenter v. Younan, supra note 296. 
299. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City & County of San 
Francisco, supra note 271. 
300. Ibid. See also Jaffarian v. Murphy, supra note 204. 
301. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City & County of San 
Francisco, supra note 271. 
302. Cf. Mangiello v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City, 6 N.J. Misc. 
536, 142 Atl. 179 (1928). 
303. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City & County of San 
Francisco, supra note 271. 
304. Hall v. Leonard, 260 App. Div. 591, 23 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1940). 
305. Cf. State ex rel. Russell v. Board of Appeals of Village of Prairie 
du Sac, 250 Wis. 394, 27 N.W.2d 378 (1947). 
306. Clark v. Greenlee, 287 Ill. App. 474, 5 N.E.2d 278 (1936). 
307. State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, 209 Wis. 63, 243 N.W. 317 (1932). 
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b. Judicial Redress 
(1) Standing 
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The availability of judicial recourse is, of course, contin-
gent upon standing. Thus, to be able to compel or oppose issu-
ance (or to attack such by way of protest), it is requisite that 
the complainant be a proper party plaintiff.308 And, in accord 
with traditional notions, the necessity is that he be "aggrieved" 
in the sense of ascertainable injury to his personal or property 
rights.309 
The typical situation in which difficulty arises in regard to 
this requirement occurs where the plaintiff has made no applica-
tion, or at least has not been turned down. In such event, as 
well as where exception provisions are applicable, the courts 
generally dismiss on the ground that the complainant has suf-
fered no injury,310 Typically, the United States Supreme Court 
has observed: 
It seems somewhat doubtful whether the plaintiff in 
error is in a position to raise the question of the invalidity 
of the ordinance because of the alleged arbitrary power of 
the mayor to grant or refuse it. He made no application 
for a license, and of course the mayor has not refused it. 
Non constat, that he would have refused it if application had 
been made by the plaintiff in error. Whether the discretion 
of the mayor is arbitrary or not would seem to be unimpor-
tant to the plaintiff in error so long as he made no applica-
tion for the exercise of that discretion in his favor and was 
not refused a license,311 
To safeguard the right to judicial recourse, application to 
the proper authorities is, therefore, imperative; and, upon refus-
al, such must be pleaded by the protesting applicant,312 
(2) Specific Remedies 
Having secured the right, the next step is to select the ap-
propriate action. Careful scrutiny of statutes and ordinances is 
advisable since exclusive remedies are frequently prescribed. 
308. City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 45 Ohio App. 511, 
187 N.E. 312 (1933). 
309. Aliotta v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 418, 59 N.E.2d 829 (1945). 
310. E.g., staub v. City of Baxley, 94 Ga. App. 18, 93 S.E.2d 375 (1956); 
and Beene v. Bryant, supra note 279. 
311. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 186, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 635 (1900). 
312. Ibid. 
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Also, care must be taken to appear within certain time-periods, 
where the statute so provides.313 
Mandamus. This most frequently utilized of the remedies 
available is not dependent upon statutory authorization, it being 
regarded as within the inherent powers of the courts.314 Where 
issuance is mandatory or merely ministerial, and the applicant 
has complied with all the requirements relevant thereto, manda-
mus is proper in the event of denial whether the statute so pro-
vides or not.315 Additionally, even though vested with considera-
ble discretion, licensing authorities cannot act arbitrarily316 or 
merely because of caprice or whim.317 In such event, the writ 
lies to compel issuance.318 Finally, where the ordinance at is-
sue is void, e.g., as constituting a denial of equal protection of 
the laws,319 mandamus is sometimes available to secure munic-
ipal authorization.320 
In accord with the general rule, the writ lies only upon 
proof of a clear legal right to the license and upon demonstra-
tion that no valid ground existed for its denial by the licensing 
authority .321 For this reason, where discretion is authorized, 
the remedy is unavailable absent unreasonable and arbitrary ac-
tion by the licensing body.322 As stated by the New York court: 
In considering the power to issue a mandatory order 
for license, permit or consent, the courts must take into 
consideration the limits of the discretion which under the 
statute or ordinance is vested in the administrative 
313. State ex rel. Campagna v. City of Baton Rouge, 32 So.2d 82 (La. 
App. 1947). 
314. Permenter v. Younan, supra note 296. 
315. Ibid. 
316. State v. Town of Oak Harbor, 48 Wash.2d 839, 296 P.2d 1004 (1956). 
317. City of St. Louis v. Meyrose Lamp Mfg. Co., supra note 222. 
318. State v. Town of Oak Harbor, supra note 316. 
319. McWhorter v. Settle, 202 Ga. 334, 43 S.E.2d 247 (1947). 
320. State v. City of Defiance, 99 Ohio App. 398, 133 N.E.2d 392 (1955). 
Attack on the grounds of imprecise standards is thus permissible 
by mandamus. State ex rel. Triangle Fuel Co. v. Caulfield, 355 
Mo. 330, 196 S.W.2d 296 (1946). The same would be true of an at-
tack based upon unreasonable conditions. Richardson v. Coker, 188 
Ga. 170, 3 S.E.2d 636 (1939). On the other hand, some courts have 
stated that where the ordinance is totally void, mandamus is im-
proper because in such event no license is necessary. E.g., Larkin 
Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926). 
321. Pruzam v. Valentine, 282 N.Y. 498, 27 N.E.2d 25, aff'd, 258 App. 
Div. 791, 15 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1940). 
322. Smith v. City of Whitewater, 251 Wis. 313, 29 N.W.2d 37 (1947). 
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body. • • • The courts may not interfere with discretion 
as to when exception shall be made, nor formulate stand-
ards to be used in the exercise of that discretion; they may 
interfere only when it is clearly shown that refusal is based 
solely upon grounds which as a matter of law m~ not con-
trol the discretion of the [ administrative body] .3 3 
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And, the fact that others have been granted permits under simi-
lar circumstances has been held to be immaterial on the ques-
tion of arbitrariness.324 
Where a mere privilege (as opposed to a legal right325) is 
involved, mandamus is unavailable, as issuance can be denied at 
will. Further, unfulfilled but valid conditions preclude use of the 
writ;326 as does the existence of another quick, specific legal 
remedy.327 Finally, mandamus will be denied where issuance 
would bring about violation of some other statute or ordinance.328 
Though limitations thus exist as to its use, the writ, upon 
proper application and the fulfillment of statutory conditions, af-
fords a significant counterweight to government power as mani-
fested in arbitrary and capricious executive action. 
Injunction. Whereas mandamus is generally employed posi-
tively, i.e., to compel issuance, the injunction is ordinarily avail-
able to complete the picture by affording negative relief in re-
straining the enforcement of license or permit requirements, 
fees or taxes, etc.329 Of course, to succeed in an action in 
equity, grounds for equitable jurisdiction must be demonstrated. 
Such would normally include inadequacy of remedy at law,330 ir-
reparable injury, or multiplicity of suits.331 
323. Larkin Co. v. Schwab, supra note 320, at 334-35, 151 N.E. at 639. 
324. Meadows v. Town Clerk of Saugus, 333 Mass. 760, 133 N.E.2d 498 
(1956). 
325. I.e., where the activity is one which the State can prohibit entirely, 
e.g., a beer license. Phillips v. Head, 188 Ga. 511, 4 S.E.2d 240 
(1939). 
326. Deehan v. Johnson, 141 Mass. 23, 6 N.E. 240 (1886). 
327. Lindquist v. City of Lindsborg, 165 Kan. 212, 193 P .2d 180 (1948). 
328. Spur Distributing Co. v. City of Burlington, 216 N.C. 32, 3 S.E.2d 
427 (1939). 
329. E.g., American Bakeries Co. v. City of Huntsville, 232 Ala. 612, 
168 So. 880 (1936); Aliotta v. City of Chicago, supra note 309; and 
Mims v. City of Ft. Worth, 61 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). 
330. Availability of the legal remedy of mandamus may, therefore, pre-
clude injunctive relief. Coker v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. 473, 198 
S.E. 74 (1937). 
331. Cf. D. Gottlieb & Co. v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. App. 523, 97 N.E. 
2d 468 (1950). 
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Even the federal courts may be petitioned to restrain dis-
criminatory fees or otherwise unconstitutional ordinances. 
Such cases are rare, however, particularly where the order 
sought would regulate the issuances to conduct business of a pub-
lic nature in the city .333 In any event, the unconstitutionality 
must be clear.334 
Money Had and Received. In proper cases, an action quasi 
ex contractu is permissible for recovery back of a fee or tax. 
Absent payment under duress, e.g., to prevent seizure of person 
or property,335 the action is supportable only by statutory auth-
orization.336 Payment under protest, however, is not sufficient 
even where the ordinance is void;337 there must be actual or 
threatened compulsion.338 On the other hand, recovery back has 
been allowed on a proportionate basis where the ordinance was 
subsequently revoked by the municipality. 339 
The rationale of the remedy was well stated by the Minne-
sota court as follows: 
To permit defendant to retain that sum would be unconscion-
able enrichment of it at the plaintiff's expense. Hence, re-
covery quasi ex contractu is properly allowed.340 
As to excessive fees paid pursuant to an illegal contract, how-
ever, recovery back is precluded under normal equitable princi-
ples of "unclean hands." 341 
Miscellaneous Remedies. As provided by statute, certiorari 
may be proper in certain cases;342 although it would appear to 
be inferior to mandamus in that municipal authorities cannot be 
332. Bradford v. City of Somerset, 138 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1943). 
333. Gaines Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 123 F .2d 104 (7th 
Cir. 1941). 
334. Ibid. 
335. Home Ins. Co. v. City of Birmingham, 236 Ala. 41, 180 So. 783 
(1938). 
336. Moore v. Village of Gilbert, 207 Minn. 75, 289 N.W. 837 (1940). 
337. Noyes v. State, 46 Wis. 250, 1 N.W. 1 (1879). 
338. Barker Bros., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 603, 76 P.2d 
97 (1938). 
339. Cf. Chamberlain v. City of Tecumseh, 43 Neb. 221, 61 N.W. 632 
(1895). Contracts between cities and licensees regarding payment 
back have been honored by the courts. Town of Columbia City v. 
Anthes, 84 Ind. 31 (1882). 
340. Moore v. Village of Gilbert, supra note 336, at 77, 289 N.W. at 
838. 
341. Krueger v. City of Hatton, 75 N.D. 489, 28 N.W.2d 749 (1947). 
342. Aldee Corp. v. Flynn, 72 R.I. 199, 49 A.2d 469 (1946). 
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compelled to act in the former instance,343 Declaratory judgment 
actions have, in certain circumstances, been upheld;344 as have 
actions under civil rights statutes where the validity of the ordi-
nance or municipal denials thereunder interfered with the exer-
cise of constitutional rights of national citizenship.345 Finally, if 
one wishes to subject himself to incarceration, the writ of habeas 
corpus is available to test the validity of the committing ordi-
nance.346 
Action for Damages. This remedy is unavailable as against 
either the municipality347 or its officers,348 Since the issuance 
or rejection of permits and licenses is a governmental function,349 
even wrongful or arbitrary action by the licensing authority af-
fords no legally enforceable claim for damages.350 Nor does 
negligence in the inspection procedure, causing financial loss to 
the applicant, occasion such relief absent specific statutory pro-
vision.351 
The arsenal of counterweights to governmental power, as 
manifested in the exercise of the authority to regulate by license, 
is thus seen to be stocked with a variety of legal weapons. Cau-
tion must be exercised in their deployment, however, to ascertain 
the proper time and operation of each, as well as its particular 
utility in accomplishing the end sought. This means careful ex-
amination must be made of the statutes, charters, and ordinances 
pertinent to the particular activity at issue. 
(3) Trial and Appeal 
Assuming standing and the selection of an appropriate form 
of action, the complainant's case will proceed to trial, where the 
343. Ibid. 
344. E.g., Glackman v. City of Miami Beach, 159 Fla. 376, 31 So.2d 
393 (1947); Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 
Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943); City of Corpus Christi v. Crow, 204 
S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). 
345. Cf. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). 
346. Ex parte Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 122 Kan. 33, 250 Pac. 1056 (1926). 
An additional remedy, which although of importance to local admin-
istrative law as a whole is of very limited value in regard to li-
censing, is the writ of prohibition, which issues to restrain action 
in excess of jurisdiction. E.g., State ex rel. Townsend v. Ward, 70 
Minn. 58, 72 N.W. 825 (1897). 
347. Cf. Chism v. City of Tulsa, 192 Okla. 366, 136 P.2d 409 (1943). 
348. Jaffarian v. Murphy, supra note 204. 
349. Wasserman v. City of Kenosha, 217 Wis. 223, 258 N.W. 857 (1935). 
350. Roerig v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 231, 175 N.W. 542 (1919). 
351. Mead v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 72 (1873). 
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general rules of judicial process, e.g., as to pleading and proof,352 
prevail. Usually, class suits are available to parties with identi-
cal interests on the theory of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.353 
Ordinances requiring permits or licenses,354 as well as the 
fees or taxes imposed,355 are presumptively valid, and the bur-
den is upon the party asserting invalidity to demonstrate the non-
existence of the facts upon which the decision was based or that 
denial was in excess of authority or constituted an abuse of dis-
cretion by the licensing authority .356 
Courts differ as to the strictness of construction to be ap-
plied to such ordinances. Generally it is held that licensing pro-
visions are to be accorded "reasonable constructions," permitting 
of liberality in application.357 Others, however, and particularly 
in the presence of penal provisions, impose strict construction on 
the ground that such ordinances are in derogation of the common 
law.358 Constructions and interpretations of the licensing author-
ities are given great weight by the courts.359 
Usual rules as to trial practice and procedure apply •360 
Hence, attendance and testimony of witness is compellable by 
subpoena,361 failure of compliance being punishable by contempt 
proceedings.362 The usual "fact-law" dichotomy persists in li-
cense cases,363 though the courts have differed as to whether 
reasonableness in regard to a license fee was a question of fact 
and for the jury,364 or a question of law and thus for the court.365 
Generally, disputed questions of fact passed upon by the licensing 
352. Cf. Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distributing Co., 202 Ga. 559, 
43 S.E.2d 704 (1947). 
353. Willkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 58 N.E. 1004 (1900). 
354. City of Prichard v. Richardson, supra note 254. 
355. Helena v. Russwurm, 190 Ark. 601, 79 S.W.2d 993 (1935). 
356. Silverman v. Department of Health of City of New York, 252 App. 
Div. 678, 300 N.Y.S. 979 (1937). 
357. Saxe v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 307 Mass. 495, 30 N.E.2d 
380 (1940). 
358. Cutaio v. Board of Health of City of Elizabeth, 36 N.J. Super. 565, 
116 A.2d 646 (1955). 
359. South Jersey Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Burnett, 125 N.J.L. 
105, 14 A.2d 487 (1940). Such is, nevertheless, only persuasive. 
McNeil v. Omaha, 160 .Neb. 301, 70 N.W.2d 83 (1955). 
360. Cf. Townley v. Bruckman, 168 Misc. 422, 5 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1938). 
361. In re Costello, 50 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1944). 
362. Cf. Application of O'Leary, 50 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 
1944). 
363. Hawkins v. City of Prichard, 249 Ala. 234, 30 So. 2d 659 (1947). 
364. Daily v. City of Owensboro, 257 Ky. 281, 77 S.W.2d 939 (1934). 
365. City of Burlington v. Unterkircher, 99 Iowa 401, 68 N.W. 795 (1896). 
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authority are not subject to inquiry. On the other hand, the suf-
ficiency of proof to justify the administrative decision is justici-
able.366 
The cardinal rule of judicial review in these cases was well 
stated by the New York court: 
The courts may not interfere with discretion as to 
when exception shall be made, nor formulate standards to 
be used in the exercise of that discretion; they may inter-
fere only when it is clearly shown that refusal is based 
solely upon grounds which as a matter of law may not con-
trol the discretion of the [body] .367 
And, of course, the burden is upon the complaint to show that the 
action "was so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a clear 
abuse of discretion. 11368 In this regard, the trial assumes the 
character of a reviewing court rather than a trial de novo,369 the 
substantial evidence rules generally governing the scope of judi-
cial action.370 
The character of the ultimate judgment or decree will, of 
course, depend upon the action employed and the practice of the 
community. Ordinarily, however, while a court may void an or-
dinance, it may not modify it by substituting a different require-
ment or fee.371 
Appeal to higher courts is generally permissible by certio-
rari. In such event, the general law and practice of appeal and 
error controls.372 
c. Substantive Grounds 
Having indicated the procedural remedies available to the 
unsuccessful applicant, the question remains of the substantive 
366. City of Chicago v. Kirkland, 79 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1935). 
367. Larkin Co. v. Schwab, supra note 320, at 334-35, 151 N.E. at 639. 
368. State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 
522, 75 N. W.2d 780, 786 (1956). The statement of reasons by the 
licensing authority may [Amperse v. Common Council of City of 
Kalamazoo, 59 Mich. 78, 26 N.W. 222 (1886)] or may not [State ex 
rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, supra] influence the court 
on the question of whether the administrative action was unreason-
able. 
369. Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 47 Cal.2d 11, 300 
P.2d 831 (1956). 
370. Deane v. Edgeworth Borough Board of Adjustment, 172 Pa. Super. 
502, 94 A.2d 112 (1953). 
371. City of Prichard v. Richardson, supra note 354. 
372. See generally Alabama Gas Co. v. City of Montgomery, 249 Ala. 
257, 30 So.2d 651 (1947). 
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grounds upon which such attack may be predicated. Generally, 
two categories of argument are available: (1) invalidity of the 
ordinance on its face; and (2) invalidity of municipal action there-
under. These will now be considered in turn. 
(1) Invalidity of Ordinance 
Unreasonableness. As indicated above,373 licensing ordi-
nances, as expressions of the police power, will be held unrea-
sonable absent a clear tendency to protect the public health, safe-
ty, morals, or general welfare. Such, indeed, is a requirement of 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution.374 Illustratively, the Oklahoma court stated: 
There is no legal or logical presumption to be indulged 
that only those presently licensed to sell raw milk in Okla-
homa City are qualified or could qualify to engage in that 
business without endangering the health of the inhabitants,375 
This rule of reason applies as well to require clarity and cer-
tainty as to persons to whom it applies and as to what obligations 
exist thereunder.376 Finally, the due process prerequisite will be 
violated where the ordinance is so vague as to permit its un-
bridled and arbitrary application.377 
Delegation and Sufficiency of Standards. After a period of 
initial judicial confusion in attempting to distinguish between cases 
of "true" and "quasi" delegation,378 the courts are agreed that 
ordinances may no longer be invalidated solely on the ground of 
delegation of legislative and/or judicial functions to administrative 
bodies such as licensing authorities.379 Rather, the crux of the 
requirement is the existence of ascertainable standards whereby 
to guide and adjudge administrative determinations.380 As the 
Michigan court stated the rule: 
373. Supra note 189. 
374. City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, 245 Minn. 325, 71 N.W.2d 855 (1955). 
375. Oklahoma City v. Poor, 298 P .2d 459, 460 (Okla. 1956). 
376. Minnis v. City of Fort Worth, 61 S. W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). 
377. Hague v. C.I.O., supra note 345. Of course, the presumption favors 
validity. City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, supra note 374. 
378. Cf. language of the court in Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 
Wis. 63, 65 N.W. 738 (1896). 
379. Cf. language of the court in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection 
Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928). 
380. Gross v. Allan, 37 N.J. Super. 262, 117 A.2d 275 (1955). The re-
quirement of standards exists as well in cases of delegated author-
ity to fix fee-schedules. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. 
City of Philadelphia, supra note 254. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
Reasonable regulations and a uniform rule of action in 
its determination are essential to the validity of a municipal 
ordinance. It cannot be left to the arbitrary decision of an 
administrative officer or board.381 
63 
Illustratively, the standards of "fit and responsible" and "worthy" 
have been held insufficient as guides to the granting of licenses 
to solicit funds for charitable purposes.382 
The requirement, it should be emphasized, is a strict one 
as applied to local boards. The Michigan court phrased the ra-
tionale as follows: 
Without definite standards an ordinance becomes an 
open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready tool for 
the suppression of competition through the granting of author-
ity to one and the withholding from another.383 
Even where the licensing authority is the local governing body 
itself (e.g., the city council) the requirement may not be viti-
ated.384 
Of course, the courts will not demand the impossible in li-
censing statutes. Thus, where circumstances render impractica-
ble the establishment of very explicit standards, the ordinance 
may, nevertheless, be upheld. This, indeed, was the ground pos-
ited by a New York court, in a frequently cited case, for uphold-
ing a rather broad grant of discretion of Buffalo officials in is-
using licenses for the sale of meat. The court stated: 
It will be observed that in some of the cases adverted to 
the test upon which the discretion of the mayor was to be 
exercised was defined in the Act or ordinance creating the 
authority, while in others there was no limitation placed 
upon it. It does not follow that the omission to prescribe 
the bounds of authority carries the conclusion that it is 
vested arbitrarily in the official or body to whom it is 
committed. The difficulty of defining in a given case what 
standard shall be applied in the disposition of the petition 
and the fact that the conservation of the public health is 
381. Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich. 564, 571, 195 N.W. 60, 
63 (1923). 
382. Hoyt Bros., Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 260 Mich. 447, 249 N.W. 
509 (1932). 
383. Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 700, 75 N.W.2d 
25, 28 (1956). Ordinances concerned with the possible censorship 
of faith and ideas are especially suspect, the requirement of ex-
plicitness of standards being commonly invoked in such cases. E.g., 
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S. Ct. 1148 (1948). 
384. City of Houston v. Freedman, 293 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 
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the basis for the existence of the authority, indicate the 
reason for the absence of the definition; but it is no war-
rant for the inference that the power is an arbitrary one, 
to be exercised in ruthless disregard of the rights of any 
class or individual. The discretionary authority must rest 
somewhere, and experience has shown that its lodgment 
in some body or official of the municipality is more effi-
cacious than to leave it with the legislature, to whom the 
local situation may be unknown.385 
Also, where a tradition of regulation has been established 
(e.g., with respect to meat and milk), courts have read standards 
into statutes whereby to uphold their validity .386 And finally, in 
the licensing of activities particularly subject to especial police 
surveillance (e.g., dealers in secondhand goods), rather broad 
standards have been validated as constituting a special class of 
regulated activity .38 7 
In spite of these exceptions, the requirement that definite 
standards be stated usually prevents arbitrariness in municipal 
licensing.388 
Commerce Clause. License requirements or fees that bur-
den interstate commerce are invalid as violating the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution. Typical cases include 
registration and fees imposed upon out-of-state solicitors389 and 
interstate truckers.390 In either case, if the exactions are so 
onorous as to impede commerce, the ordinances will be struck 
down. Where reasonable, however, (i.e., only slightly burden-
some,391 or where the local interest outweighs the national)392 
an ordinance will not be invalidated on this ground. 
Equal Protection. Although classification is permissible in 
municipal licensing ordinances, to be valid they must be reasonably 
385. City of Buffalo v. Hill, 79 App. Div. 402, 406, 79 N.Y. Supp. 449, 
452 (1903). See also State ex rel. Altop v. City of Billings, 79 
Mont. 25, 255 Pac. 11 (1927). 
386. E.g., Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923). 
387. Ex parte Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 203 Pac. 398 (1921). 
388. E.g., City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937); 
Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, 82 S.W.2d 283 (1935); American 
Cancer Society, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 94 Ohio App. 131, 110 N.E. 
2d 605 (1952); and City of Texarkana v. Mabry, 94 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1936). 
389. Nafziger Baking Co. v. City of Salisbury, 329 Mo. 1014, 48 S.W.2d 
563 (1932). 
390. Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 57 S. Ct. 439 (1937). 
391. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 136 F. 
Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill. 1955). 
392. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 
463 (1949). 
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nondiscriminatory against particular persons or classes of per-
sons. 393 As a California court observed: 
The municipality may classify business where there is 
an intrinsic, natural and reasonable ground for such dis-
tinction, and may impose a different license burden on the 
different classes. It cannot classify, except on such basis, 
and cannot tax some falling within a class while exempting 
others of the same class.31}4 
Exemptions are permissible (e.g., to farmers peddling their own 
wares395 and disabled veterans396), but where such constitute un-
warranted favoritism they will be invalidated.397 Classifications, 
to be upheld, must be "genuine and substantial ••• as distinguished 
from. • .merely capricious and arbitrary"398; this is a require-
ment both of due process and equal protection of law. 
Freedom of Religion and Communication. Ordinances re-
quiring permits or licenses to use the public streets for pa-
rades399 or loud-speakers,400 public halls for meetings,401 or as 
prerequisites to soliciting funds for religious purposes,402 cannot 
accord to the licensing authority the power of censorship. Rea-
sonable requirements in the interest of the public safety, health, 
or welfare are, of course, unassailable.403 On the other hand, 
the expression of particular ideas or religious beliefs can neither 
be proscribed by ordinance directly, not limited indirectly by the 
unbridled discretion of a licensing official. As the Supreme Court 
put it: "The power of censorship inherent in this type of ordi-
nance reveals its vice.11 404 
Conflict with State Law. Finally, a local ordinance may be 
invalid on its face due to a conflict with state law. Proscribed 
393. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 67 S. Ct. 
1062 (1947). 
394. Kelly v. City of San Diego, 63 Cal. App. 2d 638, 644, 147 P .2d 127, 
131 (1944). 
395. Cf. State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313 (1939). 
396. E.g., Kelly v. City of Jefferson, 178 Ga. 427, 173 S.E. 133 (1934). 
397. Soares v. City of Santa Monica, 38 Cal. App. 2d 215, 100 P .2d 
1108 (1940). 
398. City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, supra note 374, at 331, 71 N.W.2d at 
859. 
399. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762 (1941). 
400. Saia v. New York, supra note 383. 
401. Cf. Hague v. C.I.O., supra note 345. 
402. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 
(1945). 
403. Cox v. New Hampshire, supra note 399. 
404. Saia v. New York, supra note 383, at 562, 68 S. Ct. at 1151. 
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activities, e.g., gambling,405 and any activities specifically pre-
cluded by state constitution406 or statute407 may not be licensed 
locally. In the absence of explicit pre-emption, however, the 
states vary widely as to duplicatory licensing, necessitating care-
ful scrutiny of the particular law of the forum where a case 
arises. Thus, although the general rule appears to be that state 
licensing of a particular activity or occupation does not preclude 
complementary action by municipal authorities, some jurisdictions 
rule to the contrary. Illustratively, an Ohio court has held that 
state permits to operate liquor stores implied a legislative inten-
tion that nothing further be required to engage in the activity, 
thereby prohibiting duplicatory licensing at the municipal level.408 
(2) Invalidity in Application 
Assuming the ordinance to be valid on the face, relief may, 
nevertheless, be forthcoming where municipal action thereunder 
is arbitrary or unreasonable.409 In the leading case of Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins,410 the Supreme Court of the United States described 
the requirement as follows: 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in 
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public 
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as prac-
tically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between 
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, 
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of 
the Constitution. 411 
405. State ex rel. Sergi v. City of Youngstown, 68 Ohio App. 254, 40 
N.E.2d 477 (1941). 
406. Cf. State v. Pehrson, supra note 395. 
407. City of Lincoln v. Dehner, 268 Ill. 175, 108 N.E. 991 (1915). 
408. Compare Spisak v. Village of Solon, 68 Ohio App. 290, 39 N.E.2d 
531 (1941), with Smith Co. v. Town of Elsmere, 308 Ky. 442, 214 S.W. 
2d 765 (1948). See also 3 Antieau, supra note 180, at 376-77, and 
cases cited therein. 
409. The cases rejecting municipal action under licensing and permit 
ordinances are, indeed, legion. E.g., City Council of City & County 
of Denver v. United Negroes Protective Ass'n, 76 Colo. 86, 230 
Pac. 598 (1924); Meyers v. Houghton, 137 Minn. 481, 163 N.W. 754 
(1917); Coyne v. Prichard, 272 Pa. 424, 116 Atl. 315 (1922); City 
of Mobridge v. Brown, 39 S.D. 270, 164 N.W. 94 (1917); and Con-
gregation Committee of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City and Council of 
Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 
410. 118 U.S. 356, 30 S. Ct. 220 (1886). 
411. Id. at 373-74, 30 S. Ct. at 227. 
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In applying the rule, the Court held invalid municipal action under 
an ordinance requiring perm its to use wooden buildings in the 
laundry business in San Francisco, as constituting a naked dis-
crimination against Chinese residents. Even granting considera-
ble discretion, its exercise must be predicated upon "some rea-
sonable foundation in fact, justifying its exercise.11412 On the 
other hand a mere showing of issuance of permits or licenses to 
others in similar circumstances is not sufficient to secure judi-
cial reversal on grounds of unreasonable application.413 
All the surrounding factors, including the attitude of neigh-
bors, is within the judicial purview in ascertaining reasonable-
ness. 414 Although reasons may not be required to accompany de-
nials,415 their existence strengthens judicial respect for the de-
cisions of the licensing body 416 and makes the task of the com-
plainant in establishing unreasonableness that much more difficult. 
Although reasonably exercised discretion (even where such 
is widely bounded) is unassailable, arbitrary and discriminatory 
determinations are thus seen to invest the injured party with 
grounds for judicial redress just as effective as if the ordinance 
were invalid on its face. 
5. Renewal 
Inasmuch as permits and licenses usually are issued for 
limited periods only, renewal is necessary to lawful continuation 
of the activity permitted.417 The rules indicated above with re-
gard to application, specific remedies, trial and appeal, etc., gen-
erally apply to renewals just as to the original request. Similar-
ly, renewal fees are assailable when unreasonable, disproportion-
ate to policing costs, or confiscatory .418 
A basic point in renewal cases deserving especial emphasis 
is that the grant of a license confers no vested right, either in 
property or in contract, to continue the activity in perpetuity. 419 
In fact the very requirement for renewal implies the limitation. 
412. State ex rel. Hardman v. Town of Glenville, 102 w. Va. 94, 97, 134 
S.E. 467, 468 (1926). 
413. Cf. Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 66 A.2d 225 (1949). 
414. French v. Cooper, 133 N.J.L. 246, 43 A.2d 880 (1945). 
415. Rowland v. State, 104 Ohio St. 366, 135 N.E. 622 (1922). 
416. Cf. State ex rel. Johnson v. City of Charleston, 91 W. Va. 318, 112 
S.E. 577 (1922). 
417. Cf. Kurowski v. Board of Adjustment of City of Bayonne, 11 N.J. 
Super. 433, 78 A.2d 429 (1951). 
418. City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P .2d 72 (1935). 
419. State ex rel. Hoffman v. Vocelle, 159 Fla. 88, :n So.2d 52 (1947). 
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Generally, renewals can be turned down on those grounds 
sufficient to warrant revocation420 or forfeiture, 421 or on the 
basis of a change of policy embracing legitimate police power 
purposes.422 On the other hand, arbitrary denial is not sustain-
able, and the denial or a renewal is likely to be held arbitrary 
where the license was issued many times previously and no rea-
sonable basis appears manifest for the current refusal.423 The 
scope of judicial oversight is, as in original request cases, the 
"arbitrary and capricious" rule.424 
6. Revocation 
a. In General; Grounds 
As stated above, the grant of a license confers no vested 
right in the licensee of a nature that the municipality cannot, in 
the interest of the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, re-
voke or suspend for cause. 425 Generally the same rules apply to 
govern the discretion of officials in revoking as in issuing li-
censes. 426 Such necessarily includes the requirement of ascer-
tainable standards reasonably related to the police power, and· of 
reasonable, unarbitrary action thereunder.427 
Unless specifically revocable at pleasure by the municipali-
ty, legal grounds must be posited for its validation.428 Such 
420. Librizzi v. Plunket, 126 N.J.L. 17, 16 A.2d 280 (1940). 
421. Zicherman v. Driscoll, 133 N.J.L. 586, 45 A.2d 620 (1946). 
422. Ibid. 
423. Katz v. Moss, 184 Misc. 133, 55 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1944). 
424. Zicherman v. Driscoll, supra note 421. Special rules as to the ef-
fect of appreciable property interests and particular types of activ-
ity, e.g., the liquor business, are the same as for revocation and 
are discussed infra at notes 440-43 and accompanying text. 
425. Such is usually authorized by statute or ordinance [ Richardson v. 
Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, 57 S.W.2d 797 (1932)), but has been implied 
from the power to issue. McKenzie v. McClellan, 62 Misc. 342, 
116 N.Y.S. 645 (1909). 
426. Richardson v. Reese, supra note 425. 
427. Middleton v. Kavenedas, 298 Ky. 296, 182 S.W.2d 896 (1944). All 
of the substantive grounds suggested above by which to attack re-
fusal of issuance would apply here as well. See notes 373-416 
supra, and accompanying text. 
428. Cf. Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distributing Co., supra note 352. 
Generally, statutes and ordinances authorize revocation for causes 
enumerated or for instances of specified misconduct. Burley v. 
Mayor, Counsellor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis, 182 Md. 307, 
34 A.2d 603 (1943). In the public interest, however, revocation is 
permissible even absent specific authorization. Southern Pacific 
Co. v. City of Portland, 227 U.S. 559, 33 S. Ct. 308 (1913). 
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grounds commonly include material misrepresentations in the ap-
plication,429 issuance through mistake or inadvertence,430 unfair 
or fraudulent practices by the licensee,431 issuance without author-
ity432 or under an invalid ordinance,433 issuance in violation of an 
ordinance, 434 and violations of terms and conditions of the licens-
ing ordinance,435 Where, on the other hand, no such cause may 
be found to exist, the licensee must evidently be worthy of con-
tinuing in business and revocation is impermissible.436 
b. Rights of Licensees 
(1) Effect of Reliance; Noxious Activities 
In addition to the requirements of unarbitrary action under 
reasonable statutes and the existence of legal grounds as precon-
ditions to revocation, certain rights may arise respecting conduct 
of the activity by which to attack municipal action taken in abridg-
ment thereof. Thus, it has been stated that while no vested right 
inheres in a license so as to tie the hands of the local boards, 
certain types of permits (e.g., authorizations to build) acquire 
something of a vested right after expenditure of large sums or 
undertaking of substantial construction in reliance on the permtt.437 
429. Ramundo v. Murdock, 265 App. Div. 526, 39 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1943). 
430. Howe Realty Co. v. City of Nashville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S.W.2d 
904 (1940). Neither estoppel [ Alexander Co. v. Owatonna, 222 
Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244 (1946)] nor laches [ S. B. Garage Corp. 
v. Murdock, 185 Misc. 55, 55 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1945)) is available 
against the government in such event, even where substantial ex-
penditures have been incurred. Building Commission of City of 
Detroit v. Kunin, 181 Mich. 604, 148 N .W. 207 (1914). 
431. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 402. 
432. Cf. City of San Antonio v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 27 S.W.2d 
868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). 
433. City of Martinsburg v. Miles, 95 W. Va. 391, 121 S.E. 285 (1924). 
434. Cf. Edge v. City of Bellaire, 200 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). 
435. Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N.E. 718 (1905). Of 
course, a change in the ordinance may contructively revoke a li-
cense, at least where substantial expenditures have not been incurred 
in reliance on the prior law. Davis v. Mayor & Aldermen of City 
of Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S.E. 6 (1918). 
436. Burley v. Mayor, Counsellor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis, 
supra note 428. 
437. Russell Dairy Stores, Inc. v. City of Chippewa Falls, 272 Wis. 138, 
74 N.W.2d 759 (1956). Such rights have been variously described 
as property rights [ Burton v. Lefevre, 72 R.I. 478, 53 Atl. 2d 456 
(1947)], contract rights [Katz v. Moss, supra note 423) and a li-
cense coupled with an interest. 
(: 
~ 
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In such circumstances, both substantial expenditure438 and the 
absence of notice 439 are imperative to secure the right. 
Somewhat of a double standard obtains in this regard, how-
ever. Businesses or activities which are potentially harmful, or 
which might be outlawed altogether (e.g., the sale of intoxicating 
liquors) fall without the ambit of the rule. Vested rights are 
never said to exist in such cases, not even upon substantial ex-
penditures; 440 and so long as not arbitrary or capricious, revo-
cation is permissible at will.441 Even in these cases, however, 
a particular licensee cannot be singled out and his authority can-
celled without cause. 442 Finally, the basis for revocation must 
affect all in the class equally or suffer invalidation as abridging 
equal protection of the law.443 
(2) Notice and Hearing 
As was stated above with regard to original issuance, there 
is no due process right to notice and hearing in revocation 
cases. 444 At least, summary revocation is permissible where 
specifically a part of the statute or ordinance,445 or where re-
vocation is authorized at the pleasure of the licensing board. 446 
Also, where necessary to protect the public health, safety, moral-
ity, or general welfare, summary revocation is recognized.447 
Usually, however, in the latter instance, a subsequent judicial 
hearing is afforded on the propriety of the peremptory action and 
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Where summary revocation is not authorized on one of the 
above grounds, notice and hearing are normally required. 449 Es-
pecially is this likely to be true where substantial expenditure, 
work, or obligation has been incurred under the license.450 The 
rationale for broadening the protection accorded subsequent to 
the grant of the license was well-phrased by a Texas court as 
follows: 
The revocation, or suspension, of a license to follow a 
lawful occupation is necessarily penal in its effect, and its 
imposition by a tribunal as the consequence of offensive 
misconduct involves all of the elements of a judicial pro-
ceeding, 451 
Generally, notice and hearing are required by statute or ordi-
nance in such cases.452 Even if no express requirements exist, 
however, reliance plus substantial investment apparently raises 
the protection to the status of constitutionally guaranteed right. 453 
Where obliged constitutionally or by statute, the require-
ments governing notice, hearing procedure, standards, matters of 
proof, etc., follow lines indicated above with regard to original 
issuance and will not be discussed further at this point. Of simi-
lar effect are the rules governing remedies available and sub-
stantive grounds of attack. 
C. Special Assessments 
1. Nature and Purpose 
The conditions of modern cities necessitate constant im-
provements. Indeed, the national complex, once almost exclusively 
agricultural, has so altered in form that today close to sixty-five 
per cent of our population resides in cities or towns. 454 The 
consequent urban sprawl has, in turn, generated the demand for 
new streets, retaining walls, sidewalks, sewers and drains, 
449. City of Texarkana v. Brachfield, 207 Ark. 774, 183 S.W.2d 304 
(1944). 
450. New York Southern Coal Terminal Corp. v. Woolley, 35 N.Y.S.2d 
443 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City 1942). 
451. Wichita Electric Co. v. Hinckley, 131 S.W. 1192, 1193 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1910). 
452. E.g., Flood v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 25 Ga. App. 455, 
103 S.E. 720 (1920). 
453. City of Texarkana v. Brachfield, supra note 449. 
454. I.e., of 2,500 or more population. Adrian, Governing Urban America 
16 (1955). 
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lighting systems, water pipes, parks, etc. The provision of such 
services, of course, entails considerable expense, the result of 
which is a conflict between the general interest in securing the 
improvement and the individual interest in being obliged to pay. 
Though, as in the case of licenses, the public interest has pre-
vailed to the extent of validating pecuniary exactions from the 
populace where expressly authorized by statute,455 a complement 
of individual rights remains. The purpose of this section is to 
ascertain the limitations upon government and the extent of indi-
vidual safeguards with respect to the special assessment tech-
nique of local financing. 
Although the purpose of the special assessment is the fi-
nancing of municipal services, not every improvement may be 
funded in this manner. The requirement is that the advantage 
accruing to the assessed property owners be primarily local as 
opposed to beneficial to the community as a whole.456 As the 
Arkansas court exposited the requirement: 
If we look for the technical or legal meaning of the 
phrase "local improvement," we find it to be a public im-
provement, which, although it may incidentally benefit the 
public at large, is made primarily for the accommodation 
and convenience of the inhabitants of a particular locality, 
and which is of such a nature as to confer a special bene-
fit upon the real ,Eroperty adjoining or near the locality of 
the improvement. 57 
Additionally, it should be kept in mind that local governments 
possess no inherent power to levy special assessments. Statutory 
authorization must be explicit,458 and local action pursuant there-
to must strictly accord with statutory requirements.459 
By way of a final word before proceeding, it should be em-
phasized that the practices of local governments vary widely in 
this regard. No attempt is made herein to catalogue the great 
455. Kansas City v. Jones Store Co. 325 Mo. 226, 28 S.W.2d 1008 (1930); 
and City of Wichita Falls v. Williams, 119 Tex. 163, 26 S.W.2d 910 
(1930). 
456. City of Waukegan v. DeWolf, 258 Ill. 374, 101 N.E. 532 (1913). 
457. Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 37, 55 S.W. 955, 957 (1899). 
As to what improvements are regarded as "local," see generally 
14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 72-108. 
458. Anderson v. City of North Miami, 99 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1957); Daniel 
v. Smith, 179 Ga. 79, 175 S.E. 240 (1934); City of Charlotte v. 
Kavanaugh, 221 N.C. 259, 20 S.E.2d 97 (1942). 
459. State ex rel. Wheless Inv. Co. v. City of Shreveport, 142 So. 641 
(La. App. 1932); and Marquette Homes, Inc. v. Town of Greenfield, 
244 Wis. 588, 13 N.W.2d 61 (1944). 
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diversity, nor would such listing seem imperative to the objec-
tives of the present work. Rather, attention is focused upon!!£!_-
cal procedures in effecting and enforcing such assessments and 
the remedies of the individual with respect thereto, that is, gov-
ernmental limitations and individual safeguards. As to a specific 
problem in a particular jurisdiction, the statutes and ordinances 
of the locality must be consulted. 
2. Procedures in Effecting 
a. Preliminary Resolution or Petition 
Typically, special assessments are initiated either by reso-
lution of intention by the governing bocty460 or a statutory board461 
of the municipal corporation, or by petition of the property own-
ers directly affected. 462 Whatever method is provided, strict 
compliance with the statutory procedure is necessitated, defective 
execution voiding the assessment.463 Indeed, where statutes re-
quire a resolution, its absence is deemed jurisdictional, 464 per-
mitting judicial inquiry at any stage in the proceedings and pre-
cluding the otherwise potent defense of estoppel.465 
The purpose of the resolution is to inform interested par-
ties of the prospective improvement and assessment. Notice, of 
course, to be effective must be published; and such publication 
must clearly indicate the nature, kind, and character of the im-
provement contemplated, 466 as well as, occasionally, the esti-
mated amount of the assessment.467 Ordinarily, a waiting period 
then ensues to permit protest by affected land owners. By statute 
or ordinance the provision is generally made that if a certain 
number of the property owners-usually two-thirds or a "majori-
ty" (more than half}-object to the proposed assessment, no fur-
ther action may be taken under the resolution. Those objecting 
to the assessment would, in this event, circulate a petition con-
testing the assessment among the property owners in the proposed 
460. E.g., Michigan Stat. Ann. § 5.1827 (1949). 
461. E.g., Wisconsin Laws ch. 275 (1931). 
462. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 429.03 (1945). 
463. City of Alexandria v. Shevnin, 240 La. 983, 126 S.2d 336 (1961) 
(petition by property owners). 
464. Partridge v. Lucas, 99 Cal. 519, 33 Pac. 1082 (1893). 
465. Infra notes 568-70, and accompanying text. 
466. Escott v. City of Miami, 107 Fla. 273, 144 So. 397 (1932). 
467. City of Mattoon v. Stump, 414 Ill. 319, 111 N.E.2d 551 (1953). 
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district, If the required number of signatures are obtained, the 
assessment is defeated.468 
Where initiation occurs by way of petition rather than by 
resolution, the local board or governing body determines the val-
idity of the procurement of the necessary signatures. 469 Although 
most courts deny finality to this determination,470 some states 
preclude judicial inquiry in holding that a finding of sufficiency 
of the petition is unassailable by collateral attack. 471 
From the vantage of the individual property owner, redress 
at the initial stage of the assessment procedure is thus confined 
to mustering solidarity of attitude and action by those similarly 
situated. Such is effected either by securing the statutory pro-
test figure to thwart the potential assessment in the case of reso-
lutions, or by failure of fulfillment of the statutory signature re-
quirement in the case of petitions. 
b. Assessment Districts 
Typically, the next step is the establishment of the assess-
ment, improvement, or taxing district.472 The method of deter-
mining the boundaries of the district is often explicitly prescribed 
by statute or charter.473 Legislative delegation to local officials 
of the authority to construct their own formula (e.g., block-by-
block, parallel lines, etc.) for demarcating the boundaries, how-
ever, is not invalid as an abdication of the legislative function. 
On the contrary, rather broad grants of discretion to municipal 
bodies have, in this regard, been readily sustained by the 
courts.474 Nevertheless, such mandatory and jurisdictional pre-
scriptions as are contained in the statute necessitate substantial 
468. E.g., Harder v. City of Springfield, 192 Ore. 676, 236 P.2d 432 
(1951). 
469. Cf. Nichols v. Tallmadge, 260 Mich. 576, 245 N.W. 521 (1932). 
470. Steinmuller v. City of Kansas City, 3 Kan. App. 45, 44 Pac. 600 
(1896). 
471. City of Avis v. Allen, 83 W. Va. 789, 99 S.E. 188 (1919). 
472. The legislative power to create such districts is incidental to the 
taxing power and is limited only by the Constitution. Cf. Chesebro 
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 306 U.S. 459, 59 S. 
Ct. 622 (1939). The delegation of this power to municipalities has 
been uniformly upheld. E.g., Hartman v. Nimmack, 116 Mont. 392, 
154 P.2d 279 (1944). On such special districts generally, see Pock, 
Independent Special Districts: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area 
Problems (1962). 
473. E.g., Bass v. City of Gasper, 28 Wyo. 387, 205 Pac. 1008 (1922). 
474. E.g., City of Tulsa v. McCormick, 63 Okla. 238, 164 Pac. 985 
(1917). 
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compliance, 475 and failure in this regard renders the establish-
ment illegal.476 
The usual procedure for creating the district is by resolu-
tion of the municipal councU477 or by ordinance. 478 The descrip-
tion of boundaries must be certain and accurate479 and may not 
include property not benefited by the improvement. 480 Generally, 
the governing body's duty to demarcate boundaries cannot be dele-
gated, although the preparation of initial plans or outlines by city 
engineers is permissible. 481 Within these limitations, however, 
broad discretion inheres in the municipal body in fixing the bounds 
of the district.482 The theory is that the establishment constitutes 
a legislative act, and, in consequence, is conclusive absent a 
showing of fraud. 483 As the South Carolina court stated: 
The Legislature itself may create a district of this 
kind and fix its boundaries. Where it does so, the land-
owners included therein are not entitled to a hearing on the 
question of whether their lands will be benefited. Prior in-
quiry by the legislative body is presumed. 484 
And by the Missouri court: "[T] he determination was conclusive, 
absent fraud or oppression, and not subject to review by the 
courts.11485 
On the other hand, discretion is not unlimited either. Where, 
for example, a purely private charge is contemplated under the 
guise of setting off an assessment district, 486 where action is 
without any regard to benefits derived,487 where the boundaries 
are uncertain, 488 or in the extent of fraud or demonstrable 
475. Marret v. Jefferson County Construction Co., 161 Ky. 845, 171 
s.w. 396 (1914). 
476. City of St. Louis v. Koch, 169 Mo. 587, 70 S.W. 143 (1902). 
477. E.g., Bass v. City of Casper, supra note 473. 
478. E.g., In re Eighth Avenue Northwest, Seattle, 77 Wash. 570, 138 
Pac. 10 (1914). 
479. Whitney v. Common Council of the Village of Hudson, 69 Mich. 189, 
37 N.W. 184 (1888). 
480. Lipscomb v. Lenon, 169 Ark. 610, 276 S.W. 1088 (1925). 
481. Cf. Scofield v. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437 (1868). 
482. Seested v. Dickey, 318 Mo. 192, 300 s.w. 1088 (1927). 
483. Schaer v. Little Rock, 179 Ark. 68, 14 S. W.2d 237 (1929). 
484. Mills Mill v. Hawkins, 232 S.C. 515, 529, 103 S.E.2d 14, 20 (1957). 
485. Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Service, Inc., 361 Mo. 504, 
512, 235 S.W.2d 355, 359 (1950). 
486. Lipscomb v. Lenon, supra note 480 (auditorium). 
487. Hanscom v. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N.W. 739 (1881). 
488. Whitney v. Common Council of Village of Hudson, supra note 479. 
76 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
mistake, 489 judicial inquiry is permissible. Where review is thus 
available, the typical remedy is an injunction.490 
c. Finding of Necessity 
Although not required by federal 491 or state492 constitutions, 
statutes or charters frequently provide for the filing, at this 
stage, of plans, specifications and cost estimates. 493 The pur-
pose of the filing, where authorized, is to afford notice of the 
prospective assessment. Ordinarily, in such event, a public hear-
ing on the question of the necessity of the improvement follows 
the giving of notice;494 and whether the hearing be labelled "leg-
islative" or "judicial" it must at least be fair.495 Typically, 
this means no more than knowledge plus an opportunity to re-
but.496 
After the hearing, or in its absence if none is required, the 
public body makes a determination of the necessity of the im-
provement, and then proceeds, by resolution or ordinance, to or-
der the improvement and to indicate the total amount to be as-
sessed.497 Judicial inquiry is severely limited at this stage. As 
the New Mexicd court stated: 
[T]he city commission is clothed with the power to deter-
mine what local improvement is required, its nature, when 
it shall be made and the manner of its construction. These 
matters are confided to the discretion of the municipal author-
ities, and this discretion, when honestly and reasonably ex-
ercised, its determination is conclusive and cannot be re-
viewed by the courts except for want of authority or fraud.498 
And, in the words of the South Carolina court: 
489. State ex rel. Scotten v. Brill, 58 Minn. 152, 59 N.W. 989 (1894). 
490. Engstrom v. City of Wichita, 121 Kan. 122, 245 Pac. 1033 (1926). 
491. Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U.S. 432, 22 S. Ct. 397 (1902). 
492. Hodges v. City of Roswell, 31 N.M. 384, 247 Pac. 310 (1926). 
493. Richardi v. Village of Bellaire, 153 Mich. 560, 116 N.W. 1066 
(1908). 
494. E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. §5.1828 (1949). 
495. Cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, 170 Cal. App. 2d 
637, 339 P.2d 933 (1959). 
496. Cf. Phoenix Brick & Construction Co. v. Gentry County, 257 Mo. 
392, 166 s.w. 1034 (1914). 
497. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. §428.08 (1945). 
498. Shalit v. City Commission of City of Albuquerque, 62 N.M. 55, 59, 
304 P.2d 578, 580 .(1956). 
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( TJ he Legislative determination can be assailed under the 
due process and equal protection clauses 'only where the 
legislative action is arbitrary, wholly unwarranted, a flag-
rant abuse, and by reason of its arbitrary character a con-
fiscation of particular property.•499 
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Where fraud or extreme arbitrariness is manifest, however, in-
junctive relief is available.500 
d. Determination of Individual Assessment 
The officers or boards by whom the special assessments 
are to be made are prescribed by statute or charter. Usually, 
the task of inspection and calculation of benefits to individual 
properties is delegated to subordinates. Upon completion of the 
assessment roll these officials then submit their findings to the 
statutory board for review and confirmation. The delegation is 
sustained on the ground that examination of the premises consti-
tutes the exercise of merely "administrative" functions.501 
The mode of the assessment may be prescribed by consti-
tution, statute, or charter,502 or it may be left to the discretion 
of the municipality .503 In any event the determination is con-
sidered to be legislative and nonreviewable, absent fraud or pat-
ent mistake.504 The ordinance must, however, embody a definite 
and just plan,505 prescribing rather definitely the criteria to be 
employed by the assessors in making the individual determina-
tions.506 Plans differ widely, and some, for example the "block-
by-block" method, have been adopted by some localities and re-
jected by others.507 Everywhere, however, assessments must be 
predicated upon the benefits received by the property from the 
improvement;508 thus, an assessment based upon the costs of the 
improvement-i.e., in determining the individual assessment by 
499. Mills Mill v. Hawkins, supra note 484, at 529-30, 103 S.E.2d at 20. 
500. City of Chicago v. Brown, 205 Ill. 568, 69 N.E. 65 (1903). 
501. Auditor General v. Bishop, 161 Mich. 117, 125 N.W. 715 (1910). 
502. E.g., Village of Milan v. Looby, 320 Ill. 515, 151 N.E. 501 (1926). 
503. E.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. City of Leavenworth, 81 Wash. 511 
142 Pac. 1155 (1914). 
504. Flynn v. Chiappari, 191 Cal. 139, 215 Pac. 682 (1923). 
505. Panfil v. City of Detroit, 246 Mich. 149, 224 N.W. 616 (1929). 
506. In re Henner, 125 Misc. 472, 211 N.Y.S. 334 (1925). 
507. Compare Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. City of Kingman, 122 Kan. 
504, 252 Pac. 220 (1927), with In re Brondell Ave., New York City, 
150 N.Y.S. 403 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City 1914). 
508. City of Ft. Myers v. State, 95 Fla. 704, 117 So. 97 (1928). 
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dividing the cost of the improvement by the total number of prop-
erty owners-is invalid.509 
Ordinarily, upon completing the initial determination the · as-
sessing officer appends a certificate to the roll, indicating the 
manner in which the assessment was made. Where properly pre-
pared, the certificate is usually conclusive as to the procedure 
employed 510 but not as to the extent of benefits.511 
e. Notice and Hearing 
As a rule, before assessments may be finalized against in-
dividual property, the owners must be accorded notice thereof, 
together with the opportunity to be heard and to contest on 
grounds of validity and fairness.512 Such is sometimes said to 
constitute a requirement of due process under both the federal 
and state constitutions.513 Unless the requirement is waived,514 
failure to give notice and hearing may render the assessment 
void whether or not they are expressly required in the enabling 
legislation.515 Where notice is provided by statute, the require-
ment is mandatory and jurisdictional, and action in contravention 
thereof is wholly void.516 Generally, substituted service is suf-
ficient,517 but there is authority contra.518 Where required, the 
hearing is not subject to the rigors of a case at law, though 
compliance with all statutory requisites is essential; but, it must 
at least be fair.519 As a California court reasoned: 
Until such facts resting in the minds of the council-
men are presented in the record, the objectors have no 
509. Watkins v. Zwietusch, 47 Wis. 513, 3 N.W. 35 (1879). 
510. Walker v. City of Detroit, 138 Mich. 639, 101 N.W. 847 (1904). 
511. Auditor General v. O'Neill, 143 Mich. 343, 106 N.W. 895 (1906). 
But see Walker v. City of Detroit, supra note 510. 
512. Jarvis v. Mayor & Council of Berlin, 153 Md. 156, 138 Atl. 7 (1927). 
513. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Roosevelt County, 134 Mont. 355, 332 
P.2d 501 (1958). 
514. Griffin v. City of Waxahachie, 257 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). 
515. Ulman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 70 Atl. 
141 (1890); and Hutchins v. Board of Supervisors of Alcorn County· 
227 Miss. 766, 87 S.2d 54 (1956). That the statute itself may be un-
constitutional, cf. Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 13 S. Ct. 750 
(1893). 
516. City of Dubuque v. Wooten, 28 Iowa 571 (1870). 
517. Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 (1885). 
518. Meadowbrook Manor, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Park, 258 Minn. 266, 
104 N.W.2d 540 (1960). 
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means of knowing on what facts the judgment rests so as 
to enable them to controvert them. In the instant case the 
city relies, in the final analysis, not on the real facts 
showing a benefit to the Safeway property-of which there 
is none-but rather on the unknown factors which give rise 
to the judgment which were locked up in the minds of the 
councilmen and not disclosed in the council record. This 
does not afford fair play under American standards ... ,520 
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It must be emphasized, however, that due process is not 
offended in all cases where notice and hearing are not provided.521 
At least this seems to be the rule where the council itself im-
poses the individual assessment.522 As the Florida court said: 
The Legislature has entire control over the imposition 
of special assessments for local improvements and may it-
self make the assessments without preliminary hearings as 
to benefits, and such procedure constitutes due process of 
law in the ... constitutional sense ... ,523 
At least, however, where a board-as opposed to the local gov-
erning body-makes the determination, due process seems to re-
quire that the person to be assessed be given an opportunity to 
be heard "at some time before the land is finally burdened by 
the assessment."524 
f. Confirmation, Correction, Revision 
The final act necessary to constitute the assessment is con-
firmation by the officer, board, or tribunal authorized by statute 
or ordinance to do so.525 Typically, a correction procedure is 
provided at this stage, with the power to make revision outright 
or to refer the roll back to the assessing officers, or to annul 
the roll and order a new assessment.526 In such proceedings 
the only question protestants may raise is whether their property 
was assessed more or less than it was benefited, or more or 
519. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, supra note 495. 
520. Id. at 648, 339 P.2d at 940. 
521. Thayer Lumber Co. v. City of Muskegon, 152 Mich. 59, 115 N.W. 
957 (1908), 
522. Shalit v. City Commission of City of Albuquerque, supra note 498. 
523. Town of Gulfport v. Mendels, 127 Fla. 730, 732, 174 So. 8, 9 (1937). 
524. Nev-Cal Electric Securities Co. v. Imperial Irr. District, 85 F .2d 
886, 901 (9th Cir. 1936), 
525. Frank v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City, 6 N.J. Misc. 446, 141 
Atl. 689 (1928). 
526. E.g., Beatty v. Panhandle Const. Co., 275 S.W. 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1925). 
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less than its proportionate share of the total cost of the improve-
ment, and whether the proceedings preliminary to the improve-
ment were or were not valid.527 Once confirmation is effected, 
the determination is deemed conclusive, absent fraud, collusion, 
or jurisdictional defect.528 All presumptions are indulged in favor 
of validity of the assessment.529 
Finally, an assessment record is prepared and filed, and 
the assessment made an obligation upon individual property own-
ers by ordinance or resolution as local law may require.530 
3. Enforcement Proceedings 
a. Actions Available 
Upon failure to make the payment assessed, the defaulting 
property owner becomes subject to enforcement proceedings as 
provided by the statute or charter authorizing the assessment. 
The statutory remedy is usually exclusive in the particular 
case;531 although as between jurisdictions, great contrariety is 
manifest in the remedies prescribed.532 
In some states, the special assessment is placed on the tax 
lists of the city or county and collected in the same manner as 
taxes.533 Thus, summary judgment or an order for sale of the 
land might be employed,534 as might an execution to enforce an 
assessment without suit.535 Still other states provide for action 
on a special tax bill536 or certificate of indebtedness.537 In some 
527. DeKoven v. City of Lake View, 131 Ill. 541, 23 N.E. 240 (1890). 
528. Hale v. City of Minot, 52 N.D. 39, 201 N.W. 848 (1924); and Ex 
parte Finley, 246 Ala. 218, 20 S.2d 98 (1944). 
529. Rosche v. City of Hollywood, 55 S.2d 909 (Fla. 1952). 
530. In the event that the money raised proves inadequate fully to fund 
the improvement ,additional pro-rata assessments are ordinarily 
permitted by statute. E.g., In re Lower Baraboo River Drainage 
Dist. v. Schirmer, 199 Wis. 230, 225 N.W. 331 (1929). Where, how-
ever, the inadequacy occurs solely because of nonpayment by cer-
tain property owners, additional assessments are generally denied. 
Schildknecht v. City of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 33, 13 N.W.2d 577 
(1944). 
531. E.g., Kansas City & Travellers Ins. Co. v. Field, 285 Mo. 253, 
226 s.w. 27 (1920). 
532. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 558. 
533. Saline Branch Drainage Dist. v. Urbana-Champaign Sanitary Dist., 
395 Ill. 26, 69 N.E.2d 251 (1946). 
534. Cf. White v. City of Williamsburg, 213 Ky. 90, 28 S.W. 486 (1926). 
535. City of Waycross v. Cowart, 164 Ga. 721, 139 S.E. 521 (1927). 
536. Cf. City of St. Louis v. Stoddard, 15 Mo. App. 173 (1884). 
537. Beers v. Johnson, 117 Fla. 593, 158 So. 41 (1934). 
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states, collection by means of distress warrants is authorized;538 
and in Pennsylvania enforcement is by way of scire facias.539 
Suits in assumpsit are common,540 as are foreclosures upon the 
lien which practically· everywhere attaches to the property of the 
nonpaying owner.541 
Sometimes provision is made by statute for the contractor 
who makes improvement to enforce collection against the non-
paying property owner. Typical actions, in this event, include 
foreclosure proceedings,542 civil suits to enforce the lien at 
law,543 or actions in equity.544 Where the statute or charter 
authorizing the assessment specifies no procedure for enforce-
ment, an ordinary foreclosure suit in equity is permissible as 
inherent to equity jurisdiction.545 
Although by no means exhaustive, the foregoing indicates 
the great variety of enforcement procedures available as against 
the nonpaying property owner. For the pertinent procedures-re-
specting, for example, jurisdiction and venue, pleadings and evi-
dence, parties plaintiff, etc.-of a particular remedy in a particu-
lar jurisdiction, the local law in issue must be consulted. Such 
vary widely, precluding any meaningful discussion in a work of 
this sort. 
b. Defenses of the Property Owner 
Defenses, as well as forms of action, may be defined by 
statute or by ordinance.546 Caution, therefore, counsels judicious 
purview of local law to prevent denial of a defense otherwise 
available (e.g., because not timely made). 
The general rule is that successful defense must be predi-
cated upon particular injury to the defendent, e.g., an increase 
538. Schaefer v. Woodmere Cemetery Ass'n, 256 Mich. 332, 239 N.W. 
300 (1931). 
539. Vendetti Appeal, 181 Pa. Super. 214, 124 A.2d 448 (1956). 
540. E.g., City of South Fulton v. Parker, 160 Tenn. 634, 28 S.W.2d 639 
(1930). 
541. E.g., Wilson v. City of Medford, 107 Ore. 624, 215 Pac. 184 (1923). 
542. Cf. National Exchange Bank v. Smith, 63 Ind. App. 574, 114 N .E. 
881 (1917). 
543. Town of Medford ex rel. Fuss v. Early, 194 Okla. 566, 153 P.2d 
633 (1944). 
544. Lamar v. Rivers, 235 Ala. 130, 178 So. 16 (1937). 
545. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 562-62. 
546. Cf. Farley v. Uvalda Paving Co., 74 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1934). 
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in general taxes,547 decrease in value of the property,548 or de-
struction of improvements.549 On the other hand, lack of specific 
benefit550 and the question of the necessity of the improvement,551 
are unavailable by way of defense. Such matters are said to be 
legislative and thus without judicial oversight,552 
Of course, the jurisdictional defense of ultra vires is al-
ways available (e.g., where statutory authority was confined to 
repair of a street, an assessment for reconstruction constituted 
sufficient answer in a suit for collection553). Failure of substan-
tial compliance with the improvement contract may be raised by 
way of defense. The theory, of course, is that a person should 
not be compelled to pay for that which he has not received-in 
this case, the improvement. On the other hand, strict perform-
ance is not essential-e.g., failure to begin and complete work 
within a time period as stipulated by contract {where the work 
was subsequently completed and paid for by the city) was held not 
to render the contract a nullity from the beginning.554 Finally, 
arbitrary and wilful over-assessment is grounds for successful 
defense, although much latitude of discretion belongs to the legis-
lative department, and the courts will not interfere with it unless 
there is some manifest abuse.555 
Such constitute the three principal grounds for defending 
against enforcement proceedings. The specifics are, in esse, the 
same as for an attack upon the assessment generally, and will be 
discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.556 
c. Personal Liability 
The states differ widely on the legality of legislation pur-
porting to impose personal liability upon a property owner re-
specting an assessment levied against his property. In explaining 
the rationale for repudiating personal liability, a Texas court said: 
547. Cf. Grecian v. City of Hill City, 123 Kan. 542, 256 Pac. 163 (1927). 
548. Stockman v. City of Trenton, 132 Fla. 406, 181 So. 383 (1938). 
549. Town of Winnfield v. Thomas, 5 S.2d 587 (La. App. 1942). 
550. St. Louis v. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S.W. 910 (1888). 
551. Heman v. Franklin, 99 Mo. App. 346, 73 S.W. 314 (1903). 
552. Cf. Duling Brothers Co. v. City of Huntington, 120 W. Va. 85, 196 
S.E. 552 (1938). 
553. Parker-Washington Co. v. Meriwether, 172 Mo. App. 344, 158 s.w. 
74 (1913). 
554. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Raymo, 68 Md. 569, 13 Atl. 
383 (1888). 
555. Haisch v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 435, 38 Pac. 1131 (1894). 
556. Infra notes 615-49, and accompanying text. 
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In those states where assessments for improvements 
are limited to benefits conferred, the authorities are con-
flicting on the question whether an assessment may be con-
stitutionally imposed UPon an owner of property benefited, 
which may be collected out of any of his property general-
ly; the theory of the cases denying the Power being that 
such assessments are purely in the nature of a local tax 
for a local improvement, and that to extend the liability of 
the owner beyond the value of the lot benefited (uPon which 
a lien may be lawfully imposed) is to burden him with the 
payment for a benefit in which property owners generally 
participate. In other words, that the property of the owner 
not especially benefited by the local assessment is affected 
by the improvement only, as is the property of all other 
members of the community, and that as to it there is no 
sound reason for a discrimination in imPosing the burden of 
the assessment.557 
Contrariwise, the Pennsylvania court stated: 
Assessment against the property itself is only a method of 
compelling the owner to pay and thus relieve his property 
from the charge or lien against it. • • • [ T] he remedy for 
the collection of such assessments or taxes, as well as 
every other species of tax, is a matter of legislative dis-
cretion.558 
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Thus, in addition to the in rem actions mentioned above, the 
possibility exists of an action in personam. Statutory authority 
must expressly authorize such procedure,559 however, and, ac-
cording to an early United States Supreme Court case, nonresi-
dent property owners may not be so subjected. 560 Nevertheless, 
the liberalization in recent years of the personal jurisdiction re-
quirement may forecast some alteration in this latter rule. 
4. Remedies of the Individual 
a. Standing, Limitations, Estoppel 
Successful attack upon a special assessment, is, at the out-
set, dependent upon standing. Accordingly, to be a proper party 
557. Eubank v. City of Fort Worth, 173 S.W. 1003, 1004 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1915). Texas, however, has expressly upheld the authority of the 
legislature to imPose a personal liability. Shambaugh v. Smithey, 
59 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). 
558. In re Vacation of Centre Street, 115 Pa. St. 247, 254, 8 Atl. 56, 59 
(1886). 
559. Cf. John K. & Catherine Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 
290 U.S. 89, 54 S. Ct. 38 (1933). 
560. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 19 S. Ct. 379 (1899). 
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plaintiff it is essential that the complainant be personally injured 
by the proceeding.561 It is not enough that a defect exists gen-
erally, 562 or that others were unfairly assessed;563 the plaintiff 
must demonstrate detriment to himself. 
In addition to the general requirement of standing, statutes 
and ordinances prescribe a multiplicity of conditions and pro-
cedures necessary of compliance to effect relief. Where resort 
to an administrative board is provided, this remedy must, of 
course, be exhausted prior to judicial assault.564 In addition, 
complaints must be seasonably made. If a time period is spelled 
out in statute or ordinance, such is mandatory; and a suit brought 
thereafter will, absent fraud, or lack of jurisdiction, be set 
aside.565 Even where statutory limitations are absent, the plain-
tiff must act before expenses are incurred or be barred by 
laches,566 Some states go so far as to hold that delay in object-
ing, even aside from reliance, will constitute a waiver,567 And 
finally, estoppel, in many cases, may serve to bar relief (e.g., 
of one who originally petitioned for the improvement,568 who ac-
quiesced in the construction,569 or who accepted its benefits57°) . 
b. Judicial Redress 
(1) Specific Remedies 
Injunction. Other than the typical administrative procedure 
of objecting before the municipal officers vested with jurisdic-
tion,571 the most common form of rederss in an assessment pro-
ceeding is by suit for injunctive relief. Thus: 
Equitable relief is frequently sought against an invalid 
assessment in the form of an injunction to prevent the sale 
of the property assessed to satisfy the assessment, or in 
561. Birnie v. LaGrande, 78 Ore. 531, 153 Pac. 415 (1915). 
562. Hearne v. City of Catlettsburg, 239 Ky. 592, 40 S.W.2d 293 (1931). 
563. In re Twentieth Street Northeast, Seattle, 95 Wash. 5, 163 Pac. 12 
(1917). 
564. City of Cincinnati v. Board of Education of City School Dist., 63 
Ohio App. 549, 27 N.E.2d 413 (1940). 
565. Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 121 Okla. 18, 247 Pac. 15 (1926). 
566. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Rahway, 3 N.J. Misc. 1105, 130 
Atl. 642 (1925). 
567. Noyes v. Chambers & DeGolyer, 202 Cal. 542, 261 Pac. 1006 (1927). 
568. City of High Point v. Clark, 211 N.C. 607, 119 S.E. 318 (1937). 
569. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 105 N.W. 
563 (1905). 
570. City of Beggs v. Kelly, 110 Okla. 274, 238 Pac. 466 (1925). 
571. Manning v. City of Ames, 192 Iowa 998, 184 N.W. 347 (1921). 
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the form of a suit to set aside the assessment or the sale 
as a cloud upon the title of the owner. Equitable relief is 
ordinarily given in such cases if the assessment is a lien 
upon the property, and if its existence, or the fact of a sale 
to satisfy such assessment, either of them constitutes a 
cloud upon the title.572 
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Of course, such form of action is predicated upon the demon-
stration of grounds for equitable intervention (e.g., to avoid a 
multiplicity of suits or prevent irreparable injury573). And, it 
has been held that where the assessment is merely voidable, as 
opposed to wholly void, equity will decline enjoinment,574 Final-
ly, a clear, quick remedy at law (e.g., certiorari) must be un-
available.575 
Contrary to other · remedies, no specific statutory relief by 
way of injunction need be spelled out in the statute. All that is 
required for equity jurisdiction to attach is that some form of 
statutory relief be provided.576 Where the action is allowed, 
normal rules of procedure in equity cases apply.577 
Appeal. Although this remedy is not accorded as a matter 
of constitutional right,5 78 most assessment statutes expressly 
authorize it.579 As to limitations of time,580 the means of per-
fecting the appeal, notice,581 parties,582 objections,583 etc., indi-
vidual statutes must be scrutinized. The scope of review is, 
likewise, governed by local law, some states holding the general 
rules as to appeals in other civil cases to govern.584 Others 
permit a hearing de novo.585 Nevertheless, the general rule is 
572. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 485. 
573. City of Dallas v. Wright, 120 Tex. 190, 36 S.W.2d 973 (1931). 
574. Cf. Lenon v. Street Improvement Dist. No. 512, 181 Ark. 318, 26 
S.W.2d 572 (1930). 
575. Cf. Hodge v. City of Princeton, 227 Ky. 481, 13 S.W.2d 491 (1929). 
576. City of Dallas v. Wright, supra note 573. 
577. See generally Fairmount Land Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 145 Md. 391, 125 Atl. 796 (1924). 
578. Hughes v. Parker, 148 Ind. 692, 48 N.E. 243 (1897). 
579. E.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Johnson, 123 Md. 320, 
91 Atl. 156 (1914). 
580. Thomas Bennett Estate, Inc. v. City of New Haven, 117 Conn. 25, 
166 Atl. 680 (1933). 
581. Stovall v. City of Jasper, 218 Ala. 282, 118 So. 467 (1928). 
582. State ex rel. Conn v. Henderson, 130 Fla. 288, 177 So. 539 (1937). 
583. Cf. City of Kankakee v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 257 Ill. 298, 
100 N.E. 996 (1913). 
584. Haynes Automobile Co. v. City of Kokomo, 186 Ind. 9, 114 N.E. 
758 (1917). 
585. Cf. Austin v. City of Anniston, 243 Ala. 214, 8 So.2d 410 (1942). 
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that the court may not itself make the assessment. Such, it has 
been held, would constitute judicial usurpation of a legislative 
function. For this reason, remand to the proper municipal author-
ities with instructions is said to constitute the extent of the judi-
cial purview on appeal.586 
Certiorari. This discretionary writ is available in most 
states,587 but not in all,588 to test special assessment proceed-
ings. Where allowed, the proceeding is not de novo, but is con-
fined entirely to the record.589 According to usual principles, 
laches,590 limitations,591 and the existence of another remedy592 
will bar the action. The scope of review is confined to questions 
of law,593 though the court may, where manifest inequality exists 
on the record, change an individual assessment to accord with 
that on similarly situated property of others.594 
Recovery Back. Where a payment is made involuntarily and 
the assessment subsequently is rendered void, many statutes per-
mit recovery back of the amount paid.595 Absent statutory au-
thorization, the action quasi ex contractu is generally denied,596 
although the New York Court allowed recovery by way of assump-
sit where no other adequate way appeared possible to protect the 
property owner .597 Abandonment of an improvement, before com-
pletion and where no substantial benefit accrues to the property 
owner, usually sustains the action.598 
586. Cox v. Thurber Brick Co., 86 s.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). 
587. E.g., Holloway v. Township of Pennsauken, 12 N.J. 371, 97 A.2d 
141 (1953). 
588. E.g., Whitbeck v. Common Council of Village of Hudson, 50 Mich. 
86, 14 N.W. 708 (1883). 
589. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 552. 
590. Ploch v. City of Clifton, 126 N .J .L. 199, 18 A.2d 546 (1941). 
591. Whittingham v. Township of Millburn, 90 N.J.L. 344, 10.0 Atl. 854 
(1916). 
592. Cf. Atkinson v. City Council of Newton, 169 Mass. 240, 47 N.E. 
1029 (1897). 
593. People ex rel. James v. Gilon, 126 N.Y. 640, 27 N.E. 285 (1891). 
594. People ex rel. Connelly v. Reis, 109 App. Div. 748, 96 N.Y.S. 597 
(1905). 
595. Corby v. Detroit, 180 Mich. 208, 146 N.W. 670 (1914). 
596. Forest Hill Cemetery Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 303 Mich. 56, 5 
N.W.2d 564 (1942). 
597. Adrico Realty Co. v. City of New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732 
(1928). 
598. Chapman v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 186, 79 P.2d 128 
(1938). 
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Miscellaneous Remedies. Other actions include suits by 
way of abatement for excessive assessments,599 petitions to de-
termine the lawful amount of assessments,600 bills to quiet title,601 
the writ of prohibition to halt a levy or collection thereof,602 and 
declaratory judgment actions.603 These latter remedies, it must 
be emphasized, require statutory authorization; and where such is 
absent, they will generally be denied.604 
(2) Trial and Appeal 
Assuming standing, timely complaint, the absence of estop-
pel, and selection of the appropriate form of action, the case will 
proceed to trial where the normal rules of evidence apply.605 
Every presumption favors validity,606 however, and the burden of 
proof is everywhere upon the complainant.607 Further, the stand-
ard employed by many courts is greater than mere preponderance 
of the evidence;608 indeed, it has been said that only proof of 
great force will be sufficient to overturn the assessment.609 
Some statutes go so far as to deem municipal determina-
tions (e.g., as to benefits) conclusive.610 In this event, even 
proof of great force is insufficient to the complainant, proof of 
fraud or extreme arbitrariness then defining the judicial pur-
view .611 In the words of a federal district court: 
It has also been generally held that the determination 
of assessments by municipal corporations of adjacent 
599. City of Lowell v. Lowell Building Corp., 309 Mass. 165, 34 N.E.2d 
618 (1941). 
600. In re Nemzek, 239 Minn. 351, 58 N.W.2d 746 (1953). 
601. Van Zanten v. City of Grand Haven, 174 Mich. 282, 140 N.W. 471 
(1913). 
602. This remedy, however, is frequently denied. LeConte v. Trustees 
& Marshall of Town of Berkeley, 57 Cal. 269 (1881). 
603. City of Tallahassee v. Baker, 53 S.2d 875 (Fla. 1951). 
604. E.g., City and County of Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 198, 
274 Pac. 743 (1929) (declaratory judgment). 
605. Cf. Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 154 Wis. 121, 
142 N.W. 476 (1913). 
606. Snyder v. City of Belle Plaine, 180 Iowa 679, 163 N.W. 594 (1917). 
607. E.g., Driscoll v. Inhabitants of Northbridge, 210 Mass. 151, 96 N.E. 
59 (1911). 
608. State v. Mayor & City Council of Passaic, 51 N .J .L. 109, 16 Atl. 62 
(1888). 
609. State v. Mayor & Common Council of City of Newark, 48 N.J.L. 
101, 2 Atl. 627, (1886). 
610. Cf. Broussard v. Oldham, 142 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). 
611. Driscoll v. Inhabitants of Northbridge, supra note 607. 
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property for local improvements is a matter for the city 
council acting in its legislative capacity, and that such de-
termination is conclusive, in the absence of fraud or con-
duct so arbitrary as to be the equivalent of fraud, or so 
manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable as to be palpably un-
just and oppressive.612 
Although not required constitutionally,613 many statutes per-
mit a jury trial in assessment cases.614 In such event, normal 
rules as to the division of questions of law and fact between the 
judge and jury, respectively, apply. In appeal to higher courts, 
the usual procedure incident to appeal of civil actions governs. 
c. Substantive Grounds 
As in the case of licenses, municipal action in special as-
sessment proceedings may be attacked on one of two categories 
of grounds: (1) invalidity of the enabling statute or ordinance or 
(2) invalidity in application. These will be considered in turn. 
(1) Invalidity of Statute or Ordinance 
Ultra Vires. As indicated previously,615 municipal corpora-
tions are endowed with no inherent power to fund local improve-
ments by special assessments. Authority must exist, either by 
statute or charter. The requirement is, in fact, jurisdictional, 
and enacting ordinances must strictly conform therewith.616 As 
the Florida court said: 
( M] unicipal corporations have no inherent power to levy 
special assessments, and in order for such assessments to 
be valid they must be made pursuant to legislative authority 
and in accordance with the method prescribed by the legis-
lature. 617 
Further, the power is "strictly construed, and every reasonable 
doubt as to the extent or limitation of such power and authority 
612. Kissane v. City of Anchorage, 159 F. Supp. 733, 737 (D. Alaska 
1958). 
613. City of Tuscaloosa v. Hill, 14 Ala. App. 541, 69 So. 486 (1915). 
614. E.g., City of Chicago v. Van Schaack Bros. Chemical Works, Inc., 
33 0 Ill. 264, 161 N .E. 486 (1928). 
615. Supra notes 458 & 459, and accompanying text. 
616. Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Gough, 54 Ind. App. 438, 102 N .E. 
453 (1913). 
617. Anderson v. City of North Miami, 99 So.2d 861, 863-64 (Fla. 1957). 
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is resolved against the city and in favor of the taxpayer."618 Thus, 
absent a statute or in the event of variation in the enacting or-
dinance, the contesting property owner possesses a potent argu-
ment that the proceeding is ultra vires and void. 
Public and Local. Municipal financing by this means re-
quires that the . improvement be public in nature, as opposed to 
merely private.619 For example, a private driveway could not 
validly be constructed with the proceeds from a special assess-
ment; benefit must accrue to the locality as a whole. On the 
other hand, the benefit must nof be so general in effect as to 
embrace the community at large.620 At least, the "primary" ef-
fect must inure to the benefit of the property owners in the im-
mediate locality .62l Otherwise, the improvement must be born 
by the citizens of the whole community (i.e., through general 
taxes) and not be made a burden upon the locality in which the 
improvement is constructed and which received no unique bene-
fit therefrom.622 
Though available, however, these grounds, that the improve-
ment was not "public" or not "local," are difficult of substantia-
tion. The reason is that the determinations of municipal author-
ities in these regards are practically conclusive, being over-
turned only on very clear proof of fraud or for extreme arbitra-
riness. 623 
Benefit Conferred. To be valid, a special assessment may 
not be in substantial excess of the benefit conferred upon the 
taxed property. As the Nebraska court said: 
That special assessments can only be based upon special 
benefits to the property assessed, and that such an assess-
ment beyond the special benefits conferred would be a tal{-
ing of private property for public use without just compen-
sation ... is settled law in this state.624 
But all available uses of the land may be considered by the as-
sessing authority, the question being "whether the general value 
of the property has been enhanced, not whether its present owner 
618. Besack v. City of Beatrice, 154 Neb. 142, 145, 47 N.W.2d 356, 357 
(1951). 
619. Irish v. Hahn, 208 Cal. 339, 281 Pac. 385 (1929). 
620. In Shilshole Avenue, 85 Wash. 522, 148 Pac. 781 (1915). 
621. Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 273, 274 N.W. 605, 608 (1937). 
622. Ibid. 
623. Altman v. Philadelphia, 393 Pa. 246, 141 A.2d 592 (1958). 
624. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. City of Seward, 166 Neb. 123, 
129, 88 N.W.2d 175, 180 (1958). 
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receives advantage."625 Market value of the land is the usual 
test, in this regard,626 although the courts vary widely as to its 
computation (e.g., as to future possibilities and growth of the 
community627). 
Further, inasmuch as the ascertainment of benefits is 
deemed a legislative function, the scope of judicial review is 
severely constricted.628 In fact, only for fraud or extreme arbi-
trariness will the municipal determination be overturned. 629 The 
party attacking an assessment rate on the ground of lack of ben-
efit, in consequence, faces quite a task. To succeed he must 
prove that municipal action was so arbitrary as to amount to 
confiscation. 630 Where such can be demonstrated, however, re-
lief will be forthcoming.631 
Constitutional Grounds. Constitutional restrictions attendant 
upon general taxes, are, as a rule, inapplicable to special as-
sessments. Thus, generally speaking, complaint may not be made 
that a statute or ordinance is invalid on its face on the grounds 
of double taxation, 632 equal protection of the law, 633 or equality 
and uniformity of taxation.634 
Neither is improper delegation a ground for attack under 
traditional separation of powers concepts. Inasmuch as assess-
ments constitute a branch of the general taxing power, the legis-
lature may delegate to local public bodies as it wm.635 Further, 
there is no requirement of explicit standards to govern municipal 
action, rather wide discretion often being afforded to the local 
authorities.636 And, where the assessment is to be made by the 
local governing body, as opposed to a statutory board, there is 
not even a requirement of notice and hearing. 637 
625. Appeal of Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 18 N.J. Super. 357, 
363-64, 87 A.2d 344, 347 (1952). 
626. Ibid. 
627. Compare Driscoll v. Inhabitants of Northbridge, supra note 607, with 
Gingles v. City of Onawa, 241 Iowa 492, 41 N.W.2d 717 (1950). 
628. Quale v. City of Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 25 N.W.2d 699 (1946). 
629. Nev-Cal Electric Securities Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., supra note 
524. 
630. Rosche v. City of Hollywood, supra note 529. 
631. McKee v. City of Grand Rapids, 203 Mich. 527, 170 N.W. 100 (1918). 
632. Cf. Jones v. Holzapfel, 11 Okla. 405, 68 Pac. 511 (1902). 
633. Walston v. Nevin, 128 U.S. 578, 9 S. Ct. 192 (1888). 
634. St. Benedict's Abbey v. Marion County, 50 Ore. 411, 93 Pac. 231 
(1908). 
635. Cf. Fitchpatrick v. Botheras, 150 Iowa 376, 130 N.W. 163 (1911). 
636. Supra note 498. 
637. Supra note 523. 
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The above, of course, has reference to the Federal Consti-
tution only. State constitutional requirements are sometimes 
contra (e.g., with regard to the due process requirement of no-
tice and hearing638) and should be consulted regarding constitu-
tional arguments in a particular case. 
(2) Invalidity in Application 
Compliance with Statute. The general rule is that strict 
observance of all mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of 
the statute and ordinance is indispensable to validate an assess-
ment. 639 Thus, where a legislative body fails to adopt and pub-
lish a resolution respecting the proposed improvement, as re-
quired by statute, the complainant has an effective grounds for 
setting the assessment aside,640 The variance, however, must be 
substantial, minor irregularities or defects being of no avail to 
the property owner. 641 
Defective Work. Absent special injury, property owners 
may not generally attack a special assessment for defective 
work.642 The majority rule is otherwise, however, for substan-
tial failure of performance by the building contractor. In the 
words of a Missouri court: 
( SJ ince the burden to pay rests upon (the property owners] 
. . .they have a right to insist upon a faithful performance 
of the contract and the corporate authorities cannot dispense 
with such performance. 643 
And again: 
[ E] ven though the improvement has been accepted by the 
city, failure of substantial performance (but only a substan-
tial performance) within the terms of the contract, if es-
tablished, will render the tax bill invalid. 644 
638. Supra note 520. 
639. Union Street Ry. Co. v. Mayor of New Bedford, 253 Mass. 314, 149 
N .E. 46 (1925). 
640. Doemker v. City of Richmond Heights, 322 Mo. 1024, 18 S.W.2d 
394 (1929). 
641. Cf. City of Chicago v. Terwillinger, 253 Ill. 395, 97 N.E. 694 
(1912). On what requirements are regarded as mandatory and juris-
dictional, see 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 421-25. 
642. Dawson v. Hipskind, 173 Ind. 216, 89 N.E. 863 (1909). 
643. McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo. App. 535, 541 (1897). 
644. Scales v. Butler, 323 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo. 1959). 
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Fraud or Arbitrariness. Where an individual assessment, 
in relation to that imposed upon similarly situated property own-
ers, is grossly disproportionate, successful attack may be possi-
ble on the grounds of fraud or extreme arbitrariness.645 The 
argument is a difficult one to sustain, however. Municipal offi-
cials are presumed to have acted in good faith, 646 and the pre-
sumption everywhere prevails that the assessments have been 
fairly allocated.647 Only "clear, cogent and conclusive" proof, 
amounting, in fact, to a showing of confiscation, will establish this 
ground of attack.648 Where such is demonstrated, however, the 
assessment will be invalidated. 649 
645. Supra note 631. 
646. Hills v. City of Rahway, 29 N.J. Super. 16, 101 A.2d 563 (1953). 
647. Dickey v. City of Burlington, 247 Iowa 116, 73 N.W.2d 96 (1955). 
648. Supra note 630. 
649. Hatch v. Michigan Central R.R. Co., 238 Mich. 381, 212 N.W. 950 
(1927). 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATION: THE LOCAL EXPERIENCE 
A. Introduction 
As has been indicated, the preceding does not purport to 
present a definitive, treatise-like statement of the law of licens-
ing and special assessments. The purpose rather has been to 
afford some raw data by which to assess the administrative 
practices of local governments. These materials, together with 
those on zoning and annexation,650 should-it is hoped-present 
sufficient means by which to observe the limitation doctrine in 
its local operation. This objective, as well as its corollary of 
individual safeguards, constitutes the purview of the present chap-
ter. · The approach is in terms of the categories employed in the 
second chapter with regard to administrative limitations in the 
federal and state contexts, i.e., constitutional limitations, rules 
of practice and procedural limitations, and judicial review. 
B. Categories of Protection 
1. Constitutional Limitations 
a. Separation of Powers 
(1) Introduction 
The first of the two principal constitutional limitations upon 
administrative action is the time-honored doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers. As has been mentioned,651 the exigencies of 
modern conditions have required its virtual emasculation from 
the national and state scenes, pious averrments in court opin-
ions,652 state constitutions,653 and text-books on government654 to 
the contrary notwithstanding. 
650. I.e., Pooley, Planning and Zoning in the United States (1961); and 
Sengstock, Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Prob-
lem (1960). 
651. Supra notes 80-83, 144, and accompanying text. 
652. E.g., Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 
189, 48 S. Ct. 480 (1928). 
653. See, e.g., the provision of the Texas Constitution quoted at supra 
note 29. 
654. Cf. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution 3 (1922). 
93 
94 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
If, however, the history of the doctrine at these levels has 
witnessed-at least in practice-a retreat from the theoretical 
schema of Montesquieu and Madison, local government has under-
gone a dissimilar fate, representing historically, in our system, 
the great exception to trifurcated authority.655 As a well-known 
authority on local government observed: 
It is well settled that municipal officers may be invested 
with powers which belong to either or all three departments 
of municipal government, namely, the executive, the legisla-
tive and the judicial.656 
Thus, from the beginning and in contradistinction to national and 
state experience, no constitutional impediments were erected with 
regard to concentrated functions in local governmental organiza-
tion.657 
The development of local government from the viewpoint of 
separation of powers is, however, an interesting phenomenon even 
apart from constitutional requirements. In addition, its signifi-
cance to the broader principle of limitation in the local context 
would appear to warrant some consideration at this point. 
(2) Historical Development 
Prior to the nineteenth century, of course, cities played but 
a very minor role in the community complex.658 What urban de-
velopment that did exist consisted, for the most part, in the New 
England town or the middle western township. And, these gov-
ernmental units, as geographical and political subdivisions of the 
states, more closely approximated our contemporary counties 
than the incorporated municipalities of today .659 Not by the peti-
tion of an agglomeration of property owners, but by the arbitrary 
determinations upon a surveyor's map did they derive political 
sanction and the authority to effect community purposes.660 The 
"great frontier" with its enticing lure of free land for an, as 
well as Jeffersonian mistrust of urbanization,661 accentuated the 
predominantly rural bent of early American society. 
655. State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N.W. 
264 (1912). 
656. 1 Yokely, Municipal Corporations 179 (1956). 
657. State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, supra note 655. 
658. In 1790, only 5.1% of the inhabitants of the United States dwelt in 
areas of 2,500 or more population. Schulz, American City Govern-
ment 4 (1949). 
659. Anderson & Weidner, State and Local Government 17-19 (1951). 
660. Id. at 19. 
661. Supra note 17. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATION: LOCAL EXPERIENCE 95 
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, however, cities 
began to assume a more significant position in our national life. 
As the factory system required a stationary labor force, aggre-
gates of individuals and families began to settle in the proximity 
of the industrial site. Shipping and service industries magnified 
the demographic concentration, and gradually the city began to 
take shape. In contrast to the town and township, however, geo-
graphic boundaries had not been predetermined. Rather, the 
growth was haphazard, reflecting typical economic indicia of in-
dustrial development, such as accessibility to raw materials and 
to markets, the availability of sources of energy and labor supply, 
etc.662 
The concentration of population and economic activity, of 
course, occasioned the necessity of maintaining public order and 
the provision of basic services. These were essentially local 
needs and the state legislatures responded by awarding charters 
of incorporation (first by special act and subsequently by general 
legislation663) for purposes of local government. Though "crea-
tures" of the State,664 municipal corporations were thus accorded 
the governmental prerogative in matters purely "local."665 
Assuming the mandate to govern, the next question was the 
form that the government organism was to assume. The national 
and state governments with their President and Congress, gover-
nor and legislature, afforded natural models or prototypes. It 
was no wonder, then, that the typical form of local government 
in the nineteenth century came to be the mayor-council variety. 
Theoretically at least, the mayor was the executive and adminis-
trative officer. Not a member of the council, i.e., the legislative 
branch, he sometimes possessed a veto power over measures 
passed by that body, although in such event the latter generally 
could override the veto by a two-thirds or three-quarters vote.666 
Generally, too, local courts were provided,667 rounding out the 
tripartite organization of the higher governing models. 
Thus, on the surface, anyway, practice would seem to indi-
cate that, although not required constitutionally, local government 
662. Schulz, supra note 658, at 2-4. 
663. See generally MacCorkle, American Municipal Government and Ad-
ministration 54-59 (1948). 
664. City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., 196 
U.S. 539, 549, 25 S. Ct. 327, 330 (1905). 
665. See generally Schulz, supra note 658, at 25-45. 
666. Anderson & Weidner, supra note 659, at 494. 
667. See, e.g., Virtue, Survey of Metropolitan Courts, Detroit Area 9-10 
(1950). 
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in the United States assumed a structure similar to that ordained 
by constitution to the governments of the United States and the 
states. In fact, however, the Madisonian symmetry of three sepa-
rate and independent branches of government exercising the three 
functions-executive, legislative and judicial-respectively, simply 
did not reflect the realities of local conditions. Indeed, the then 
prevalent mayor-council type of government was not the "strong" 
variety (to use the political science denomination668) of today, but 
consisted rather of its "weak" counterpart. The weaknesses were, 
in essence, the result of a failure to localize responsibility. 
The cities had no spokesman for concentrated authority, as 
the nation had in Alexander Hamilton.669 Further, the Jeffersoni-
an antipathy to cities in general became concretized in Jacksoni-
an disdain for city government with its attendant graft and cor-
ruption, 670 The result was the erection of an organizational ar-
rangement of such an overlapping, duplicatory, and cross-purpose 
character as to render the location of responsibility for any 
given action an insurmountable, and even fanciful, task. For ex-
ample, the mayor appointed some municipal officials, others were 
appointed by the council. Still others were elected, and some had 
ex-officio status. The mayor's men were often at cross-purposes 
with the council's men, and elected officials were responsible to 
neither.671 Behind the confusion, corrupt politicians carried on 
their activities safe in the knowledge that in all probability they 
would never be exposed to the public,672 This, indeed, was the 
situation that occasioned Lord Bryce's cryptic commentary: 
There is no denying that the government of cities is 
the one conspicuous failure of the United States •... The 
faults of the State governments are insignificant compared 
with the extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement which 
mark the administration of most of the great cities.673 
The lesson of nineteenth-century American cities should 
seem clear. Where limitation, in the form of wide diffusion of 
power and function, is refracted to the point of precluding the 
location of responsibility for the acts of government, confusion, 
corruption, public disrespect and governmental impotency can be 
668. Schulz, supra note 658, at 317-18. 
669. Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition 4 (1955). 
670. Anderson & Weidner, supra note 659, at 494. 
671. Ibid. 
672. Cf. McGoldrick, Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule, 1916-
1930, p. 1 (1933). 
673. 2 Bryce, The American Commonwealth 281 (1888). 
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the only result. Where on the other hand, executive power is lo-
cated squarely in the hands of an executive branch with its chief 
clearly responsible for executive acts-the same being true for 
legislative and judicial officials with respect to legislative and 
judicial functions-there is no question as to responsibility, con-
fusion disappears, the opportunity for corruption is mitigated, 
public respect rekindled, and government is possible of positive 
action. Limitation, of course, remains in the tripartite organiza-
tion, each branch possessing certain "checks" on the power of 
each of the others. To effect this ideal, based obviously upon the 
federal and state models, the National Municipal League began, 
at the turn of the century, to agitate for the "strong" mayor-
council type of city government.674 Essentially, the proposal-
which gained wide-spread adoption-was as follows: 
[E]xecutive and administrative powers [were vested] 
in the mayor and. . .rather complete legislative powers 
·rconferred] upon the council. Boards and commissions and 
independently elected officers were. . .held to a minimum, 
and preferably abolished outright. Thus a separation-of-
powers system similar to that of the national government, 
with a short ballot, was favored for cities.675 
The doctrine, however, was not everywhere implanted at the 
local level, as two competing forms of government-neither of 
which embodied the sepa!'ation theory-gained currency. Thus, 
Galveston, Texas, responding to the inability of its weak mayor-
council organization to cope with the devestation of its great tidal 
wave of 1900, established, under authority of special state law, 
the commission form. Thereunder, all government power was 
vested in a commission, with each member individually the head 
of a city department. The mayor enjoyed no independent status, 
being merely a member of the commission, the same as was the 
member who headed, for example, the department of public safe-
ty. He possessed no veto power, nor was the commission con-
strained to confine itself to the legislative function. It was, in 
fact, the governing body. 676 
The other principal competitor to the strong mayor-council 
form in this century has been the council-manager plan. First 
established for the city of Sumter in 1912 by special act of the 
South Carolina legislature, the plan has spread rapidly under the 
674. National Municipal League, A Municipal Program (1900). 
675. Anderson & Weidner, supra note 659, at 495. 
676. See generally Schulz, supra note 658, at 318-23. 
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active endorsement of the National Municipal League. Essential-
ly, the plan consists in an appointive executive who serves at the 
pleasure, of an elected council, with the latter serving as the 
legislative body. Obviously, no real separation of powers can ex-
ist under such scheme, the departments in this case being neither 
independent nor equal.677 
Advantages as well as disadvantages inhere in each of the 
three forms herein indicated to embrace current trends in the 
organization and structure of municipal government. Evaluation 
in these terms, however, is without the purview of this mono-
graph.678 Rather, the immediate concern is with the concept of 
the separation of powers as a limiting influence upon government 
action-in this case, in its local or municipal manifestation. 
(3) Current Status 
With the increasing popularity of the commission (14.9% of 
cities of 5,000 or more population) and council-manager (24.3%) 
types of municipal government in the United States,679 the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers is seen to suffer in the local 
context no less than at the federal and state levels. No consti-
tutional requirement, either federal or state, subsists to com-
mand the traditional trifurcation of functions.680 And, as indicat-
ed, the tendency in practice is to pursue paths of merged, as op-
posed to separated, models of governmental organization. 
The significance of the instant discussion to individual safe-
guards may be seen by recalling the section in the preceding 
chapter pertaining to licensing. As was indicated, the practice is 
frequently for the local council itself to construct the licensing 
ordinance, establish its own rules of procedure, investigate and 
decide who is to be granted and who denied the privilege, and, 
finally, to enforce its own determination-all with no constitutional 
requirement of judicial review. As is obvious, executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial functions with regard to issues at hand are 
combined in the same governmental body. No check to arbitrari-
ness nor assurance of individual rights exists in such case but 
the self-restraint of the governing body. On the other hand, were 
the functions separated (e.g., ordinance-enacting to the council, 
determination in a particular case to an independent local board 
677. Id. at 323-27. 
678. For such evaluation, see, e.g., Adrian, Governing Urban America 
172-207 (1955). 
679. International City Managers Association, Municipal Yearbook 39 
(1950). 
680. Supra note 655. 
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or court, and enforcement to the executive branch), power would 
be so spread, with its incumbent checks, as to afford the individ-
ual a greater degree of protection than he would possess in the 
case where all of his eggs must be put in the same departmental 
basket. Nevertheless, no constitutional requirement now obtains 
to compel internal separation; and, as has been observed, the 
practice, likewise, is in the opposite direction. 
(4) Legislative Oversight 
It should be noted at this point that the wide diffusion and 
overlap of local function (with its attendant confusion and corrup-
tion) which rendered the weak mayor-council formula inacceptable 
to the conditions of the twentieth century, is not the only means-
outside of separation-of limiting governmental power at this 
level. There remains, in addition, the possibility of legislative 
oversight, suggested with regard to federal administration by 
Kinnane681 and state administration by Howe.682 Since the feder-
al and state agencies are "creatures" of the Congress or legisla-
ture, so the theory goes, they remain subject to legislative con-
trols, that is, to the external checks alluded to in an earlier 
chapter.683 The powers of investigation, of the purse, of altera-
tions in the enabling legislation, and, in fact, of life-and-death 
itself is thought sufficient, at these levels, to protect the citizen-
ry. from the potential despotism of concentrated powers.684 
The analogy to local government is obvious. Municipal cor-
porations are, as are the regulatory agencies, creatures of the 
state. In the words of the United States Supreme Court: 
A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of 
the State, and exists by virtue of the exercise of the power 
of the State through its legislative department. The legis-
lature could at any time terminate the existence of the cor-
poration itself, and provide other and different means for 
the government of the district comprised within the limits 
of the former city. The city is the creature of the State.685 
Difficulties are encountered, however, in attempting to uti-
lize the analogy to effect an "external" or vertical check upon 
681. Kinnane, "Administrative Law: Some Observations on Separation of 
Powers," 38 A.B.A.J. 19 (1952). 
682. Howe, Legislative Review of Administrative Rules (1956). 
683. Supra notes 54 and 55, and accompanying text. 
684. Kinnane, supra note 681. 
685. City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., supra 
note 664. 
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local governmental activity. Judicially acknowledged notions of 
local self-government, as well as such practical considerations 
as legislative apathy and inadequate supervisory machinery, both 
as to time and finances, work to stay the hand of the state legis-
lature as a limiting influence.686 By far the most significant fac-
tor in this regard, however, has been the development of local 
home rule.687 · 
Originating in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, the very 
objective of home rule is to free municipal government from the 
supervision of the state legislature as to matters "purely local." 
One commentator stated the objectives as follows: 
(1) [TJ o prevent or minimize legislative interference in 
matters that are primarily of local concern; 
(2) to permit the local communities to adopt the type and 
form of government they desire; 
(3) to provide the cities with sufficient powers to meet the 
increasing needs for local services without the necessity of 
repeatedly seeking new authority from the legislature •... 688 
Nor is the home rule provision confined to Missouri, some fifteen 
other states now employing the idea and prospects being great 
that others will soon do so.689 In these states, and especially in 
those with constitutional home rule, the prospects would thus ap-
pear dim that the legislature could operate as much of a check 
or limitation upon municipal activity. In fact, in such cases, 
where "municipal affairs" are in issue, local legislation is con-
trolling even in the presence of conflicting state law.690 
Even in the non-home rule jurisdictions, however, legisla-
tive oversight, without more, would appear of minimal value only 
in securing the end sought. Legislative apathy has already been 
mentioned. In addition, there should be noted the ad hoc charac-
ter of such supervision. Legislative action occurs only after the 
harm has already been done in a particular case. Also, the 
686. In addition, local control of municipal finances eliminates the in-
fluence of the power of the purse. On local financing generally, 
see Elison, Finances of Metropolitan Areas (1963). 
687. On home rule generally, see Littlefield, Metropolitan Area Prob-
lems and Municipal Home Rule (1962). 
688. Schmandt, "Municipal Home Rule in Missouri," 1953 Wash. U.L.Q. 
385, 386. 
689. These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
690. Kansas City v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642, 29 S.W. 845, rehearing de-
nied, 127 Mo. 654, 30 S.W. 111 (1895). 
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legislature, as the agent of the majority, not of the individual or 
minority, may not be sympathetic. This, indeed, was the reason 
for including the Bill of Rights in the organic law of the land, as 
was the doctrine of the separation of powers so included, although 
by implication. Thereby, certain guarantees to individual or mi-
nority rights were sought to be placed outside of the instantaneous 
whim of the masses, and the despotism of the majority thus 
avoided.691 Ad hoc legislation or alteration of enabling laws or 
local characters would not seem conducive to the realization of 
these guarantees. 
(5) Delegation 
Whereas the separation of powers in its manifestation of in-
ternal trifurcation and external checks appears of minimal and 
decreasing value as a limitation upon local governmental action, 
its corollary, i.e., the maxim against delegation, retains some-
what more vitality. Of course, no question exists but that the 
state may delegate functions and powers to municipal government, 
and that it, subject to prohibitions in the enabling legislation or 
charter, may further subdelegate to local boards or agencies.692 
Two very important limitations arise at this point, however, with 
respect to the exercise of the legislatively-delegated power. 
In the first place, the municipal government may exercise 
only those powers conferred upon it, either expressly or by clear 
implication, by the state legislature. According to Dillon's Rule: 
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that 
a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the fol-
lowing powers, and no others: First, those granted in ex-
press words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in 
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those 
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and 
purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but in-
dispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt con-
cerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts 
against the corporation, and the power is denied.693 
Thus, by predetermination of the structure and scope of the 
municipal corporation, the state legislature may be said to im-
pose a very significant limitation upon local governmental activity. 
Where the local authority exceeds its predefined ambit, the action 
691. Supra note 10, and accompanying text. 
692. Cf. State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, supra note 655. 
693. 1 Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations 448-
50 (5th ed. 1911). 
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is ultra vires and void, and the individual afforded appropriate 
judicial relief. As was seen with regard to special assessments, 
the power to make local improvements does not contain, by im-
plication, the authority for their funding by special exactions. 694 
Similarly, the power to levy taxes, without more, does not sanc-
tion the imposition of a regulatory license fee.695 In either case, 
the authority must be explicit or the local government will have 
transfressed its proper sphere of activity. 
It is, of course, true that the effectiveness of such limita-
tion is mitigated to some extent by the wider spheres of action 
permitted in home rule jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the prospec-
tive legislative control-as distinguished from the retrospectively-
oriented legislative oversight discussed earlier696 -of predeter-
mining the scope of local governmental undertakings, would, at 
this date anyway, appear to comprise a significant limitation. 
The second facet of the delegation doctrine deserving of at-
tention as a limiting factor in the local context is that, although 
delegation, per se, is today uniformly acknowledged as proper, to 
be valid it must be circumscribed by reasonably ascertainable 
stanqards by which to govern the exercise of the discretion con-
ferred. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in a zoning 
case: 
[T] here now seems to be little doubt that a zoning ordinance 
must prescribe definite standards for the guidance and con-
trol of the building inspector, the zoning officials and indeed 
the municipal council, when by the ordinance it reserves to 
itself various administrative zoning powers. An ordinance 
whereby the city council delegates to itself the arbitrary and 
unfettered authority to decide where and how a particular 
structure shall be built or where located without at the same 
time setting up reasonable standards which would be appli-
cable alike to all property owners similarly conditioned, 
cannot be permitted to stand as a valid municipal enact-
ment.697 
694. Supra notes 458 & 459, and accompanying text. 
695. As the Illinois Court said in City of Chicago v. Drogasawacz, 256 
Ill. 34, 99 N.E. 869, 870 (1912): "A city possesses no inherent 
power to license any occupation. That power must be expressly 
granted in its charter, or be a necessary incident to the powers so 
granted." 
696. Supra notes 681-91, and accompanying text. 
697. North Bay Village v. Blackwell, 88 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla. 1956). See 
also State ex rel. Greenberg v. Dade County, 120 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 
App. 1960) (licensing ordinance). 
ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATION: LOCAL EXPERIENCE 103 
The requirement, which, as indicated earlier, applies as 
well to licensing ordinances698 and the imposition of individual 
assessments,699 is not an inflexible one, however. Thus, "where 
it is difficult or impractical for the Legislature to lay down a 
definite, comprehensive rule," the courts have generally permitted 
a "reasonable amount of discretion [to] • • .be delegated to the 
administrative officials." 700 
Where the delegation is of a legislative function (e.g., the 
authority to fix the boundaries of an assessment district), it is 
often said that little objection may be made to the grant of rather 
wide spheres of discretion. 701 Legislation or rule-making is gen-
eral in application; and inasmuch as the legislature itself could 
make such determinations-so the courts have held-, it requires 
no great feat of logic to justify its delegation to the legislative 
branch of the municipal government, which is more familiar with 
its own local problems and questions of policy than is its more 
remote counterpart in the state capital. 
Where, however, adjudication is involved, i.e., where the 
action is particular in application, somewhat more of a problem 
exists in the grant of unfettered administrative power. In fact, 
in this possibility is said to inhere the principal vice which op-
ponents attribute to the administrative process. In this regard, 
the words of the Michigan court will be recalled: 
Without definite standards an ordinance becomes an 
open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready tool 
for the suppression of competition through the granting of 
authority to one and the withholding from another. . . . A 
zoning ordinance cannot permit administrative officers or 
boards to pick and choose the recipients of their favors.702 
This is the "tyranny of the American system of government" of 
which the Kansas Court spoke,703 and the "one conspicuous fail-
ure of the United States" as envisioned by Lord Bryce.704 
In the light of such fears, it seems little wonder that the 
courts (at least at the local level) have, for the most part, limit-
ed the more extended grants of discretion to cases involving 
698. Supra notes 378-88, and accompanying text. 
699. Supra notes 504-07, and accompanying text. 
700. Bologno v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 159, 164 N.E.2d 389, 196 N.Y.S. 
2d 90, 93 (1959). 
701. Flynn v. Chiappari, 191 Cal. 139, 215 Pac. 682 (1923). 
702. Supra note 383. 
703. Supra note 176. 
704. Supra note 673. 
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potentially substantial harm to the community. As the California 
court state_d with regard to licensing statutes: 
The granting of discretionary power, not restricted by 
specific standards, to confer or deny licenses or permits 
has been upheld. . .where the licensed activity, because of 
its dangerous or objectionable character, might be regulated 
or restricted to certain localities. 705 
As has been seen, liquor establishments,706 pool halls,707 and 
junk yards,708 among other such activities, are embraced by the 
"dangerous or objectionable" classification to which the California 
court alluded. 
If, on the other hand, the business or activity is not con-
ducive to public harm-and this would include the validity of an 
individual assessment, no less than the request, for example, of 
a permit to build, or a license to operate a hardware store in a 
particular locality-the requirement that discretionary municipal 
authority be bounded by rather definite and reasonably precise 
standards, would seem to be well established by judicial deci-
sion. 709 Exceptions are, of course, in evidence.710 Nevertheless, 
the general rule appears to be that announced by the Pennsylvan-
ia court in affirming mandamus for a building permit, "the au-
thority of the enforcement officer or agent must be plainly spelled 
out in rules or regulations promulgated by duly enacted ordinances 
or resolution." 711 In this manner, arbitrariness and capricious-
ness on the part of local government are sought to be limited. In 
the absence of standards to define the ambit of municipal author-
ity and the manner of its exercise, the authorization will be 
struck down as an unconstitutional delegation of power ,712 
705. In re Petersen, 51 Cal.2d 177, 184, 331 P.2d 24, 29 (1958). 
706. Supra note 440. 
707. Cf. Murphy v. People of the State of California, 225 U.S. 623, 32 
S. Ct. 697 (1912). 
708. Supra note 236. 
709. The case material in this regard is voluminous. Illustrative recent 
decisions include State ex rel. Ware v. City of Miami, 107 S.2d 
387 (Fla. App. 1958); State ex rel. Continental Oil Co. v. Waddill, 
318 S. W.2d 281, 285 (Mo. 1958); Busch Jewelry Co. v. City of Bes-
semer, 269 Ala. 180, 112 So. 2d 344 (1959); Borough of Baldwin, Al-
legheny County v. Mathews, 394 Pa. 53, 145 A.2d 698 (1958). 
710. E.g., Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 154 A.2d 9 (1959). 
711. Borough of Baldwin, Allegheny County v. Mathews, supra note 709, 
at 55-56, 145 A.2d at 699. 
712. State ex rel. Continental Oil Co. v. Waddill, supra note 709. 
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Such, it will be noted, marks a deviation from federal713 -
and, to a lesser extent, state 714-practice. At these levels, gen-
eral legislation in the form of administrative procedure acts ob-
tain to restrict or limit administrative discretion. The need for 
strict standards in the particular enabling statute is, in such 
event, at least mitigated, if not obviated altogether. On the other 
hand, no comparable limitation prevails to contain the discretion 
of municipal officials. This would appear to constitute a signifi-
cant factor in justifying, if not explaining, the continuing vitality 
of the requirement of standards in particular enabling acts or 
charters at local levels of governmental activity. 
b. Due Process 
The second of the two principal constitutional limitations 
upon administrative government consists in the due process re-
quirements of the federal and state constitutions. Originating as 
a purely procedural limitation upon the action of government in 
its dealings with the populace,715 the guarantee has been expand-
ed, of late, to embrace consideration of the substantive content 
of the statutes authorizing the governmental action in the first 
instance.716 Thus, the distinction has arisen in constitutional jar-
gon of "procedural" and "substantive due process," both as re-
gards the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the federal consti-
tution, and of the state constitutions as well. 
713. Supra notes 71-83, and accompanying text. 
714. Supra notes 145-50, and accompanying text. 
715. The requirement is said to originate in ch. 3 of 28 Edw. III (1355), 
which provided: "No man of what state or condition he be, shall be 
put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor 
put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of 
law." The significance of the constitutional clause, which provides 
that "no person •.. shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law," to the framers as a purely pro-
cedural limitation, is highlighted by the statement in Coke's Insti-
tute (which was the source of their understanding of the matter) 
that by due process of law is meant "by indictment or presentment 
of good and lawful men ..• or by writ original of the Common Law." 
2 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 50 (1669). See generally 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292 (1884) 
(dissent). 
716. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 
U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923) (invalidating a minimum wage act as 
a violation of "due process" on grounds of its substantive require-
ments). 
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(1) Procedural Due Process 
The basic ingredient of procedural due process is said to 
be the requirement of notice and the opportunity to be heard.717 
It is rudimentary to principles of fair play and common decency, 
· so the theory goes, that before a person may be put in jeopardy 
of life, liberty or property, he should be notified of the action 
pending against him and provided the opportunity to defend against 
it. 718 The sufficiency of notice (by personal service or publica-
tion) as well as the form of the hearing (with or without jury) 
will, of necessity, depend upon the "nature of the case." 719 Nev-
ertheless, where a hearing is required, the constitutional provi-
sion ordains that it be fairly conducted before a tribunal mani-
festing currently prevailing standards of impartiality •720 
As has been indicated, however, with regard to federal and 
state agencies, the constitutional guarantee (absent such general 
legislation as the Administrative Procedure Act) has no necessary 
application to administrative proceedings.721 Where, for example, 
the function involved is rule-making, the constitutional mantle is 
explicitly withheld. 722 And even in the case of adjudication, no-
tice and hearing may be denied without constitutional offense, 
where the individual interest in issue is classified as a privilege 
rather thaii a right, e.g., alien admission and state occupational 
licensing.723 
The deficiency of the constitutional guarantee (both federal 
and state), in this regard, is similarly evident re the local con-
text. The starting point for inquiry at this leveT, also, is the 
legislative-adjudicative dichotomy. Thus, when a local agency (or 
the local governing body, itself, e.g., the common council) engages 
in a legislative function, as, for example, when, pursuant to statu-
tory authorization, it drafts a licensing ordinance or determines 
the "necessity" of a special assessment, it need not, any more 
than need a legislative assembly, afford a hearing prior to pro-
mulgation.724 The theory is that such action is general in appli-
cation (i.e., affects a rather large number of people) and that in 
balancing considerations as to the desirability of policy, necessity, 
717. E.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S. Ct. 841 (1897). 
718. See text at note 96 supra. 
719. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289, 2 S. Ct. 569, 589 (1883). 
720. Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 70 S. Ct. 445 (1951). 
721. Supra notes 90-95, and accompanying text. 
722. Supra note 121. 
723. Supra notes 152-57, and accompanying text. 
724. Supra notes 497-500, and accompanying text. 
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and speed as against the protection of individual interests, the 
former is said to prevail to the extent of repudiating the guaran-
tee. 725 In fact, in such cases, judicial review may itself be pre-
cluded, absent manifest fraud or oppression. As the Kansas Su-
preme Court stated in an assessment case: 
The law having vested the function of determining the 
necessity for an improvement in the governing body of the 
city, it follows that its determination is controlling and 
when made in good faith is not open to review by the 
courts. 726 
The practical effect of this situation, while perhaps neces-
sary on other grounds, is certainly offensive to the doctrine of 
limited powers. As was seen in a preceding section, continuing 
legislative "oversight" (by the state) of local administrative ac-
tion has rapidly eroded, of late, under the stimulus of municipal 
home rule. 727 With judicial review limited to cases of extreme 
arbitrariness-and the burden of proof everywhere upon the com-
plaining individual and, in fact, without even a right to appear be-
fore the local board-not much of a safeguard against adminis-
trative government in matters of general application would ap-
pear to exist at this level. Even the control of the ballot box-a 
principal check on the legislature-may be absent, where, for ex-
ample, the board is nonelective or responsibility for the ordinance 
or determination is so diffused as to render its ascertainment 
impossible.728 
Even in the event of administrative action with particular-
ized effects, i.e., the exercise of adjudicative functions, the guar-
antee would appear to have been more honored in breach than in 
practice. As in the case of legislative matters, the applicability 
of the constitutional guarantee is said to rest upon a balancing of 
the general interest in the common welfare as against the protec-
tion of the individual in the particular instance.729 Inasmuch as, 
by definition, an individual is affected personally in such event, it 
would seem to follow that notice and hearing would generally be 
forthcoming as a matter of constitutional right. 
Such, however, is not necessarily the case. In two situa-
tions, in particular, the due process requirement has been held 
725. Cf. language of the Court in Kissane v. City of Anchorage, 159 F. 
Supp. 733, 737 (D. Alaska 1958). 
726. Palmer v. Munro, 123 Kan. 387, 389, 255 Pac. 67, 68 (1927). 
727. Supra notes 687-91, and accompanying text. 
728. Supra notes 670-73, and accompanying text. 
729. Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 88 (1951). 
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to be inapplicable to local administrative practice of an adjudica-
tive character: (1) where the adjudicative function is performed 
by the legislative body of the local government and (2) where a 
privilege rather than a right is involved. 
Legislative determination. In regard to number (1) above, 
it will be recalled from the discussion of special assessments 
that although generally the landowner is accorded, by constitu-
tional right, if not by specific statute, the opportunity to be heard 
at some stage of the proceeding ( i.e., before his individual as-
sessment is impose-ct); where the local legislature or council, it-
self, makes the determination, no constitutional right is infringed 
by proceeding without notice and hearing to the affected land-
owner.730 The courts adhering to this position, distinguish cases 
of council delegation to subordinates or administrative boards, 
which situations, in their view, do fall within the ambit of the 
constitutional guarantee.731 But, since the state legislature, itself, 
could impose the assessment sans hearing, they find no due proc-
ess impediment to a delegation to the local legislature of that 
function. 732 
The difficulty with this view resides in the evident confu-
sion of the exercise of a legislative function with the exercise of 
an adjudicative function by the legislative body. Not structure-
or who exercises the power-but function-whether adjudicative 
(particularized action) or legislative (generalized action)-should 
control. The problem, of course, issues from the fact of merged 
functions at the local governing level. As was indicated earlier, 
no constitutional requirement persists to require a separation of 
powers in the municipal governing body.733 Further, as was seen, 
the tendency (illustrated in the growing popularity of the council-
manager and commission forms of governmental organization) has 
been away from separation in practice as well. 734 The result has 
been that oftentimes the local council is endowed with adjudicative 
and executive functions, no less than legislative. This causes, it 
would seem, the judicial confusion that exists at this date. Never-
theless, though evidently predicated on an erroneous, or at least 
confused, premise, the general rule appears to be that where the 
legislative body itself makes a determination, though particular in 
effect, no due process guarantee of notice and hearing obtains. 
730. Supra notes 522-53, and accompanying text. 
731. E.g., Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Glover, 86 Ark. 231, 110 
s.w. 1031 (1908). 
732. E.g., Town of Gulfport ex rel. C.J. Williamson & Co. v. Mendels, 
127 Fla. 730, 174 So. 8 (1937). 
733. Supra note 655. 
734. Supra note 679, and accompanying text. 
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Privilege versus Right. There can be no doubt but that the 
grant or denial of an occupational or business license is particu-
lar in application, and, for that reason, adjudicative. Neverthe-
less, as has been seen, the due process requirement is without ap-
plication as a limitation upon local government (or upon the 
states) on the ground that the constitutional guarantee embraces 
only rights not privileges.735 By characterizing licenses as con-
ditional privileges, the notice and hearing mandate, in this event, 
is avoided,736 and an applicant may be denied the authority to 
engage in a particular business without even the opportunity to be 
heard.737 Thus liberty of free occupational choice, so often ex-
tolled in theoretical discourse, is partially limited in practice. 
Even in questions of re-issuance or revocation, where sub-
stantial investments have been built up, due process does not 
necessarily attach to guarantee a hearing. As was indicated, in 
this regard, the distinction has been drawn between noxious and 
non-noxious activities, and in the former instance (e.g., re a liq-
uor establishment) considerable latitude accorded to the local au-
thorities in dealing with individual interests. 738 The point is, as 
has been said, that due process is a very flexible concept. 
Whether it will require notice and hearing in a particular case 
depends upon a balancing of the interests involved.739 In the case 
of potentially harmful or noxious activities, this has meant prac-
tically free reign to local authorities. The police power, in such 
event, has weighed heavily to tip the balance away from individu-
al protection in the right to be heard and toward vindication of 
ex parte administrative action. 
Such is not to suggest, of course, that hearings may not be 
required in local licensing cases. By state constitution or statute, 
or by local ordinance, such may be specifically prescribed. The 
point, rather, is that in the absence of specific guarantees, the 
federal and state due process clauses do not afford any guarantee. 
Neither is the suggestion intended that due process never 
demands that notice and hearing be accorded to interested parties 
in cases of particularized action by municipal government. Where 
735. Supra notes 265-66, and accompanying text. 
736. Nulter v. State Road Comm'n of W. Va., 119 W. Va. 312, 317, 193 
S.E. 549, 552 (1937). 
737. As a matter of fact, of course, most statutes provide for hearings 
in such cases. Nevertheless, there is no constitutional requirement 
to such effect. 
738. State ex rel. First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 136 
Fla. 788, 187 So. 148 (193 9). 
739. Supra note 729, and accompanying text. 
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individual assessments are imposed by local boards rather than 
the governing untt740 or where a local board seeks to revoke the 
license of a nonharmful and useful business, 741 the constitutional 
requirement, as has been observed, applies; and notice and the 
opportunity to be heard are essential to the validity of municipal 
action. Whether, in a given case, the safeguards are afforded de-
pends, of course, upon a judicial balancing of the interests in-
volved. The uncertainty incumbent in this approach (because liti-
gation is necessary to determine whether a hearing is required 
in the first instance) would, however, seem to weaken substantial-
ly the practical effect of the guarantee. The individual, in this 
event, is required to go to court to ascertain if he can go to 
court. Strange justice! Nevertheless, this is the result of so 
volatile and undefined a concept as "due process of law." 
Tangentially, it should be noted that where a hearing is re-
quired, the guarantee extends to require a fair hearing. 742 Al-
though not subject to the formal requirements of a case-at-law, 
administrative hearings, to be valid, must at least afford the 
parties opportunity to be informed as to claims of opponents, to 
hear the evidence against them, to cross-examine, to introduce 
evidence in their own behalves and to make argument.743 The 
specifics, of course, will be governed by the necessities of the 
particular situation-balancing, once again. 744 
(2) Substantive Due Process 
Of comparatively recent vintage,745 the doctrine of substan-
tive due process is addressed to the content of legislation, as 
opposed to the procedures employed in its administration and en-
forcement. 746 Thus, in a variety of instances, legislation has 
been struck down as invalid on its face, the courts holding the 
statute in question to be in violation of fundamental notions of 
due process of law.747 Early decisions invalidating maxiip.um 
740. Supra note 524, and accompanying text. 
741. Supra notes 437-39, and accompanying text. 
742. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, 170 Cal. App. 2d 637, 
339 P .2d 933 (1959) (special assessments). 
7 43. See text at note 96 supra. 
744. Cf. Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 6.5 S. Ct. 1316 
(1945). 
745. See generally Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power in the 
United States 107-25 (1946). 
746. See generally Corwin, Constitution of the United States of America 
845-46 (1952). 
747. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277 (1908); and 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 539 (1905). 
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hour and minimum wage legislation,748 as well as holdings that 
retroactively-oriented statutes are invalid,749 illustrate the em-
ployment of substantive due process at other than local levels. 
In the local setting as well the doctrine has gained cur-
rency. Although employed in a great number of situations at this 
level, the most significant applications for present purposes are 
the following: (1) discriminatory classifications; and (2) reason-
ableness, as defined by the relation between the statutory purpose 
and an authorized power of the governing unit. 
Classification. Practically all legislation (federal and state, 
as well as local) involves some degree of classification whereby 
statutory objectives are dire.cted to particular categories of per-
sons, things, or events. So long as the classifications are rea-
sonable, no constitutional difficulty is encountered.750 By way of 
illustration, it will be recalled from the discussion of licensing 
that the imposition of license fees upon interstate shippers, where 
reasonable in amount and confined to the actual cost of necessary 
regulatory activity, is not discriminatory and unreasonable where 
no like fees are imposed on local shippers.751 Likewise, a re-
quirement that improved property in the District of Columbia be 
connected with the city sewage system, with different sanctions 
for residents and nonresidents, was upheld over the argument 
that the classification was arbitrary. 752 
Where, on the other hand, by state statute or local ordi-
nance, a classification is without justification in logic or in fact, 
(e.g., in authorizing the issuance of licenses to operate a laundry 
business to Caucasian residents but not to Chinese753), it is said 
to be without basis and void, as being in violation not only of the 
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection of law, but of 
substantive due process as well. Classifications which in word 
or effect amount to naked discrimination against certain persons, 
while simultaneously favoring others without a reasonable basis 
in law, or in fact, are thus deemed defective in content, and ac-
cordingly are invalidated. In the words of Justice Jackson: 
748. Ibid. 
749. Cf. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 13 S. Ct. 
271 (1893). 
750. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 
883 (1937). 
751. Supra notes 391 and 392, and accompanying text. 
752. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 29 S. Ct. 560 (1909). 
753. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886). 
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I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states 
and the Federal Government must exercise their powers so 
as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon 
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object 
of regulation. 754 
Reasonableness. As suggested in the preceding quotation, 
not only must classifications be reasonable in the sense of being 
nondiscriminatory, but a statute or ordinance to avoid the onus 
of substantive due process, must be reasonably related to an 
acknowledged power of the governing unit. In the case of licens-
ing, as will be recalled, this means that the regulatory activity 
undertaken must exhibit a clear tendency to protect the public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare, that is, it must not 
exceed the proper scope of the local police power. 755 And, by 
way of illustration, as the public health or welfare may not rea-
sonably be said to be promoted by limiting the sale of raw milk 
to local dealers only, an Oklahoma City ordinance which so pro-
vided was invalidated as offensive to substantive due process. 756 
Such, of course, by no means exhausts the categories of 
cases where the content of local legislation may be assaulted on 
grounds of substantive due process. However the principal ones 
from the perspective of the limitations of administrative law have 
been mentioned, providing basis for the generalization that sub-
stantive due process appears somewhat more effective as a con-
stitutional safeguard than does its procedural counterpart. At 
least this conclusion appears warranted in the local context, 
where, as has been indicated, procedural due process is of some-
what dubious import. 
Parenthetically, there should be mentioned at this point the 
related requirement of statutory reasonableness apart from any 
question of constitutionality. Often confused in the case law, the 
distinction was well-delineated as follows: 
The question of reasonableness of an ordinance is treated 
differently from the question of constitutionality of a statute. 
The former bears on whether or not a local legislative body 
has reasonably exercised general powers delegated by stat-
ute or charter; the latter on whether a limitation in the 
754. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112, 69 
S. Ct. 463, 466 (1949) (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.) 
755. Supra note 374, and accompanying text. 
756. Supra note 375. For other such instances, see Corwin, supra note 
746, at 853-72. 
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constitution, the organic law of the land, has been contra-
vened .... 
Ordinances enacted under the general welfare clauses 
of city charters or those permitting regulation of the li-
quor traffic must bear some reasonable relation to the 
public health, safety, or morals or to the furtherance of 
such regulation. They must not be arbitrary or discrimi-
natory .... 
Accordingly, the courts will review the question as to 
the reasonableness of an ordinance, and if an ordinance 
passed under a general power is found unreasonable will 
declare it void as a matter of law. . .for in every power 
given to a municipal corporation to pass ordinances there 
is an implied restriction that ordinances will be rea-
sonable, consistent with the general law and policy of the 
state, uniform in their operation, and promotive, rather 
than destructive, of lawful businesses and occupations. 757 
Thus, in addition to the limitation of "substantive due proc-
ess" in assessing the legality of municipal action, the individual 
possesses a potent weapon in the related doctrine of ultra vires 
or statutory unreasonableness per se. 
2. Procedural Limitations 
Procedural limitations, in the form of rules of practice and 
procedure imposed by general legislation upon administrative ac-
tion, have not, at this date, filtered down to the local levels of 
government. Thus, even in those states which have adopted ad-
ministrative procedure acts more-or-less on the federal model, 
municipal administration continues to be governed by specific en-
abling statutes and the ordinances enacted pursuant thereto. The 
procedures required of local licensing officials in granting or 
denying an application, for example, must, in consequence, be in-
finitely variable as between cities in the same state, and per-
haps even as between different activities in the same city. An 
example would be the right of a hearing in regard to the grant 
of a license to operate a hardware store, but not for a liquor 
757. Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 205-08, 32 N.W.2d 
538, 549-50 (1948) (dissent). See also Stason & Kauper, Cases on 
Municipal Corporations 123-24 n.4 (1959). 
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establishment.758 In addition to the absence of a general guar-
antee of procedural safeguards, the result (from the vantage of 
individual rights) can only be a denial of equal justice. 
On the other hand, the application of state procedure acts, 
even where such exist, to local administration may sound sim-
pler than experience warrants. It is certainly true that munici-
palities bear a superficial resemblance to state agencies, in that 
both are creatures of the state and theoretically, at least, are 
subject to its strict surveillance.759 Nevertheless, current atti-
tudes toward local self-government, and especially the ascendancy 
of municipal home rule in this century, 760 have the effect of 
rendering doubtful such an application to local agencies. In con-
stitutional home rule states the attempt would even appear to run 
counter to the state constitution, in imposing state procedures in 
matters of purely "local" concern, e.g., the procedures to be fol-
lowed in the imposition of a special assessment to fund the laying 
of a sewer pipe.761 
Even outside of home rule jurisdictions, however, the rule 
of practicality would seem to preclude the application of such ex-
tensive procedure acts as that, for example, of California. 762 In-
dependent hearing examiners for a town of 1500 would certainly 
seem out of the question. On the other hand, the problem of 
governmental limitations and individual safeguards persists even 
in the smallest of municipalities, necessitating inquiry at these 
levels as well. 
As has been suggested, the result of particularized legisla-
tion, where agency procedures are spelled out in the enabling 
statute rather than in general legislation applicable to all agencies 
in the jurisdiction, is almost infinite variety in the procedures 
employed. Thus, notice and hearing may be prescribed for one 
agency, and not for another,763 representation by counsel allowed, 
or not;764 the rules of evidence followed in one type of proceed-
ing, and not in another; 765 a judicial-type trial provided, or pro-
vision be made for a pro forma hearing only;766 etc. 
758. Supra notes 440-41, 450-51, and accompanying text. 
759. City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., supra 
note 664. 
760. Supra notes 687-90, and accompanying text. 
'761. Cf. Kansas City v. Scarritt, supra note 690. 
762. Supra note 161, and accompanying text. 
763. Supra note 262, and accompanying text. 
764. See text at notes 271-72 supra. 
765. Ibid. 
766. Cf. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City and County of 
San Francisco, 23 C al.2d 303, 144 P .2d 4 (1943). 





The only general guarantee that the individual possesses in 
the face of this diversity of local practice is that the procedure 
comply with some vague notion of fairness. As stated by the 
United States Supreme Court: 
[A State or Municipality] is free to regulate [its own] pro-
cedure ... in accordance with its own conception of policy 
and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle 
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamentai.767 
If such unfairness can be demonstrated, the procedure will be in-
validated as a violation of procedural due process. The difficulty 
with this limitation, however, consists in the very vagueness of 
its content. 
The chameleon-like character of procedural due process, 
ever-changing with the times and ever-dependent upon the partic-
ulars of a given situation, seems a poor substitute for the defi-
nite procedural guarantees contained, for example, in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, in the face of the obvious 
difficulties in imposing such general legislation locally, the poor 
substitute is certainly better than nothing at all. On the other 
hand, it would seem that the due process guarantee could be 
buoyed up, at least, by general legislation of a limited nature. 
Thus, a general statute differentiating, perhaps, between legisla-
tive and adjudicative functions and providing for judicial review 
of adjudicative action in the event of adverse decision or failure 
to act, would appear to be reasonable and practicable. In addi-
tion, the confusion, alluded to above, of possible denial of any 
hearing whatsoever in cases of legislative determination of adju-
dicative questions, 768 would be obviated to the benefit of individu-
al safeguards and the enhancement of the limitation doctrine in 
the local context. 
3. Judicial Review 
a. Introduction 
Judicial review as a limitation upon arbitrary administra-
tive action at the local governing level should naturally have 
proven somewhat more salutary as an individual safeguard than 
767. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332 
(1934). 
768. Supra notes 733-34, and accompanying text. 
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has its legislative counterpart. As indicated above,769 continuing 
legislative oversight, as contrasted with the more circumscribed 
prospective legislative limitation of predetermining the premises 
of local action, 770 is of minimal value only in constraining the 
caprice of municipal officials. 
Additionally, of course, the internal check of general, limit-
ing legislation prescribing certain rules of procedure, compliance 
with which is said to constitute a condition to the validity of the 
administrative action of federal and some state officers, 771 ap-
pears unavailable as a safeguard in the local context.772 In con-
sequence, the concept of limited government would appear to re-
quire, all the more, that recourse to the courts be made availa-
ble as an external check upon the administrative process. 
Such is not to suggest, however, that judicial review is ac-
corded as a matter of right to anyone wishing to object to local 
administrative action. Indeed, as was indicated in the sections on 
licensing773 and special assessments, 774 the significance of this 
safeguard may, in many instances, appear somewhat nebulous, or, 
on occasion, even nugatory. The disinclination of many courts to 
consider the question of the necessity of a special assessment to 
be a justiciable issue within the proper ambit of judicial pur-
view775 will be recalled by way of illustration. Nevertheless, ow-
ing perhaps to the practical impotence of legislative oversight and 
the unavailability of general procedural legislation on the model 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, the doctrine of judicial re-
. view has retained, on balance, a good deal more vitality as a 
limitation upon municipal administration than it now possesses at 
the higher governing levels.776 
b. Availability of Review 
The availability of judicial review respecting action by local 
administrative officials is, as is the case in the federal and state 
contexts, predicated, in the first instance, upon the requirement 
769. Supra notes 681-91, and accompanying text. 
770. Supra notes 693-96, and accompanying text. 
771. Supra notes 99-124, 160-62, and accompanying text. 
772. Supra notes 686-91, and accompanying text. 
773. Supra· notes 310-12, 323, 325-28, and accompanying text. 
774. Supra notes 497-99, and accompanying text. 
775. Ibid. 
776. On the declining significance of judicial review as a limitation upon 
federal and state administration, see Cooper, supra note 729, at 
305-15. 
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of standing. In order to gain access to the courts, the objecting 
party must be "aggrieved" in the sense of ascertainable and es-
pecial injury to himself or his property. 777 By way of illustra-
tion, a property owner required to contribute to an improvement 
to be financed by a special assessment, is affected in the amount 
of the exaction imposed, and, therefore, has standing to attack 
the assessment either in toto (e.g., as not being "public" in na-
ture778) or in its specific application to him (e.g., as being out 
of relation to the benefit he receives779). On the other hand, the 
existence of standing is not confined to the party directly before 
the local agency. Third parties may be affected, for example, by 
the grant of a license or the award of a variance in a zoning 
case. Thus, a neighboring property owner who is opposed to the 
grant of a variance (e.g., to permit the exploitation of a brick 
kiln in a residential neighborhood) is said to be sufficiently "ag-
grieved" to maintain an action to have the variance set aside.780 
Usually, provision is made in the statute or ordinance for judi-
cial review by "aggrieved" persons;78l such, however, is not nec-
essary, for as stated by the Tennessee court: 
[A] court already has such power with respect to municipal 
ordinances without any Act of the Legislature giving it such 
power. . . . [T] he power to determine the reasonableness 
of a municipal ordinance is necessarily committed to the 
courts.782 , 
In addition to the requirement of standing, the availability 
of judicial redress is conditioned upon its prompt attainment. If 
a statutory time period is prescribed in which review must be 
sought (e.g., within twenty days of the administrative determina-
tion) the requirement is mandatory, and, as was seen with re-
gard to special assessments, the doors of the court closed to a 
party wishing to contest thereafter. 783 Further, even in the ab-
sence of a statutory appeal period, unreasonable delay in seeking 
judicial review may bar its availability due to laches. 784 Or 
777. E.g., Sengstock, Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area 
Problem 64 (1960). 
778. Supra notes 619-23, and accompanying text. 
779. Supra notes 624-31, and accompanying text. 
780. Cf. Pooley, Planning and Zoning in the United States 67 (1961). 
781. E.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-310 (Supp. 1962) (annexation). 
782. Witt v. Mccanless, 200 Tenn. 360, 369, 292 S.W.2d 392, 396 (1956). 
783. Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 121 Okla. 18, 247 Pac. 15 (1926). 
784. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Rahway, 3 N.J. Misc. 1105, 130 
Atl. 642 (1925). 
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judicial review may be precluded because of estoppel, due, for 
example, to acquiescence785 or acceptance of benefits.786 
A third general limitation upon the availability of judicial 
review at this level is the typical (but not universal 787) require-
ment of the exhaustion of administrative remedies. If, for ex-
ample, provision is made for appeal by unsuccessful applicants 
for liquor licenses to an appellate licensing board, judicial review 
is ordinarily unavailable pending compliance with the administra-
tive remedy.788 Exceptions exist in some instances, where, for 
example, the validity of the statute itself is at issue,789 or, in 
some jurisdictions, where two or more remedies are sought, e.g., 
damages and injunction, and the administrative remedy is confined 
to only one.790 Nevertheless, the general rule (in spite of con-
stant attacks on grounds that its result is "exhaustion of liti-
gants11791 rather than exhaustion of remedies) continues to be that, 
where administrative redress is prescribed, it must be sought 
and relief unforthcoming before judicial resort becomes available. 
Finally, judicial review may be specifically precluded by 
statute or ordinance. 792 Of course, every statutory attestation of 
administrative finality will not be binding upon the courts because 
some may offend prevailing notions of due process of law. 793 The 
difficulty with employing due process as a means of expanding the 
ambit of judicial accessibility, however, as has been said, con-
sists in its nebulous, uncertain character. 794 It does not, as does 
the Administrative Procedure Act, for example, guarantee judicial 
type hearing in all adjudicative cases under the Act. 795 Thus, 
though the very strength of the Constitution is said to reside in 
the elasticity of its substantive provisions, as a specific proced-
ural guarantee in a specific case, it may seem lacking. In 
785. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 105 N.W. 
563 (1905). 
786. City of Beggs v. Kelly, 110 Okla. 274, 238 Pac. 466 (1925). 
787. On the New Jersey exception to the majority view, see Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law Text 369-70 (1959). 
788. Supra note 305. 
789. Supra notes 306-07, and accompanying text. 
790. E.g., Texas Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root Const. Co., 246 
S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). 
791. E.g., Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. 
Rev. 775, 831 (1953). 
792. Cf. Town of Gulfport ex rel. C.J. Williamson & Co. v. Mendels, 
supra note 732, at 732, 174 So. at 9. 
793. Cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, supra note 742. 
794. See text at supra notes 91-94. 
795. APA §5. 
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addition, the great areas of legislative functions and the classifi- . 
cation of certain activities as privileges will be recalled as il-
lustrations of broad categories of administrative activity which 
may be deemed final without offense to the fourteenth amendment 
guarantee. 796 On the other hand, where the matter at issue is 
adjudicative (at least where a right and not a privilege is con-
cerned), due process will ordinarily supply the necessary lever-
age for judicial intervention, regardless of statutory protestations 
as to the finality of administrative action.797 
c. Scope of Review 
In general, local practice as to the scope of review follows 
the federal and state models. As was suggested with regard to 
review of state administration, however, some disparity does per-
sist at the lower levels, with respect, for example, to the sub-
stantial evidence rule and judicial review of administrative de-
terminations of questions of fact. The varying utilization of the 
constitutional and jurisdictional fact doctrines will be recalled by 
way of illustration. 798 With the caution of consulting local prac-
tice in a specific case, however, to ascertain such divergencies 
where they exist, the general scheme of local review consists in 
the familiar procedure of distinguishing questions of law from 
questions of fact, allowing full review in the former instance 799 
and confining its scope to the "substantial evidence"800 or "arbi-
trary and capricious" rules801 in the latter. 
Such attacks on the statute or ordinance as unreasonableness 
on its face (due process or statutory unreasonableness),802 im-
proper delegation or delegation without sufficient standards,803 or 
offense to the commerce clause,804 the equal protection provi-
sion,805 or the guarantees of freedom of speech or religion806 of 
796. Supra notes 730-39, and accompanying text. 
797. E.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Roosevelt County, 134 Mont. 355, 
332 P .2d 501 (1958). 
798. Supra notes 168-72, and accompanying text. 
799. E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 s. Ct. 762 (1941). 
800. Cf. Deane v. Board of Adjustment of Zoning Board, 172 Pa. Super. 
502, 94 A.2d 112 (1953). 
801. State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 75 
N.W.2d 780 (1956). 
802. Supra notes 373-77, and accompanying text. 
803. Supra notes 378-88, and accompanying text. 
804. Supra notes 389-92, and accompanying text. 
805. Supra notes 393-98, and accompanying text. 
806. Supra notes 399-404, and accompanying text. 
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the federal and/or state constitutions, are thus fully reviewable 
by the courts. To the same effect are arguments that the statute 
or ordinance in question is in conflict with other state or federal 
laws,807 and the proposition that actions taken under such statutes 
or ordinances are ultra vires and thus void as a matter of law. 808 
The rationale for full review in such instances is clear. Ques-
tions of law are traditionally matters of judicial competence; the 
idea of administrative expertise (said to justify the nonjudicial 
determinations characterizing the administrative process) is in-
applicable. 809 
Determination of questions of fact, on the other hand, goes 
to the essence of the administrative idea. The exercise of dis-
cretion (the very life blood of the administrative organism) is, of 
course, predicated upon the determination of factual questions, 
whether, for example, a particular applicant for an electrician's 
license is sufficiently well-qualified under the statute.810 To per-
mit complete judicial review would not only be duplicatory, time-
consuming and unnecessarily expensive, it would be at logger-
heads with the very justification for administrative agencies in 
the first place, i.e., that by their experience and expertise they 
can better judge such factual questions within their competence 
than can a court of general jurisdiction.811 
Such, however, is not to suggest that administrative deter-
minations in such event should be conclusive, at least where 
agency action is particularized {adjudicative) as opposed to gen-
eral (legislative) in effect. Rather, it is to suggest-and this is 
the general rule in local practice-that review is not complete, 
as in the case of questions of law, but is confined to the sub-
stantial evidence rule or to the consideration as to whether the 
administrative action "was so arbitrary and capricious as to con-
stitute a clear abuse of discretion." 812 
So strong, in fact, is judicial disinclination to interfere with 
administrative determinations of questions of fact that even clear 
statutory authorizations for such review have been eviscerated by 
judicial decision. Thus, a zoning statute which empowered the 
807. Supra notes 405-08, and accompanying text. 
808. Supra notes 615-18, and accompanying text. 
809. See generally, Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative Law, Cases ~d 
Comments 526-41 (4th ed. 1960). 
810. See generally, 9 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 233-35 (3d ed. 
1950). 
811. Supra note 809. 
812. State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, supra note 801, at 
522, 75 N.W.2d at 785-86. 
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court to "hear all pertinent evidence and determine the facts, and, 
upon the facts as so determined, annul such decision if found to 
exceed the authority of such board, or make such other decree 
as justice or equity may require," 813 was treated by the Massa-
chusetts court as follows: 
Both parties and the judge at the hearing seem to have 
treated this statute as practically substituting the court for 
the board of appeals ahd giving the court the same power 
to grant variances that the board possesses. We do not 
think that is the meaning of the statute .... We do not 
construe these words as opening up to the court the whole 
area of administrative discretion, contrary to all precedent. 
We construe them as requiring a decree according to law.814 
The law-fact dichotomy, however, is not quite so simple a 
formula in practice as it might appear in theory. The problem 
is that most questions in administrative law are mixed, containing 
elements of both law and fact.815 If, for example, a zoning or-
dinance sets out certain jurisdictional requirements to the grant 
of a variance, compliance is demonstrable by factual showing on 
the part of the applicant, but the fact that compliance is deemed 
jurisdictional injects a legal aspect into the question.816 In this 
event, the court, by deciding for itself whether to characterize 
the question as legal or factual, broadens or contracts its own 
scope of review. It, in effect, determines its own jurisdiction. 
Such is the "knife of policy" referred to by Dickinson in the quo-
tation employed earlier in this work.817 
Though difficulties persist, however, in application of the 
rule, the bifurcation of questions into legal and factual, allowing 
full review in the former and confining its scope to the "arbi-
trary capricious rule" in the latter, remains the majority view 
(at least in the language of the courts) on the scope of judicial 
review of local administrative determinations. 
d. Selecting a Cause of Action 
At the local level, as with the states,818 great variety per-
sists in the forms of action by which a party may contest the 
813. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40, §30 (1952), superseded by ch. 40A (1954). 
814. Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 556-
58, 120 N.E.2d 916, 917-18 (1954), 
815. See generally Isaacs, "The Law and the Facts," 22 Colum. L. Rev. 
1 (1922). 
816. Pooley, supra note 780, at 55-64. 
817. See text at supra note 137. 
818. See generally Davis, supra note 787, at 443-49. 
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validity of municipal administrative practice. As a rule, the old 
common law writ system obtains (generally by statutory enact-
ment) with the result that a contestant selects his remedy at his 
perU.819 Thus, if an assessment statute prescribes the remedy 
of appeal to aggrieved property owners, an action by way of 
certiorari will generally be dismissed.820 The difficulty is that 
when the aggrieved party finally ascertains his proper remedy, 
it may be too late; the statutory period for appeal may have 
elapsed, 821 or in the absence of such provision the party may be 
barred access to the courts due to laches.822 
The problem is magnified by the great variety of actions 
possible, embracing, for example, mandamus, quo warranto, 
certiorari, appeal, injunction, declaratory judgment, habeas cor-
pus, prohibition, money had and received, etc. Professor Davis 
described the situation as follows: 
For no practical reason, the remedies are plural. A car-
dinal principle, now and then erratically ignored, denies one 
method of review when another is adequate. The lines are 
moved about through discussions of such concepts as judi-
cial, nonjudicial, discretionary, and ministerial. These con-
cepts are acutely unfortunate not only because they defy 
definition but because of the complete folly of using any 
concepts whatever to divide one remedy from another. Noth-
ing is accomplished by holding that certiorari is the wrong 
method of reviewing nonjudicial action, that mandamus will 
not reach discretionary action, and that since neither certi-
orari nor mandamus is good for action which is both non-
judicial and discretionary, such as public utility rate fixing, 
the remedy is equitable, so that concepts such as irrepara-
ble injury fortuitiously come to life and may be decisive, 
even though those concepts would not affect certiorari or 
mandamus. The theory varies, and departures from the 
theory are commonplace. Thousands of cases try to draw 
lines. The more the cases the more the lines. The more 
the lines the more the confusion. Yet the litigant must la-
bel his pleading at his peril.823 
The result is, of course, that many cases fail to reach the 
merits, and that much judicial effort is directed to "the solution 
819. Cf. Lindquist v. City of Lindsborg, 165 Kan. 212, 193 P .2d 180 
(1948). 
820. The writ of certiorari is discretionary in any event, and the exis-
tence of another remedy would generally preclude its use anyway. 
821. Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, supra note 783. 
822. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Rahway, supra note 784. 
823. Davis, supra note 787, at 443. 
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of false problems."824 The judicial limitation, in such event, ap-
pears severely jeopardized, to the inevitable detriment of the 
premised individual safeguards. Such, nevertheless, constitutes 
the present practice as to modes of judicial review of municipal 
administrative action; 825 and the individual is thus constrained to 
scrutinize carefully the local statutes and decisions whereby to 
ascertain the proper avenue of access to the courts, the nominal 
guardians of his liberty. 
C. Rationale of the Chapter 
The design of this chapter, as has been indicated, has been 
to utilize the conceptual categories of administrative law as they 
have evolved in the federal and state contexts as a means of 
classifying and assessing the less organized and less coherent 
practices of municipal administrations. Specifically, the focus 
has been upon the operation (or its absence) of the principle of 
limitation as a means of restraining the arbitrary excesses of 
administrative government, and, complementally, the protection of 
individual rights in interaction therewith. 
Such, of course, constitutes a very large task, owing in no 
small part to the literally thousands of local governing units 
manifesting literally millions of administrative acts and practices. 
A comprehesive catalogue of local administrative law is, there-
fore, without the purview of this work; such, in fact, would seem 
impossible in a work of any size. Nevertheless, a relatively 
short work addressed to the ascertainable general patterns aris-
ing in this area would seem infinitely valuable for a number of 
reasons. 
In the first place, descriptive commentary of what is actu-
ally going on is valuable in its own right. Most of the concern 
in the field of administrative law is directed to the federal level. 
Nothing of the attention and publicity accruing to the Hector826 or 
Landis827 reports, for example, has appeared with regard to the 
administrative practices of local governments. The attention 
that is given to the subject in the treatises, on the other hand, 
is generally confined to the glib overgeneralization inherent in 
treating local and state practice as essentially co-extensive.828 
824. Ibid. 
825. Supra notes 314-51, 571-604, and accompanying text. 
826. Supra note 58. 
827. Supra note 57. 
828. E.g., Davis, supra note 818. 
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As has been seen with regard to such matters as the require-
ment of standards829 and the home rule limitation upon the ap-
plicability of general legislation to local procedure,830 however, 
the commingling is far from justified. 
Secondly, a brief statement of local practice would seem 
justified as constituting the requisite minor premise in any ef-
fort at improvement or correction of shortcomings that such ex-
position may reveal to exist. It takes no great feat of logic to 
demonstrate that before the public resources may be marshalled 
to ameliorate the deficiencies of the status quo, there must be 
accurate knowledge as to what such deficiencies may be. 
Finally, as has been emphasized, the principle of limitation 
has significance to local administration, no less than to that of 
federal anct state governments.831 Tyranny and arbitrariness (the 
very antithesis of an individual-oriented society) may, likewise, 
occur at the municipal level. Lord Bryce, it will be recalled, 
wrote that in our system of government it was, in fact, more 
likely to so occur.832 Yet, individual contact with government is 
most direct and its effects are most felt by the average citizen 
at the local level. Respect for government and responsible parti-
cipation in the democratic processes (so necessary to the proper 
functioning of our governmental system) are, as has been said, 
bred and nurtured here, at the grass roots. If through arbitrary 
disregard of individual rights by local administrators, disrespect 
is kindled instead, our system may not long endure. Disrespect, 
of course, is erosive in effect and readily transferable to higher 
governing levels, a heavy burden for any government to bear in 
these crucial times. A statement of just what local practice is, 
pinpointing, thereby, the scope of such limitations as currently 
exist upon municipal administration, and alternatively the extent 
of individual safeguards, would thus appear particularly useful not 
only from the analytical aspect of the extent to which practice 
diverges from theory in our system, but, additionally, as a nec-
essary starting point in any effort towards reform. 
829. Supra note 702, and accompanying text. 
830. Supra notes 687-90, and accompanying text. 
831. Supra notes 32-33, and accompanying text. 
832. Supra note 673. 
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A. Individual versus State 
The philosophical framework brooding beneath the specific 
scrutinies of this monograph is, of course, the age-old poser of 
the Individual versus the State.833 Stated broadly, its resolution 
in Western society has been sought in the abjuration of extremi-
ties. Rather than to pursue one end to the exclusion of the other, 
we have endeavored (though not always with success) to mesh, as 
harmoniously as possible, individual self-assertion with commu-
nity interest as interpreted and enforced by the state. Indeed, the 
very objective of law in our system is to effectuate a balance be-
tween the two.834 The individual is constrained, in the public or 
community interest, against undertaking certain activities pro-
scribed by the governing agent. On the other hand, the state is 
limited, by constitution or otherwise, both in the activities it may 
prohibit (and/or require) and in the procedures by which it may 
do so. Thus, from the perspective of the individual, the law in 
some instances is confining while in others it affords him as-
sistance. 
But the balance is a precarious one. Changing conditions 
tilt the fulcrum from this side to that, and then back again; on 
the one extremity, anarchy; on the other, despotism. The critical 
concern of our day is, of course, with the latter. As has been 
indicated, the well-nigh frenetic concern with security, both mili-
tary and social, has produced a gigantic governing mechanism in 
this country. Conditions have so required, and no suggestion is 
intended that the increase in size nor the proliferation of activi-
ties should or could have been otherwise. Indeed, to seek equi-
poise by requiring that government relinquish powers and activi-
ties in a grandiose program of self-atrophication is as ridiculous 
in this day and age as to counsel weight reduction by cutting off 
arms and legs. In either case, the technique suggested might ef-
fect the end sought, but at what price I 
833. See generally on this problem, Duguit, Law in the Modern State 
(1919). 
834. Cf. Potts v. Coe, 145 F .2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1944). 
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The necessity for big government is not grounds for a 
counsel of despair, nor for resorting only to the hope that the 
despot will be benevolent. This, in fact, is the whole point of 
the limitation doctrine as enunciated herein-individual ·rights and 
community interests as propounded and enforced by the state can 
be balanced other than quantitatively. This, as has been said 
(and, it is hoped, to some extent demonstrated) is the aspiration 
of administrative law. Recognizing the indispensability of big 
government, its mission, in effect, is "to govern the governors," 
to accord the counterweight to government power. 
B. Form and Substance 
Theoretically, at least, the rule of limitation has signifi-
cance to all three levels of government in this country. The ex-
ercise of power can be arbitrary and capricious regardless of 
the geographical area affected. Furthermore, government is de-
signed, in our system, to be the servant, not the master, of the 
people. And, this is true regardless of whether its particular 
manifestation be federal, state, or local in scope. Thus, the 
limiting objectives of administrative law have application to mu-
nicipal administration, no less than to its counterparts at the 
higher governing levels. 
As has been seen, however, the specific embodiments of 
the limitation principle manifest different forms at each of the 
three levels of government. The requirement of standards, all 
but emasculated as a check upon federal administration, retains 
somewhat more vitality in the states and is of great consequence 
locally. On the other hand, procedural checks (or, alternatively, 
individual safeguards) imposed by general legislation have re-
placed the need for strict standards at the federal level. The 
states, it will be recalled, stand somewhere in between; where 
procedural statutes of the nature of the Administrative Procedure 
Act are in operation, the requirement of standards is corres-
pondingly mitigated. Where no such acts exist, the requirement 
remains of importance. 
The form, therefore, is not the crucial concern. The sub-
stance of restraint is volatile and capable of many shapes. The 
important thing is that limitation, whether in the guise of the 
separation of powers, administrative procedure acts, an expanded 
scope of judicial review, or whatever, be affirmatively employed 
to prevent the exercise of arbitrary, unrestrained power. Gov-
ernment, it cannot be emphasized enough, is the agent of the in-
dividual, not his principal. 
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Such is by no means to suggest that the government should 
be hamstrung with restrictions to the point of rendering its prop-
er operation impossible. The needs of defense and service re-
quire a vigorous, positive governmental mechanism. This is to 
suggest, however, that the fundamental basis of our governmental 
philosophy-the inherent worth of the individual, that the very ob-
jective of government is to protect and promote his self-attain-
ment and realization-be not submerged in the murky waters of 
a "Garrison-Service State." Balance there must be, but with 
power should go limitation, else power is corrupted and the pur-
pose of its giving, prostituted beyond recognition. 
C. Realigning the Balance 
The gargantuan rise of big government (federal, state, and 
local) as has been said, has represented a necessary response 
to the conditions of the times. And, new needs, in turn, generate 
argument as to the utility of the time-honored governmental con-
cepts erected in days when needs were simpler and problems less 
severe. Thus, to some observers the political models attendant 
at the incipiency of our nation should be scrapped, as inadequate 
to cope with the realities of the twentieth century .835 Others, 
seeking in the traditions of the past security in these troubled 
times, cling tenaciously to the ancient theories, regarding even 
the slightest question as to their current applicability to be an 
assault on everything they hold dear and precious.836 
The point is that the modes of limitation are but means of 
actualizing the substance of the limitation doctrine itself. The 
central objective, in this context, is that government be "for the 
people." If this means that modern conditions compel that the 
separation of powers idea be obviated as regards federal admin-
istrative agencies, and a general act prescribing procedural lim-
itations be constructed in its place, no great deviation would ap-
pear to be required as to ends, as to fundamental theories of our 
governmental complex. Limited government is still the goal and 
is still achievable. Only its form has been altered, more ade-
quately to adjust to the realities of the times. This, as indi-
cated, is, likewise, the direction of state development. 
Municipal administration, however, which never embraced 
fully the separation idea to begin with, has evolved differently. 
835. Cf. Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism," 97 New Republic 
367 (May 3, 1939). 
836. Cf. Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative (1960). 
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from obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision. If 
under the terms of the statute or ordinance governing the pro-
cedure before an administrative agency an administrative decision 
becomes final because of failure to file any qocument in the na-
ture of objections, protests, petition for hearing, or application 
for administrative review within the time allowed by such statute 
or ordinance, such decision shall not be subject to judicial re-
view hereunder excepting only for the purpose of questioning the 
jurisdiction of the administrative agency over the person or sub-
ject matter. 
Section 3. [ Comlll_encement of Action.] 
(1) Every action to review a final administrative decision 
shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance 
of summons within thirty days from the date that a copy of the 
decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affect-
ed thereby. 
(2) The method of service of the decision shall be as pro-
vided in the statute or ordinance governing the procedure before 
the administrative agency, but if no method is provided, a deci-
sion shall be deemed to have been served either when personally 
delivered or when deposited in the United States mail, in a 
sealed envelope or package, with postage prepaid, addressed to 
the party affected thereby at his last known residence or place 
of business. 
Section 4. [ Jurisdiction and Venue.] 
(1) Jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions is 
vested in the. • . • . . • . . . . . [Insert name of appropriate 
Court.] If the venue of the action to review a final administra-
tive decision is expressly prescribed in the particular statute or 
ordinance under authority of which the decision was made, such 
venue shall control, but if the venue is not so prescribed, an ac-
tion to review a final administrative decision may be commenced 
in the County Court in which the relevant Municipal Corporation 
is situated. 
Section 5. [Service of Summons.] 
(1) Summons issued in any action to review the final ad-
ministrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served 
by registered or certified mail on the administrative agency and 
each of the defendants as in civil cases. 
Section 6. (Appearance of Defendants.] 
(1) In any action to review any final decision of any ad-
ministrative agency, the agency shall appear by filing an answer 
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consisting of a record of the proceedings had before it, or a 
written motion in the cause or a written appearance. All other 
defendants may appear by filing a written motion, answer or ap-
pearance. 
(2) Every motion, answer or appearance shall be filed with-
in twenty days after service of summons upon said defendant. 
Section 7. [ Defendants.] 
(1) In any action to review any final decision of an admin-
istrative agency, the administrative agency and all persons, other 
than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings 
before the administrative agency shall be made defendants. 
Section 8. [Pleadings and Record on Review.] 
(1) Complaint. The complaint shall contain a statement of 
the decision or part thereof sought to be reviewed, as well as the 
grounds upon which the complaint seeks reversal or affirmative 
action. Upon motion of any defendant, or upon its own motion, 
the court may require of the plaintiff a specification of the errors 
relied upon for reversal or the specific grounds upon which af-
firmative agency action is sought to be required. 
(2) Answer. Except as herein otherwise provided, the ad-
ministrative agency shall file an answer which shall consist of 
the original or a certified copy of the entire record of proceed-
ings under review, including such evidence as may have been 
heard by it and the findings and decisions made by it. By order 
of court or by stipulations of all parties to the review, the rec-
ord may be shortened by the elimination of any portion thereof. 
(3) Record after Remand. If the cause is remanded to the 
administrative agency and a review shall thereafter be sought of 
the administrative decision, the original and supplemental record, 
or so much thereof as shall be determined by court order or the 
stipplation of all the parties, shall constitute the record on review. 
Section 9. [Scope of Review.] 
(1) Every action to review any final administrative decision 
shall be heard and determined by the court with all convenient 
speed. 
(2) The hearing and determination shall extend to all ques-
tions of law presented by the entire record before the court. If 
the agency has afforded to the affected party an opportunity to 
present testimony, questions of fact may be overturned only in 
the event of patently arbitrary and capricious agency action. 
Where no such opportunity to present testimony has been afford-
ed, questions of fact are fully reviewable. 
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Section 10. [Powers of the Court.] 
(1) The Court shall have power: 
(a) with or without requiring bond, and before or after 
answer is filed, upon notice to the agency and for good cause 
shown, to stay the decision of the administrative agency in whole 
or in part pending the final disposition of the case; 
(b) to make any order that it deems proper for the 
amendment, completion, or filing of the record of proceedings of 
the administrative agency; 
(c) to allow substitution of parties by reason of mar-
riage, death, bankruptcy, assignment, or other cause; 
(d) to dismiss parties or to realign plaintiffs and defend-
ants; 
(e) to affirm or reverse the decision in whole or in 
part; 
(f) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to re-
verse and remand the decision in whole or in part, and, in such 
case, to state the questions requiring further hearing or proceed-
ings, and to give such other instructions as may be proper; 
(g) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to re-
mand for the purpose of taking additional evidence when from the 
state of the record of the administrative agency or otherwise it 
shall appear that such action is just; 
(h) in case of affirmance or partial affirmance of an ad-
ministrative decision which requires the payment of money, to 
' enter judgment for the amount justified by the record and for 
costs, upon which execution may issue as in other cases. 
(2) Technical errors in the proceedings before the admin-
istrative agency or its failure to observe the technical rules of 
evidence shall not constitute grounds for reversal of the admin-
istrative decision unless it appears to the court that such error 
or failure materially affected the rights of any party and resulted 
in substantial injustice to him. 
(3) On motion of either party, the court shall make findings 
of fact or state the propositions of law upon which its judgment 
is based. 
Section 11. [Appellate Review.] 
(1) Any final decision, order, judgment, or decree entered 
pursuant hereto may be appealed as in other civil cases. 
Section 12. [Effective Date.] 
(1) The provisions of this Act are applicable only to such 
actions as may arise after the effective date hereof. 
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ADM!NISTRA TIVE Federal Model Ariz. Cal. Colo. !II. lnd. Md. RULE-MAK!NG Act State Act 
1~ Definitions 11001 1 41-1001, 11371; 3-16-1 264.l 2 244 
12-901 11500 
"Agency" § lOOl(a) 1(1) 41-1001, 1137l(a); 3-16-1 264.1 2 244(a) 
12-901 11500 
11Rule11 or "Regulation'' § lOOl(c) 1(7) 41-1001 1137l(b); 3-16-1 266.3 - 244(b) 
ll500 
''Contested case• or §IOOl(d) 1(2) 41-1001 1137l(c); 3-16-1 264.l 2 244(c) 
similar term 11500 
a. Requirements for §1003 3 41-1002 11374; 3-16-2 - 245 
adoption of rules 11420 
Formal & informal - 3 - - - - 245{a) 
procedure 
To supplement rules § 1002(a) 3 - - 245(b) 
with descriptive 
statements 
Prior to adoption to i 1003 3(a) 41-1002 11423 3-16-2 - - 245(0) 
give notice of intended (3)(4) 
action and afford hear-
tng to interested 
parties 
3. FU!ng and tal,;ing i I003(c) 4 41-1004, 11380; - - 246 
effect of rules 41-1006 11422 
Effective upon filing - - - - 246(b) 
Effective after no. of 30 da. 20 da. - 30 da. - - - -
days after filing 
Emergencies or exceptions - 4(b)(2) 41-1003 114Zl(b) - - -
4. Publication of rules H002 5 41-1006 11409 3-16-2 - 247 
(11) 
By Sec. of State - 5(a) 41-1006 11409 - - 247(a) 
Perfod\o Bulletin fol' I 1002{a) 5(b) - 11409 - - 247(b) 
new rule.a 
Discretion to omit - 5(c) - 11409 - - 247(c) 
some if otherwise 
available 
Periodic re vis ion - 5(a) - - - - 247(a) 
Availability of compUa- 11002(1,) 5(d) 41-1006 11382.5; 3-16-2 - - 241(d) 
tions. & bulletins 11409.5 (9)(11) 
5. Petition for adoption of §1003(d) s - 11426 3-16-2 - - 248 
rulea (7) 
Any interested person §1003(d) 6 - 11426 3-16-2 - - 248 
may petition (7) 
Reconsideration - 6 - - - - -
6. Additional :requirements - 2 - - - -
for clearance 
Approval of Att'y Gen. - - - - - -
as to form & legality 
before rule effective 
Legislative review - - - - -
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Mass. Mich. Minn. Mo. N.D, Ohio Ore. Pa. Va. Wis. 
Model 
Mun.Act 
1 24.101 15 .0411 536,010 28.3201 119.01 183.310 1710.2 9-6.2 227 .01 1 
1(2) 24.101 15.0411 536.010 28.3201 119.01 183.310 1710.2b 9-6.2 227 .01 1(1) 
1(5) 24.101 15.0411 536.010 28.3201 119.01 183.310 1710.2e 9-6.2 227 .01 -
1(1) 24.101 15.0411 536.010 - 119.01 1&3.310 1710.2a 9-6.2 227 .01 -
2, 3 24.102 15.0412 - - 119.03 183.330 - 9-6.4 - -
9 24.102 15.0412 - - - 183.330 - - - -
6 - 15.0412 - - - 183.330 - 9-6.3 - -
3(2), 2(1) - 15.0412 - - 119.03 183.330 1710.21 9-6.4; - -
9-6.6 
5 24.72 15.0412, 536.020 28.3203 119.04 183.350 1710.21 9-6.7 227 .023 -
13 
5 24.74 15.0413 - 28.3203 - - - 9-6.7(c) 227 .026 -
- - - 10 da. - 10 da. 10 da. - - 227 .026 -
2(3), 3(3) 24.75 - 536.020 - 119.03 - - 9-6.5 227 .026 -
6 24.76 15.0414; 536.030 28.3203 119.05 183.360 1710.21a 9-6. 7(b) 227 .025 -
15.047 
6 24.76 15.046 536.030 - - 183.360 1710.21a - 227 .025; -
227 .024 
- 24.76 15.047 536.030 - - 183,360 - - - -
- - 15.0414; - - - 183.360 - - - -
15.047 
- 24.76 15 .0414 536.030 - - 183.360 - - - -
6 24.78 15.047; 536.030 28.3203 119.05 183.360; 1710.21a - - -
15.0414 183.370 
4 24.103 15.0415 536.041 - - 183.390 - 9-6.8 227 .015 -
4 24.103 15.0415 536.040 - - 183.390 - 9-6.8 227 .015 -
- - - - 28.3204 - - - - - -
- 24. 72 - - 28.3202 - - 1710.21 9-6.9 - -
- 24.72 15.0412 - 28.3202 - - 1710.21 - - -





ADMINISTRATIVE Federal Model Ariz. Cal. Colo. Ill. Ind, Md. ADJUDICATION Act State Act 
1. Declaratory judgment on I 1009(b)(d) 7 41-1007 11440 - - - 249 
validity of rules by 
court 
2. Petition for agency §1004(d) 8 - - - - - 250 
declaratory ruling 
3. Duty of agency in § 1004 9 - 11512 3-16-4 - 3 251 
contested cases 
Notice to party § 1004(a) 9(a)-(b) - 11509 3-16-14(2) - 5,6 251 
Hearing before agency §1004(a) 9(a) - 11508 3-16-4(3) - 5,6 251 
Agency to prepare - 9(e) - - - - 9 251 
official record 
Informal disposition, § 1004(b) 9(d) - - - - 4 251 
settlement, etc. 
4. Rules of evidence § 1006 10 - 11513 3-16-4(7) - 7,8 252 
Effect given to evidence §1006(c) 10(1) - 11513 - - 8 252(a) 
of probative value 
Based on evidence in § 1006(d) - - 11517 3-16-4(8) - 8 252(b) 
record 
Right to cross examine § 1006(c) 10(3) - 11513 3-16-4(7) - 8 252(c) 
and to submit rebuttal 
"Official notice" § 1006(d) 10(4) - 11513 3-16-4(8) - - 252(d) 
5. Examination of evidence· § 1007 11 - 11517 - - 12 253 
by agency, if agency 
has not heard or read 
all the evidence: Pro-
12:Qsed decision (must 
be served and oppor-
tunity afforded party 
to submit exceptions 
and arguments) 
6. Decisions and orders I 1006(d) 12 - 11518 - - - 254 
must be in writing. 
and parties notified in 
person or by mail 
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Mass. Mich. Minn. Mo. N.D. Ohio Ore. Pa. Va. Wis. 
Model 
Mun. Act 
7 - 15.0416 536.050 - - 183.400 - 9-6.9(a) 227 .05 -
8 - - - - - 183.410 - - 227 .06 -
10 24.104 15.0418 536.063; 67 28.3205 119.06 183.420 1710.31 9-6.10 227 .07 -
10,11 24.104 15.0418 536.067 28 .3205 119.07 183.420 1710.31 9-6.10 227.09 -
10,11 24.104 15.0418 536.063 28.3205 119.07 183.420 1710.31 9-6.10 227.07 -
11(6) 24.104 15.0418 536.063; 67 28.3206 119.09 183.420 1710.31 - 227.11 -
- 24.104 15.0418 536.060 - - 183.420 - - - -
11(2) 24.105 15.0419 536.070 28.3206 119.09 183.450 1710.32 9-6.11 227 .10 -
11(2) 24.105(1) 15.0419 536.070 28.3206 - 183.450 1710.32 9!-.6.11 227 .10(1) 
11(4) 24.105(2) 15.0419 536.070 28 .3206 - 183.450 - 9-6.ll(d) - -
11(3) 24.105(3) 15.0419 536.070 28.3207 119.09 183.450 1710.32 9-6.ll(c) - -
11(5) 24.105(4) 15.0419 536.070 28.3207 - 183 .450 - - 227 .10(3) -
11(7) 24.106 15.0421 536.080 - 119.09 183.460 - - 227.12 -
11(8) 24.107 15.0422 536.090 28.3212 119.09 183.470 1710.34 9-6.12 227 .13 -
- - - - - 119.09 - - - - -
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APPENDIX m 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF Federal Model 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION Act State Act 
Ariz. Cal. Colo. Ill. Ind. Md. 
Initial Judicial Review §1009 15 12-904 11440; 3-16-5 265.2 14 255 
11523 
1. Any person aggrieved § 1009(a) 15(a) 12-904 11523 3-16-5(3) 267.4 14 255(a) 
by final agency action 
entitled to 
2. Time party has to - 30 da. 35 da. 30 da. - 35 da. 15 da . 30 da. 
institute court review 
3. Time allowed agency - 30 da. - 30 da. - - - 30 da. 
to submit record to 
court 
4. Filing of petition for § 1009(d) 15(c) 12-911 11519 3-16-5(5) 275.12(a) 17;26 255(c) 
review not to stay 
agency decision, but it 
may be granted 
5. Conditions for presenting - 15(e) 12-910 - 3-16-5(6) 274.11; 15 255(e) 
additional evidence 275.12 
6. Court review to be - 15(!) - - - - 18 255(!) 
without jury and con-
fined to record except 
for procedural irregu-
lartties 
7. What action court may § 1009(e) 15(g) 12-911 - 3-16-5(7) 274.11 18 255(g) 
take: 
a) Affirm or remand to - 15(g) 12-911 - 3-16-5(7) 275.12 18 255(g) 
agency 
b) Reverse or modify - 15(g) - - 3-16-5(7) 275.12 18 255(g) 
If substantial rights 
of the party are 
prejudiced because the 
administrative action 
(1) Violates constitu- § 1009(e) 15(g)(l) - - 3-16-5(7) - 18 255(g)(l) 
tion 
(2) Exceeds statute or §1009(e) 15(g)(2) - - 3-16-5(7) - 18 255(g)(2) 
agency jurisdiction 
(3) Is made on unlaw- § 1009(e) 15(g)(3) - - 3-16-5(7) - 18 255(g)(3) 
ful procedure 
(4) Involves other § 1009(e) 15(g)(4) - - 3-16-5(7) - - 255(g)(5) 
error of law 




in view of entire 
record 
(6) Is arbitrary and § 1009(e) 15(g)(6) - - 3-16-5(7) - 18 255(g)(8) 
capricious 
Appellate Review I 1009(d) 16 12-913 - 3-16-5(7) 276.13 19 256 
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APPENDIX In (Cont'd) 
Mass. Mich. Minn. Mo. N.D. Ohio Ore. Pa. Va. Wis. Model Mun.Act 
7; 14 24.108 - 536.100 28.3215 119.11; 183.480 1710.41 9-6.13 227 .15 1-10 
119.12 
14 24.108(1) - 536.100 28.3215 119.11 183.480 1710.41 9-6.13 227.16 1(2) 
30 da. 30 da. - 30 da. 30 da. 15 da. 60 da. 30 da. 30 da. 30 da. 30 da. 
40 da. 30 da. - 30 da. 30 da. 10 da. 30 da. 30 da. 30 da. 30 da. 20 da. 
14(3) - - 536.120 28.3220 119.11; 183.480 1710.43 9-6.13(h) 227.17 lO(l)(a) 
119.12 
14(7) 24.108(4) - 536.130(3) 28.3218 119.12 183.480 - 9-6.13(1) 227.19 9(2) 
14(6) 24.108(5) - 536.140(1) 28.3219 119.12 183.480 1710.44 9-613(1) 227.20 -
14 24.108(6) 15.0417 536.140(5) 28.3219 119.12 183.480 1710.44 9-6.13(g) 227.20 10 
14(8) 24.108(6) 15.0417 536.140(5) 28.3219 119,12 183.480 1710.44 9-6.13{g) 227.20 lO(l)(e) 
14(8) 24.108(6) 15.0417 536.140(5) 28.3219 119.12 183.480 1710.44 9-6.13{g) 227 .20 lO(l)(e); 
10(1)(1) 
14(8)(a) 24.108(6) 15.0417 536.140(2) 28.3219 - - 1710.44 9-6.13{g) 227 .20 -
14(8)(h) 24.108(6) 15.0417 536.140(2) 28.3219 119.12 - 1710.44 9-6.13{g) 227 .20 -
14(8){d) 24.108(6) 15.0417 536.140(2) 28.3219 - - 1710.44 9-6.13{g) 227.20 -
14(8)(c) 24.108(6) - 536.140(2) 28.3219 - - - 9-6.13(g) 227.20 9(2) 
14(8)(e) 24.108(6) - 536.140(2) 28.3219 119.12 - 1710.44 9-6.13(g) 227.20 -
14(8)(g) 24.108(6) - 536.140(2) - - - - 9-6.13{g) 227 .20 9(6) 
15; 16 24.109 - 526.140 (6) 28.3221 119.12 183.500 1710.45; 9-6.14 227.21 11 
1710.46 
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